European Governance of Migration
DOSSIER
migrantas has been working on projects related to migration, identity and dialogue between different cultures. Their projects combine tools from the social sciences, graphic design and the visual arts to create a reflection of the migrant condition. Through their projects migrantas aim to make visible in urban space the feelings and experiences of those living in a new country.

The dossier including its individual articles is published under a Creative Commons Licence. The work may be copied, distributed and transmitted under the following conditions:

- Attribution — You must name the author and the licensor (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung) as well as the URL of the work.
- Noncommercial — You may not use this work and its contents for commercial purposes.
- No Derivative Works — You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work or its contents.

Any of the above conditions can be waived by permission from the licensor.

Please read the full binding legal code at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/legalcode (in German).

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission.

This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
# Content

## Introduction 4

## Challenges & Concepts 5

STEFFEN ANGENENDT  
The Future of European Migration Policy - Motivations, Obstacles, and Opportunities 6

UMBERTO MELOTTI  
Migratory policies and political cultures in Europe: Is there something new? 9

JAKOB VON WEIZSÄCKER  
Strait is the gate - New priorities for European immigration policy 18

BERND HEMINGWAY  
EU Migration Governance Initiatives: The Involvement of the IOM 25

MICHELE WUCKER  
Security, Protectionism & Liberalization of Labour Markets - Goal Conflicts in the Governance of Migration 30

THOMAS HUDDLESTON  
From principles to policies: Creating an evidence base for a European approach to migration management 32

## Migration & the Labour Market 38

JAMES WICKHAM  
A skilled migration policy for Europe? Issues and problems 39

MARIA MORA AND EMANUELE GALOSSI  
Employment Discrimination against Migrant workers in the Italian labour market 42

## Migration & Development 45

JEFF DAYTON-JOHNSON, DENIS DRECHSLER AND JASON GAGNON*  
Migration Management: The Developing Countries’ Perspective 46

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN AND K. C. ZACHARIAH  
Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience 53

ODED STARK  
Toil and Tolerance: A Tale of Illegal Migration 59

HANS WERNER MUNDT  
Migration and Development 63

## Forced Migration, Resettlement & Asylum 65

JEAN-Pierre CASSARINO  
Empowered Maghreb countries’ Responsiveness to the Cooperation on Readmission with EU Member States 66

DON J. DEVORETZ  
Profiling at the Canadian Border: An Economist’s Viewpoint 69

DORIS PESCHKE  
Sharing Responsibility - Resettling Refugees 75
Introduction

Within the borders of the European Union the freedom of movement for both EU citizens as well as the transportation of capital, goods and services is more prevalent than ever before.

Outside of Europe, many individuals are enjoying the effects of globalization on mobility especially the highly qualified and educated. The paradox is that as some become more mobile, others are being shut out as security issues are prioritized and border control is strengthened. Within the European Union this tendency is also coupled with inconsistent migration policies that do not necessarily serve the best interests of the EU member states. Demographic changes, mainly the aging and decreasing population within Europe demonstrate the need for immigrant to fulfill the demands of the labour markets. Yet current policies make it difficult for many immigrants to gain access to European labour markets. The consequence is that many EU member states can not fill their labour markets.

Within the public debate the positive potential of immigration is often overlooked. Instead, it is treated as an "imminent threat". Due to insufficient policies and the neglect of humanitarian obligation, the European Union is becoming less and less of a safe harbour for refugees. There are policy problems around the topic of illegal migration, which is developing into a severe humanitarian and political crisis.

Reaching an agreement on common, coherent and comprehensive asylum and migration policy for the European Union unfortunately still requires great amounts of work. Labour migration is particularly an area upon which many European governments have not reached a consensus. The only areas in which a strong collaboration is apparent are the restriction of asylum policies, and in the coordinated protection of the European Union borders. The current state of European migration policy does not meet the humanitarian, economic and political needs of the population.

This dossier complements the international conference European Governance of Migration, which took place in September 2008 in Berlin.

Olga Drossou
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Ellen Falk
editor dossier
Europe faces major migration policy challenges. In many regions of the world, the pressure to emigrate is increasing, and more people than ever are attempting to escape political violence, oppression, lack of economic prospects and environmental changes and seeking a better future for themselves and their families in the EU member states. At the same time, due to aging and shrinking European populations, the need for immigration is growing. To date, however, there is no societal or political consensus on the management of this migration and the growing ethnic and cultural diversity. Uncertainty prevails in regard to the number of immigrants that are needed or wanted, the tools to be used to guide this migration, and the ways in which immigrants should be integrated.

What issues and problems should a European migration policy address? How can a common coherent European migration policy be developed?

- In the policy paper commissioned by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Steffen Angenendt analyses the state of the current European migration policies and suggests principles for a common coherent migration policy in Europe.
- Umberto Melotti compares the immigration policies in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy to demonstrate a recent tendency towards a more common migration policy.
- Jakob von Weizsäcker identifies high-skilled immigration, irregular migration, and asylum as the main concerns and challenges of a European migration policy and formulates policy recommendations.
- Bernd Hemingway discusses the role of the International Organization of Migration in global migration, highlighting its involvement in the governance of European migration.
- Michele Wucker illustrates the consequences of conflicting policies which affect migrants’ lives in the sending as well as receiving countries.
- Thomas Huddleston discusses the MIPEX project as a means to evaluate European migration policies and illuminate aspects of policy impacts.
Europe faces major migration policy challenges. In many regions of the world, the pressure to emigrate is increasing, and more people than ever are attempting to escape political violence, oppression, lack of economic prospects and environmental changes and seeking a better future for themselves and their families in the EU member states. At the same time, due to aging and shrinking European populations, the need for immigration is growing. To date, however, there is no societal or political consensus on the management of this migration and the growing ethnic and cultural diversity. Uncertainty prevails in regard to the number of immigrants that are needed or wanted, the tools to be used to guide this migration, and the ways in which immigrants should be integrated.

These national uncertainties add up at the European level. In addition, member states still differ considerably, despite growing similarities, with regard to their immigration histories, the extent and structure of immigration, and countries of origin of their immigrants. Reaching an agreement on a common migration policy is therefore difficult.

Nevertheless, over ten years ago, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the member states already agreed upon a common migration policy. Since then, numerous immigration projects have begun, with completion progressing at different rates. Great advancements have been made towards a common policy on asylum and on joint control of the EU’s external borders - with agreement in each case on the restrictive elements of the common policy. However, in regard to the management of immigration, especially labour migration, the governments have been unable to agree upon a common policy. This is where the fear of losing the national capacity to act is most pronounced: for many governments, the decision on who should be allowed to immigrate, under what conditions, and for what reasons, continues to be a core aspect of national sovereignty and state governance.

The member states will not be able to afford such hesitation much longer; the pressure of the problem is increasing too quickly. It can be expected that common asylum and migration policy will remain a balancing act: on the one hand, national powers must be protected, because only in this way can policy do justice to the major differences between national, regional and local levels in the EU. On the other hand, due to the common European Single Market, the EU member states must agree upon a binding legal framework for immigration and common concepts and tools. Only then can they achieve a coherent, efficient and legitimate asylum and migration policy.

An analysis of current migration trends in the member states, the potential for migration from areas neighboring the EU, the challenges and opportunities connected with migration movements, and the development and current state of European migration policy, allows identification of many thematic areas that the governance of European migration policy must urgently address.

In principle, it must now be understood that there is no alternative to more intensive European cooperation. A problem-oriented, realistic European migration policy must anticipate the economic and demographic need for immigration, frame socially acceptable immigration policies, consider obligations to international humanitarian law and the European states’ integration into world politics, and offer a contribution to the fight against the causes of forced migration.

EU humanitarian aid and development cooperation must aim more directly at these issues.; member states must further develop international protections for refugees and improve the financial, infrastructural and personnel capacities of international governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in this work.

In order to achieve this, coherent and comprehensive approaches must be pursued in migration and asylum policy. Coherency in this context means three things:

- Collaborative policies need to be established at different levels of government (federal, regional and local), in which civil society (especially non-governmental organizations) is included (vertical coherence).
- Steering tools in different political fields need to be combined; that is, migration policy tools must be more closely linked with the tools of foreign, devel-
opment, social, and economic policies (horizontal coherence).

- EU member states need to develop and pursue common goals, on the basis of ideas about burden-sharing and solidarity (inner coherence). In addition, in its "Global Approach to Migration," the member states determined that an overall policy should include not only a reduction in irregular migration, but also long-term solutions for refugees and better management of legal migration.

The current European asylum and migration policy is still far from such a coherent and broad policy. What predominates is still an ad hoc policy that is uncoordinated, partially contradictory, not very strategic, and yields to short term necessities. In order to make progress toward a common policy, the coherency on all three levels must be improved.

In designing future policy, the following principles should be central:

- Recognition of the shortcomings of previous management tools: In most of the EU member states, the regulations on labor migration lack transparency, legitimacy and efficiency. They are usually the result not of strategic planning, but of decades of reactions to current circumstances. National regulations are not designed to manage labor migration in such a way as to use its economic and social potential optimally. Also, the differences prevent member states from using the advantages of the EU market for recruitment - which becomes a disadvantage in regard to highly qualified immigrants, given the international competition. These shortcomings must be recognized.

- Demonstrate the need for a foreign work force: In many member states, fighting unemployment remains a central political topic, and many voters judge their government on its ability to handle this problem. This is true even when the government's possible courses of action are limited, given economic globalization and the political and economic integration of the EU. Public acceptance of new regulations for labor migration can only be achieved if the respective workers can be shown to be necessary and not to displace the domestic workforce.

- Make labor migration dependent on qualifications: The management of migration should begin with the qualifications of immigrants and should distinguish between three groups: There should be no immigration hurdles for highly qualified immigrants. A human capital oriented approach should be taken, a generous quota should be chosen, and they should be actively recruited. For skilled workers, in contrast, the danger of displacing the domestic work force exists. Here an approach should be chosen that depends on the labor market and permits immigration only if it can be shown that the need cannot be filled by the domestic workforce. For low-skilled workers, only short-term (though not one-time-only) job opportunities should be offered, with domestic workers again taking precedence.

- Consider future sources of immigration: Since the new EU member states will lose significance as sending countries due to previous emigration, economic growth and demographic development, the source of future labor migration should be considered now. Future potential lies in Africa and Asia. In order to use this effectively, strategic decisions and correspondingly broad agreements are necessary.

- Consider consequences for development policy: As part of labor migration, the ambivalent development policy outcomes for the sending countries must be considered. Options for improving the effects on development are already being discussed, for example by refraining from recruiting badly needed workers in sending countries (for example in the health care field) or easing remittances. In order to prevent the mistakes of earlier recruitment of guest workers, practices must be developed that ease the process of return for immigrants (reintegration programs) and counteract loss of qualifications while abroad (training and continuing education measures by businesses and governments).

- Strengthen integration efforts and develop concepts for temporary immigrants: Consequences must be drawn from the integration problems, especially in the second and third generations. In the early phase of recruitment of guest workers, no integration measures were taken in many countries. Today this mistake can only be offset with great effort, and often it does not succeed at all. Nevertheless, these shortcomings need to be fought with even greater effort than has been the case thus far, because none of the member states can afford, over the long term, to have a portion of its population that is marginalized (and growing). Integration measures cannot be limited to language teaching, but rather should aim to
improve opportunities on the job market, and particularly better access to the job market. Additionally, given the increasing significance of temporary migration, assistance in integrating these immigrants must be considered. So far, no such concepts exist for "temporary integration," but they are indispensable for a broad approach.

- Strengthen protection of refugees through managed migration: The fragmented and unsystematic migration policy of the member states and the lack of opportunities for legal immigration contribute to the abuse of asylum rights and the increase in irregular migration. The current proposal to reduce irregular migration by offering limited immigration quotas (mobility partnerships) should be tested as soon as possible. The number of pilot projects should be increased and all EU member-states should participate in them, since quotas that are too small will most likely have no measurable effect on irregular migration and the abuse of asylum rights. Protection of refugees, which currently barely exists, should be strengthened in the upcoming "second phase" of the EU asylum system; in particular, access to the asylum process should be improved. The EU member states should take their responsibility for international protection of refugees seriously and create new opportunities for the absorption of quota refugees, to avoid the destabilization of fragile countries in sending regions through mass exodus, which could itself contribute to refugee movements. In addition, EU member states should take in more refugees as part of resettlement programs by the UNHCR. All of these measures could contribute to a reduction in irregular migration, and they would strengthen the credibility of the EU, which it will need if it expects other countries to take in more refugees.

Reference

Dr. Steffen Angenendt is Senior Associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. Within the Global Issues Division he is responsible for research on demography, migration and security.
Umberto Melotti
Migratory policies and political cultures in Europe:
Is there something new?

In the last decade there was a considerable change in
the migration policies of the main European countries of
immigration. This was due, to a large extent, to the
process of globalisation, which, among other things,
has entailed a change in migration itself and in the
political cultures of the countries of immigration. But it
was also due to the development of the process of
Europeanization, which has exerted an important influ-
ence on the migration policies of the EU member
States.

To point out this change, it is useful to assess the rela-
tionships between the migration policies of the main
European countries of immigration and their political
cultures (where "political culture", in contrast with less
comprehensive views, defines the specific way State,
people and nation are conceived, ethnicity, nationality
and citizenship are perceived, and citizenship rights and
duties are recognized or attributed to native and non-
native people).

In fact, in any country, political culture has exerted an
important influence on both aspects of the migration
policies: the "entry policies", i.e. the norms and prac-
tices concerning the admission of foreigners, and the
"policies for the immigrants", i.e. the norms and prac-
tices meant to govern their presence there. To clarify
this point, I will briefly recall the close relationships
existing between France's political culture and its policy
of assimilation; Germany's political culture and its long-
standing tendency to keep immigrants in a precarious
condition, and Britain's political culture and its unequal
form of pluralism. Afterwards, I will focus on the situa-
tion in Italy, which is now the fourth country of immigra-
tion in Europe. Finally I will point out the increasing
influence of EU orientations on the migration policies of
its member States.

Immigration and political cultures in France,
Britain and Germany

As a strong centralized State that considers itself a
great homogeneous nation, France has regarded immi-
gration for a long time as an issue calling for a policy of
assimilation. This approach appeared to be quite natu-
ral in such a country, where immigration began as far
back as the first half of the nineteenth century and
played a major role in coping not only with recurrent
shortages of workers, but also with a chronic demo-
graphic crisis, which appeared to be dangerous even
for military reasons.

Immigrants, far from being allowed to use their ethnic
and cultural identity as a strategic resource to reach a
non-subordinate form of integration, were expected to
shed it completely, in order to become "good French-
men": a process that, according to its advocates, im-
plied assimilation as for language, culture and, possibly,
mentality and character too. In return, France extended
to them the same rights enjoyed by the native French
through "naturalization" (i.e., the granting of citizenship,
called in this way not only in France because citizenship
was perceived as the specific status of the "naturals" of
a country: its native members). Moreover, even those
immigrants who did not want to apply for French citi-
zenship, or could not obtain it, gave birth to French
citizens, because since 1889 citizenship has depended
largely on jus soli.

Germany in contrast - in spite of being the European
country with the largest number of immigrants (today
about eight million) - used to deny its long-standing
history as a country of immigration. Hence the phrase
that since the '50s German politicians have reiterated
for more than forty years: "Germany is not a land of
immigration" (Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland).
Therefore, immigrants, even if targeted by massive
recruiting campaigns, were long considered only "guest
workers" (Gastarbeiter) - i.e., foreigners admitted tem-
porarily and for working reasons alone. Their economic
contribution might even be appreciated, but their set-
tlement was not encouraged. They were allowed to live
in the country even for lengthy periods, but without any
significant change in their juridical status. Indeed, their
acquisition of citizenship was not even envisaged and,
therefore, their children born in Germany, if not in a
position to become naturalized, were destined to remain
foreigners, since jus sanguinis prevailed over jus soli.
Far from favouring a "nationalization" of immigrants,
Germans expected them to be ready to leave the coun-
try at any time, not only of their own free choice, but
also as a consequence of an economic or political crisis or a government decision. Social policies did not aim at their assimilation, but rather at keeping them in a precarious condition, in order to favour their return to their own countries (which was even encouraged with incentives, but with limited results).

This policy, too, was deeply rooted in a particular political culture. Germany was the last of the great western European countries to be constituted into a nation State and this formed far later than the German nation. On the other hand, in the German culture, "belonging" to the nation - far from being conceived in subjective civic and political terms, as in France, where Renan (1882) could even define it as a sort of "daily plebiscite" - has always been conceived in objective, ethnocultural terms, as a fact linked to blood and land and to the putatively specificity of the German people.

Even after the Second World War, as a result of the sad division of the country, this notion of belonging continued to prevail over State membership. Thus, German refugees coming from Eastern Germany and even the descendants of the Germans who had settled many generations before in other eastern European countries have been regarded as potential citizens in their own right (and not as "foreign" immigrants).

On the other hand, this view of the nation has favoured a tendency to preserve the alleged homogeneity of the German people. The influence of this idea on immigration politics could not be clearer. In fact, for a long time, all norms encouraged the rotation of immigrants, to prevent them from putting down roots in the German land. Even the "temporary integration" envisaged in 1973 "to render the condition of immigrants more humane" was not implemented, since the economic crisis of the '70s induced the country to close its borders to further foreign workers. But this entailed some unexpected consequences, such as the development of family reunification and the entry of more illegal and undocumented immigrants. Moreover, there was the arrival of masses of asylum seekers, unprecedented in peacetime, firstly from Third World countries and then from Eastern Europe. But this is a well-known story and it is not necessary to dwell upon it here.

The United Kingdom had a quite different social policy - as was its political culture, which, with well-known pragmatism, emphasized autonomy and decentralization and underlined the role of the local institutions and the intermediate social groups.

Both the British and the French immigration policies (as well as the German) had a strong ethnocentric bias, but these assumed quite different forms. In France ethnocentrism manifested itself in a universalistic way, with the claim that all immigrants, regardless of their race and culture, could become "good Frenchmen". In Britain, on the contrary, it manifested itself in a particularistic way: there was no expectation that immigrants could ever become "good Englishmen" (or Scotsmen or Welshmen). Immigrants' distinction was taken for granted and the main concern was to contain the damage that their presence might cause to the "British way of life". However, in Britain the line between citizens and non-citizens was much less clear-cut than in France and Germany. This was due to a significant range of intermediate positions, depending on the prior existence of a special category, the citizens of the Commonwealth, who, if domiciled in Britain, even enjoyed the right to vote and stand for Parliament.

This does not mean that there were not great social problems. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of the '90s a prominent British specialist, John Rex, could still define the condition of immigrants in terms of "segregated inequality", in spite of the important measures that had been adopted since the '70s to combat racial and ethnic discrimination. These problems became all too evident, owing to the recurrent ethnic riots in many towns that had been affected by the process of deindustrialization and in London itself.

The Italian case

Italy, with its 4,000,000 immigrants is now the fourth European country of immigration. Moreover, it is the first country of immigration in the Mediterranean basin, the most crucial area for the current and expected future migration towards Europe. It is also the first EU country for both the percentage of non-EU immigrants and the number of illegal immigrants, in spite of - or, rather, owing to - its tendency to regularize them periodically with great general amnesties (five extraordinary regularizations in fifteen years, probably a world record, and the last was even the largest ever carried out in Europe). In addition, there have been two other amnesties not officially declared.

The Italian attitude towards immigration is rather peculiar. This is due to various factors. First of all, Italy has become a receiving country after being for a century the European sending country with the largest number of emigrants (the turning point was reached in the '70s).
Besides, in Italy immigration did not begin in a period of reconstruction and economic development (as occurred in the north-western European countries), but rather in a period of deep economic crisis, characterized by a considerable increase in the unemployment rate.

Therefore, in Italy immigration has always depended much more on the push factors in the sending countries than on the pull factors in the receiving one. This trait - which is common to other southern European countries, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece - became even more apparent during the '90s, owing to the dramatic events of that decade: the serious deterioration in the economic and social situation in many developing countries, the destructive wars in the former Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa, the implosion of the pseudosocialist systems in eastern Europe, the crises in Albania and the breaking up of former Yugoslavia (two countries near the Italian borders). Briefly, in Italy immigration has been passively suffered rather than deliberately encouraged.

To all this we must add the effects of Italian political culture, a theme that has been object of very few studies. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

With regard to the Italian political culture, the first point to stress is its weak and ambiguous idea of nation. In effect, national identity itself in Italy has long remained a sort of taboo (due, among other things, to the Fascist exploitation of the national feelings). Italian scholars have preferred to investigate the so-called "political subcultures" (dwelling upon the distinction between the "red" subculture, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the communist and socialist parties, and the "white" one, of the areas under the prevailing influence of the Roman Catholic Church). More recently, they have focused their attention on the persistent contrasts between the northern, central and southern parts of the country or the eastern and western parts of northern Italy.

Moreover, the national sentiment, according to the latest research, in Italy is far weaker than in the other European countries. Among the many reasons, it should be remembered that, since its origins, this sentiment in Italy has been tempered by the cosmopolitan heritage of both the Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, as already appears in Dante's works at the beginning of the XIV century. Later, owing to the effects of internal conflicts and foreign rule, it was contradicted by a strong attitude to mind one's own affairs rather than the public interest. In fact, Italians, who lived for centuries under rapacious foreign oppressors, to defend themselves were obliged to develop private virtues and public vices.

More recently "civil religion", to use Rousseau's expression, or the "sense of State", to use the old liberal definition, or rather "civicness", as modern sociologists prefer to call it, has undergone the attacks of the two subcultures already mentioned: the one characterized by the ecumenical orientation of the Roman Catholic Church and the other epitomized by the internationalist stance of the leftist movements. Italy had the largest communist party in Western Europe and many of its exponents are still active in political life, though under new labels, which enabled them to take part in the leftist governments of 1996-2001 and 2006-2008, and to lead one of them.

Moreover, Italy is affected by its historical legacy. The Italian national State was formed comparatively late (after all the others in western Europe except for Germany, if we consider the date of its proclamation, but even after it, if we take into account the important eastnorthern regions that could join Italy only after the First World War). Moreover, the formation of the national State was not due to the initiative of the core part of the country, as occurred in France, Britain and Germany and also in other Mediterranean countries, which offer important examples of what Anthony D. Smith termed the "ethnic origins of nations". In Italy the first steps were taken by a small, peripheral and rather backward kingdom, the then still ethnically and linguistically composite Piedmont, whose ruling class could hardly speak Italian.
At a theoretical level we could discuss whether a weak concept of nation represents an advantage or a disadvantage for the social and cultural integration of immigrants, and our conclusion would also depend on our idea of "integration" (which I define as a condition of normal social relationships between individuals of different origin, class, culture and religion that allows civilized living in a relatively cohesive context). In fact, in Italy, the lack of a really organic policy for immigrants has given much scope to private initiatives (in particular, those of the social organisations controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, which have almost replaced public institutions in charity and other important activities).

On the other hand, the State, unable to enforce its own laws, between 1986 and 2002 approved five "special" amnesties, which covered eleven of the sixteen years of that period. This has caused a series of problems - both of a social nature and of public order - which has made it very difficult to face the situation in a rational and systematic way. Moreover, the last centre-left government (2006-2007) approved two concealed extraordinary regularizations.

This has led to two extreme positions. Some advocate the mass expulsion of illegal immigrants, with an essentially xenophobic stance. Others, in a rather irrational way, praise the continuous arrival of legal and illegal migrants as an opportunity to develop a marvellous multicultural society. In effect, these opposite stands, present to a certain extent all over Europe, in Italy seem to be even more radical than in any other country.

The communitarisation of the European migration policies

The situation presented above has considerably changed in the last years and probably will change further in the next future. The main factor has probably been the process of globalisation itself, which has affected both the migratory flows and the national political cultures. But also the incipient communitarisation of the European migration policies has played a role.

It is worth recalling that already in the '50s the German Federal Republic, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg gave life to the first European communities, which later merged their officers (1965) and extended their borders owing to the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark (1973), Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), Sweden, Austria and Finland (1995). The main result was the constitution in Western Europe of a great "common market", which, among other things, entailed the free circulation of the workers of the member States.

In 1985 five of the six initial States signed the Schengen agreement, which, between 1990 and 1996, was joined by all other member States, except the United Kingdom and Ireland. This agreement was not part of the community framework, but had a clear communitarian vocation, being open to all of its member States and only to them. Yet, when Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined, its main effects were extended to Norway and Iceland, which were associated with them in the Nordic Union.

The Schengen agreement, which came into force in 1995 for seven countries and some years later for the others, has progressively entailed the dismantling of the controls at the borders between the member countries and their reinforcement at the borders with other countries. It has also taken into account the aspects of immigration and asylum more closely connected with security and public order.

In the meantime the Convention of Dublin, which was signed between 1990 and 1991 by twelve member States, defined a series of issues concerning asylum, in order to harmonize the different national laws. Among the main results, there was the approval of some criteria to solve two hoary problems: "Asylum Shopping" (i.e. asylum claimed in more than one country) and "Asylum Seekers in Orbit" (i.e. asylum seekers shuttled from one country to another). This convention became effective in 1997.

The Treaty of Maastricht (which was signed on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993) marked a turning point in the process of European integration. It established the European Union, an international organisation with a clearer political orientation and wider competence than the previous communities. It also provided for an economic and monetary union, extended the functions of the European Parliament and attributed a new "European citizenship" to member States' citizens. On the other hand, it affirmed the principles of "subsidiarity" and "proportionality", which oblige the Union to avoid unnecessary interventions outside its exclusive competence.

The European Union is based on three "pillars". The first, which comprehends the matters that were already competence of the old communities, uses the "suprana-
tional method", which leaves only a secondary role to the States. The other two, which comprise the matters that were previously exclusive competencies of the States (namely international politics and common security: the second pillar and justice and home affairs: the third), use the "intergovernmental method", which leaves the last word to the Council of Ministers. Migration, in spite of being recognized as an issue of "common interest", was inserted into the third pillar.

However, five years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam (which was signed on 2 October 1997 and became effective on 1 May 1999) transferred almost all cooperation for justice and home affairs (including common action for immigration, asylum, visas and circulation of persons) to the first pillar. In order to facilitate this passage from the intergovernmental approach to the communitarian one, the treaty introduced a period of transition of five years from its coming into force, which however ended on 30 April 2004.

One of the protocols annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the Schengen acquis into the European Union, though by dividing it between the first and the third pillar. Only three countries failed to sign this protocol: Denmark preferred to remain free to choose whether or not to accept any new decisions, and the United Kingdom and Ireland, which had remained outside the Schengen Agreement itself (but later they decided to take part in some activities implemented in its framework, namely police and legal co-operation in criminal matters and the information system).

Though remaining defective at least under the geographical aspect, the communitarisation of the migratory policy has opened a new phase, characterized by a much more active role on the part of the European institutions. This has soon entailed the overcoming of the prevailing "defensive" character of the Schengen acquis.

The European Council of Cardiff (15-16 June 1998) requested the competent institutions of the Union to prepare an plan of action for implementing the "area of freedom, justice and security" envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam. This plan, which took into consideration immigration, asylum and temporary protection, was approved by the European Council of Vienna (11-12 December 1998).

In the following year the European Council of Tampere (15-16 October 1999) gave an important impetus to the homogenisation of the migratory policies of the EU countries. It recognized the need for a common policy for asylum and immigration and solicited an approximation of the legislations of the member States on the conditions for admission and stay of non-EU citizen. According to the Council, this development had to take into account both the economic and demographic conditions of the EU countries and the needs of the immigrants' countries, without neglecting the historical and cultural links between some of them. In other words, it underlined the necessity of balancing the interests of the sending and the receiving countries. Therefore, to contrast illegal immigration, it advised the member States to favour legal immigration and use the partnership with the countries of origin and transit. It also stressed the opportunity of a progressive improvement in the immigrants' status, in order to grant long-term legal residents rights and duties "comparable" to those of EU citizens. In addition, it decided to introduce common measures to fight racism, xenophobia and any kind of discrimination. As for asylum, after requesting the full respect of the obligations deriving from the Geneva Convention on Refugees (1951), it recognized the need to give protection to all persons in danger, even if ineligible as refugees according to that convention. It also emphasized the opportunity of defining a common procedure and a uniform status for asylum seekers.

After that Council the European Commission sent two important "communications" on asylum and immigration to the European Council and the European Parliament (22 November 2000). As for asylum, the commission underlined the importance of reconciling respect for humanitarian reasons and the need to oppose illegal immigration. On the other hand, it supported the proposal of a common procedure and a uniform status in all EU countries. As for immigration, after recognizing the right of any member State to limit the admission of non-EU citizens, it advanced the proposal to insert the residence permit and the work permit into one document, which had to become permanent after some years, and in addition asked for a common status for long-term residents. It also advocated a rapid homogenisation of the norms for family reunification.

According to the Commission, the integration of legal immigrants was a priority for the European Union: "a pluralistic society by its very nature, enriched by a variety of cultural and social traditions", which were to increase in the future. Therefore, it was necessary to respect such traditions as well as the EU fundamental principles, described in terms of assertion of human
rights and dignity, appreciation of pluralism and recognition that the existence of a society implies rights and duties for all of its members, be they nationals or not. However, owing to the length of time required for a real integration, special attention had to be paid to immigrants’ children, including those born in the EU, to prevent their social exclusion and the consequent risk of their drift to crime. To fight illegal immigration, according to the Commission, it was essential to facilitate both legal immigration and rejection, or rapid expulsion, of illegal migrants and bogus asylum seekers. With this objective, all EU member countries were invited to set up talks and to implement partnerships with the countries of origin and transit.

This was a "comprehensive strategy". Immigration was regarded as a broad long-term process, which required different kinds of measures, including co-operation for the economic and social development of the sending countries. Only this development, in effect, could control the push factors, which in this phase seem to be almost everywhere far more important than the pull factors.

The European Council of Laeken (14-15 December 2001) confirmed this trend towards a common policy of asylum and immigration, in spite of the resistance of some national administrations. Yet, some difficulties emerged in the European Council of Seville (22 June 2002): the main question was how to treat the developing countries unwilling to oppose illegal migration. The final compromise decided to reward the more co-operative countries without damaging the others. However, it was decided that all future agreements of co-operation with developing countries should include norms obliging them to control the flows and to re-admit their illegal migrants.

In this period, however, Europe had to face a new problem: the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which had become evident after the tragic attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. (11 September 2001) and the subsequent US interventions in Afghanistan (since 7 October 2001) and Iraq (since 20 March 2003) with the support of three EU countries (the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) and a then candidate country (Poland). The seriousness of this threat was proved by the terrorist outrages committed in Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) and the attempts against British, Italian and Polish objectives in various parts of the world. This global crisis obliged the European institutions to re-examine the policy of immigration in the light of common security. Therefore, in recent years a great deal of attention has been paid to border control. This clearly emerged during the semester of the Italian presidency (July-December 2003), when, inter alia, the member States agreed on the establishment of a European Agency for the management of operational co-operation at the external borders, which, however, was established only on May 1, 2005 (with the name Frontex, from the French "Frontières extérieures") and became effective in the following October.

In the meantime the EU became larger, owing to the entry of eight Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and two Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus) on May 1, 2004 and two more Eastern European countries (Bulgaria and Romania) on January 1, 2007. On October 29, 2004 the old and new EU member countries signed a Constitutional Treaty paying much attention to immigration and related phenomena. This treaty proclaimed the pluralistic character of Europe, "united in its diversity", and affirmed that the Union was founded on "the values of human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights". It also emphasized "pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination" together with the respect of "cultural, religious and linguistic diversity". Moreover, it committed the Union to prevent and combat "crime, racism and xenophobia" and declared the willingness to implement "a common policy for asylum, immigration and the control of the external frontiers, based on solidarity between member States and fair towards non-EU citizens". The treaty did not enter into force since it was rejected in two countries (France and the Netherlands) where it had been submitted to referendum. Yet, all preparatory and subsequent works have exerted an important influence on the orientation of the member States.

According to that treaty, the Union had to develop a common immigration policy in order to ensure an efficient management of migration flows (Art. III-267). To re-launch the debate on this theme, in January 2005 the European Commission issued a Green Paper on a possible EU approach to manage economic migration. This document was conceived as a basis for a policy plan on legal migration, with admission procedures capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demand for migrant labour. The basic idea was that, owing to their demographic ageing, EU countries required more sustained immigration flows to meet the needs of their labour market. Therefore, EU had to attract economic
migrants by assuring them a secure legal status and to favour their integration by granting them a clear set of rights. The Commission recognised that the number of economic migrants to admit had to remain competence of the member States, but underlined that the admission of third country nationals in one member State could affect the others in many ways (due to their indirect impact on the EU labour market and to their right to travel within the Schengen area, to deliver services in other member States and even to move there after acquiring a long-term resident status). Therefore, according to the Commission, it was necessary to agree transparent and harmonised common rules for admitting such migrants.

Some months later (10 May 2005) the Commission launched a 5 year Action Plan for Freedom, Justice and Security that detailed proposals for EU action on terrorism, migration management, visa policies, asylum, security, the fight against organised crime and criminal justice. This plan (to be known as the Hague Programme) was presented as a cornerstone of the Commission's Strategic Objectives for 2010, built upon the basic ideas of prosperity, solidarity and security. The plan singled out ten priorities for the next five years. As for migration and related issues, it defined a balanced approach envisaging a common immigration policy at the Union level and a stronger fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings (notably women and children). Moreover, it further developed an integrated management of external borders and a common visa policy and implemented the work to establish a common asylum area.

To fulfil the mandate included in that Programme, before the end of the year (21 December 2005) the Commission adopted a Policy Plan, primarily focused on economic immigration. This document did not contain any legislative or operational proposal, but defined a road-map for the remaining period of the Hague Programme. It listed the legislative initiatives and the other actions that the Commission intended to take in order to pursue the development of the EU legal migration policy.

The results of these measures (and others, on which I cannot dwell here) have been object of the subsequent Reports on Migration and Integration, annually published by the EU Commission and recently arrived at their 4th year.

The convergence of migration policies in EU countries

The process summarized above clearly explains the convergence of the migratory policies of EU countries. I'll mention only some exemplary changes occurred in the three countries discussed above, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with a final reference to Italy. France has come to recognize the ethnic communities as proper partners of its migration policies and no longer declares that accepting their specific traits would be a form of ghettosation à l'américaine. To meet with the particular difficulties of immigrants, special measures have been approved, especially as for housing. Also an intercultural approach has been partially introduced, both in education and in everyday life. Some well-known scholars have even suggested a "French form of multiculturalism": a sort of compromise between the traditional "republican" values of the country and the religious and cultural claims of the immigrant groups.

An important step in this direction was the new law on secularism (laïcité), approved in 2004. It introduced an explicit prohibition of entering State schools with "conspicuous" religious symbols (such as large Christian crosses, Islamic veils, Jewish kippahs and Sikh turbans), but it also allowed minor signs of faith and origins. Moreover, its advocates, though confirming the prior orientation for the religious and political neutrality of the public institutions, asked them to respect all religious and cultural sensibilities whenever possible, with explicit reference to schools, barracks, cemeteries and hospitals.

In fact, "owing to the change in the spiritual situation that had taken place in the last century", that law interpreted secularism as an important means of favouring the cohabitation of people of various origins, cultures and religions. Secularism was re-defined as a measure to favour not only mutual tolerance, but also the integration of immigrants. This approach (quite different from the old "republican" formula, worked out when it was essential to contrast the then reactionary claims of the Roman Catholic Church) was to foster the development of a new culture, which could improve the condition of Muslim women and to promote sexual equality without pretending an immediate assimilation of uses and customs that even in Europe had emerged enough recently.

The United Kingdom considers immigration an important resource, in spite of the well-known economic and
social difficulties that have caused strong resistance among the natives and violent reactions among the immigrants. Even the long-term consequences of immigration are substantially accepted, though some scholars and politicians underline the need to “reclaim Britishness”, to quote the title of a book published by an influential think tank of New Labour. On the other hand Prince Charles - who, if and when he ascends the throne, will inherit the function of defensor fidei - has promised to act in favour not only of the Church of England (of which he would become the head), but of all religions present in the country.

As for migration policy, while legal immigration for working reasons has been facilitated, illegal immigration (including that adducing political reasons) has been more strictly controlled. The law on asylum, immigration and citizenship, approved in 2002, has limited the flow of asylum seekers, who had become quite numerous (more than 100,000 in that year). Among other things, this law provides for the biometric identification of the immigrants: a meaningful measure in a country that since the Second World War has lived without identity cards. Yet, this absence, which made the stay of illegal immigrants much easier, has finished, owing to this “time of global uncertainty with an increased threat from international terrorism and organized crime” (to quote Queen Elisabeth herself) and “illegal immigration” (according to the words added by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair). The law makes both naturalizations and long-term stay more difficult and requires all foreigners who intend to settle in Britain to learn English (or Gaelic or Welsh, according to the place). But it also introduces important measures aiming at their integration.

Germany, which in the year 2000 abandoned its traditional denial of being a country of immigration, has also dismissed the idea of a merely temporary integration of immigrants. Suffice it to say that now immigrants meet much less difficulties to become naturalized and their children born in Germany quite easily acquire German citizenship when they reach 18 years of age. Also the request to immigrants to learn German seems to be due to the new acceptance of their permanent settlement rather than to a persistent resistance to them.

The first immigration law, which became effective on 1 January 2005, aims at coping with several problems, among which the granting of refugee status for reasons not considered before, such as persecution by non-governmental groups, discrimination for sexual orientation and fear of genital mutilation. It also contains new provisions related to internal security, such as the easier expulsion of aliens suspected of terrorist activities or involved in preaching hatred and some restrictions of movement for other extremists. But it provides important opportunities for immigrants willing to integrate.

As we can see, beyond the persistent differences between the three countries, there is a significant convergence in their policies towards a social integration of immigrants with respect for their cultural identity: the new “common policy” proposed by the European Commission in the year 2000.

Paradoxically, the first country to move in this direction, even anticipating EU communications and directions, was Italy, which became a country of immigration only in the ‘70s. In fact, the idea of the social integration of immigrants with respect for their cultural identity already inspired its first immigration law, passed in 1986 by a leftist government, and this approach was confirmed by the three subsequent laws: those approved in 1990 and 1998 by other centre-left governments and that approved in 2002 by a centre-right government (which is still in force, in spite of the harsh criticisms of the leftist majority that ruled the country between May 2006 and May 2008).

This paradox may be easily explained. In Italy immigration began in the second phase of post-war migration, which was deeply characterized by the influence of so-called “new international division of labour”, and has become important in its third phase, which developed under the influences of globalisation and Europeanisation. Besides, as we have already mentioned, under many aspects Italian political culture is a sort of compromise between the French and the German types. We may add other important factors. In Italy the influence of the “universalistic” approach of the Roman Catholic Church has always been very strong and also the influence of the “proletarian internationalism”, officially professed by the leftist movements, was quite remarkable. Furthermore, strong and widespread opinion in favour of the process of European integration has made Italy very sensitive to the positions of European institutions, even before their formal declaration, while the growing crisis of the policies of the countries that had already experienced large-scale immigration suggested the need to try a new way.
Conclusion

Globalisation, as I have already stressed, has deeply affected the patterns of immigration almost everywhere, making them much more similar than before. This has facilitated to a large extent both the work of the EU institutions and the acceptance of their directives and suggestions by the member States.

However, we are only at the beginning of a long road and many contradictions still emerge even in the new approach to immigration. It will be the duty of the EU member countries to move ahead, also overcoming the new difficulties arising from the enlargement of the Union, and, particularly, the increased difference between them in history, traditions, conditions and, of course, political culture.

Umberto Melotti is Professor of political sociology in the Faculty of Sociology at the Università di Roma "La Sapienza".
Introduction

Europe’s Migration Challenge needs to be addressed with urgency.

1. First, migratory pressure is on the rise as more people from poorer countries consider migration a realistic option for a better life.
2. Second, EU member states with a significant stock of immigrants are confronted with a major integration challenge as the aspirations of many second-generation migrants are frustrated by poor education and poor labour market performance - if integration policies fail, large ethnic underclasses will become a permanent feature in the EU.
3. Third, global competition for high-skilled workers has intensified owing to skill-biased technological change and globalisation and the EU struggles to attract and retain top talent. With the internal mobility agenda in the aftermath of EU enlargement settled, the time to address the external migration challenge is now.

Traditionally, immigration policy is considered a national responsibility. Decisions on who is allowed to enter a country and who is not can even been viewed as a tenet of national sovereignty. However, within the EU and the Schengen area in particular, purely national policies are becoming increasingly ineffective. For this reason, the EU has already started to develop a common European immigration policy under the Hague programme which extends until 2010.

But progress to date has been uneven and the failed Irish referendum further delays the introduction of qualified majority voting on European immigration policy. Against this backdrop, it is positive that immigration features prominently on the French EU presidency’s agenda. This may give new momentum to the current legislative proposals and shape the EU’s work programme on immigration beyond 2010.

However, when decision-making is fraught with difficulties, careful prioritisation is required. Where is the need for a common European approach most pressing? And what should continue to be dealt with at the national level? As in other fields, European policies are needed in areas where cross-border spill-overs are material and national preferences well aligned, national responsibility continuing to prevail elsewhere.

The following sections attempt to apply the above logic to the areas of legal migration, irregular migration, asylum, and integration policy. For those areas identified as EU priorities, concrete policy proposals are developed, comparing and contrasting them to the known details of the agenda of the French EU presidency where appropriate. The final section concludes and summarises the policy recommendations.

Legal Migration

Currently, the spill-over effects caused by legal immigration remain relatively small even within the Schengen area. The status of third-country nationals as legal immigrants only becomes 'portable' between member states after five years of legal residence within the EU. After then, while in principle there would always be the possibility for legal migrants to move and work within the entire Schengen area on an irregular basis even before five years had elapsed, any move that led to a loss of legal status would typically be unattractive.

Therefore, blanket harmonisation of legal immigration policies should not be regarded as an urgent priority at the EU level. In addition, preferences among member states regarding low- and mid-skilled legal migration often differ substantially. However, there is one major exception - high-skilled immigration - where preferences among member states are generally much better aligned and where a common European solution could make Europe much more attractive in the global competition for talent.

Figure 1 shows that the percentage of the university-educated among foreign-born inhabitants is currently well below the OECD average for the typical EU country. There is little doubt that the world’s English-speaking countries have a substantial advantage when it comes to attracting high-skilled immigrants because English is the lingua franca of the globalised age.
Hence, non English-speaking countries will need to offer high-skilled immigrants at least as attractive conditions of entry as English-speaking countries in order to compensate for the language disadvantage.

The recent flurry of national attempts to improve the legal basis for attracting high-skilled migrants, including the recent ‘carte des compétences et talents’ in France illustrates the progress that has been made in this respect. However, there is one important feature that purely national initiatives will not be able to offer: immediate access to the entire EU labour market. For highly specialised immigrants this would undoubtedly be attractive. For example, an Indian high-skilled migrant with a job offer in Vienna will accept it much more readily if this guarantees access to the entire EU labour market. Were the first job to prove unattractive or the family to have difficulties adjusting, the option value of being able to transfer to, say, Manchester (and not just within Austria to, say, Innsbruck) would be substantial.

**Blue Card**

To achieve this enhanced portability of status, a European Blue Card for high-skilled immigrants has been proposed. However, while the European Commission’s draft directive on the creation of a Blue Card is a key step in the right direction, it is unfortunately weak on status portability. Transferring from one member state to another using the Blue Card in its currently proposed form would be almost as difficult as applying for a fresh Blue Card upon first entry from outside the Union.

The larger the labour market to which an immigration permit offers access, and the more permanent this access is, the more attractive the destination is for high-skill migrants. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the most attractive immigration status - citizenship - is in the top right corner. The current EU Blue Card proposal would not be competitive compared to the US H1B visa for the highly skilled or the US Green Card. The US arrangements set a much more generous initial period of validity than the Blue Card and, in contrast to the poor portability of the Blue Card within the EU, grant access to the entire US labour market.

The current Blue Card proposal (von Weizsäcker 2006) thus needs to be improved substantially in both dimensions to position the EU more favourably in the global competition for talent, as indicated by the arrow in Figure 2.

A lack of effective portability of the Blue Card even risks undermining the whole point of this EU exercise since portability would be the principal added value of an EU scheme compared to any national scheme. But there is little hope that an agreement among member states can be reached to strengthen portability on the basis of the currently proposed access criterion for the Blue Card of three times the minimum wage in the first member state in which the migrant works. Since the level of the minimum wage compared to the median wage varies substantially between member states, the economic rationale for the proposed eligibility criterion is weak at the outset. More importantly, a Blue Card that can be obtained on the basis of, say, monthly earnings of as low as €400 in Romania is unlikely ever to be accepted throughout the EU.

A more promising approach would be to allow skill, age, language skills and other migrant characteristics to determine eligibility for a Blue Card. Ideally, this would be achieved through a Europe-wide points system as applies in Canada. The Canadian points system rewards characteristics such as educational status, young
age, language proficiency and work experience, which are good predictors of immigration success. By similarly enlarging the set of criteria for the Blue Card well beyond a salary threshold based on the first job contract, it ought to be much easier to agree on a Blue Card that would grant access to the entire EU labour market.

Also, more could and should be done to attract high-skilled migrants by strengthening the attractiveness of European universities, which to some extent also requires European policy action as argued in Aghion et al. (2007). In the US, the quality of its leading universities is one of the most important channels by which top talent is attracted early, and after their studies foreign-born students benefit from a special quota of H1B visas to allow them to stay on and work.

A similar feature could be introduced in the EU on the basis of the Blue Card in the form of a 'Blue Diploma', allowing foreign-born graduates with a Masters degree (or equivalent) from a participating university to find a job in the EU without being subject to the proposed salary threshold of the Blue Card (von Weizsäcker 2006).

**Brain Drain**

Perhaps the most serious policy concern that the Blue Card raises is its prospective ‘brain drain’ impact on the source country. Brain drain could have a negative impact on the growth potential of the source country’s economy and the skill premium might increase, thereby leading to greater inequality. Furthermore, the fiscal impact of high-skilled emigration will generally be negative.

However, brain drain may not be a net negative for the source country. The option to emigrate may substantially increase the expected returns on education, thereby improving private education incentives. Also, if migrants return to their country of origin - and many of them do - the skills and savings that they have acquired abroad can become a powerful force for development. For these reasons, moderate levels of brain drain may in fact be beneficial for the source country as is argued, for example, by Beine et al. (2003).

Further, the explosion of tertiary education in developing countries over the last 15 years as presented in Figure 3 has dramatically increased the supply of skill in developing countries. In particular, the number of students in the ten most populated developing countries (Pop-10) has trebled, increasing from 16 million in 1990 to 49 million in 2005. This rapid increase in the supply of skill is likely to have reduced the potentially adverse effects of brain drain for any given level of emigration. In fact, certain developing economies even have difficulty in properly absorbing the rapidly increased supply of university graduates, leading to shockingly high unemployment rates among them in countries such as Morocco.

Nevertheless, the EU may wish to consider an opt-out from the Blue Card for those developing countries concerned about brain drain. The EU could also make a point of offering financial support for tertiary education to developing countries with particularly large numbers of high-skilled migrants to the EU, an area of the education system that is typically not covered by donors since the Millennium Development Goals rightly focus mainly on primary education.

**Irregular Migration**

Unlike legal migrants, irregular migrants do not have a legal status to lose when they move around within the Schengen area. This de facto mobility gives rise to substantial spill-over effects. For example, an estimated 50 percent of irregular Ukrainian migrants in Portugal originally entered the EU with a Schengen visa issued by the Austrian or German embassies (Baganha et al.,
The argument for EU coordination of irregular migration is further strengthened by the expectation that immigration pressures are set to increase in the coming years.

Estimates put the stock of irregular migrants in the EU at between four and eight million people, with an inflow of perhaps as much as half a million per year (Düvell 2006), which increasingly looks comparable to the massive influx of migrants from Mexico to the US. It is estimated that there are currently some 12 million Mexican immigrants living in the US, roughly 60 percent of whom are illegal, while the illegal inflow from Mexico may exceed 400,000 migrants annually.

These immigration pressures are driven by proximity and income differences. As shown in Figure 4, the US-Mexico income gap is similar to the gap between EU15 and the average of EU future accession and neighbourhood countries around the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe. However, the low-income populations in the vicinity of the EU are markedly larger than for the US, suggesting that the longer term immigration pressures could also be substantially greater.

How will Europe respond to these pressures? The key remedies routinely advanced are better border enforcement, more development assistance for countries of origin, and new legal migration schemes. However, while some of these measures can make sense, they are unlikely to be able comprehensively to address the problem of irregular migration, which is why a European agreement on a path to legalisation should be part of any policy package dealing with irregular migration.

**Better border enforcement**

The EU is already engaged in joint enforcement efforts to reduce irregular migration. Control of external borders is to be strengthened (EU Frontex agency). Efforts to fight human trafficking are to be stepped up. And there are plans to intensify cooperation with major transit countries and to accelerate the repatriation of irregular migrants. Irregular migrants generally respond to incentives and it is thus likely that a comprehensive set of enforcement measures will succeed in reducing inflows. But by how much?

Again, it might be instructive to look to the US. Recently, the Congressional Budget Office (2007) assessed the likely impact of the (currently stalled) Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act 2007. It was estimated that the comprehensive set of enforcement measures in this bill would succeed in reducing the influx of irregular immigrants by about 25 percent.

Similarly, the EU might find it difficult to achieve a reduction in irregular inflows of more than 25 percent by means of tighter controls, let alone reduce them to insignificant levels. The commonly held view that enforcement alone might solve the problem of irregular migration is clearly flawed, since a large inflow of irregular migrants can be expected to continue even with tight controls. It is important that political decision-makers put their cards on the table about this fact.

**Increased development assistance**

The argument is often advanced that increased development assistance could be used to improve economic prospects in key countries of origin so that the incentive to emigrate is reduced. However, the level of income in the country of origin and the propensity to emigrate may well be hump-shaped, with rising incomes initially increasing the likelihood of emigration. (Adams and Page 2003) One reason for this is that poor and credit-constrained individuals will only find migration affordable above a certain income level. Only once income has grown beyond that threshold will migration go down on account of reduced income differences between source and host country. In view of substantial uncertainty here, it would be imprudent to tightly couple development assistance and migration policy in the political discourse.

**Legal migration schemes**

It is sometimes claimed that a suitable means to combat irregular immigration could be the expansion of legal immigration schemes, possibly in the form of temporary or circular migration. For example, temporary
migration schemes are to be an integral part of the 'mobility partnerships' that the EU plans to conclude with source countries, not least to reduce the inflow of irregular migrants.

However, it is not clear how effective this would be. For the sake of argument, assume that every fourth potential irregular immigrant manages to enter the EU. On this assumption, four potential irregular migrants would need to be admitted legally in order to reduce the number of irregular migrants by one. And this also - optimistically - assumes that the four legal migrants would indeed come from the pool of potential irregular migrants, which is not necessarily the case. Temporary legal migration schemes may even increase irregular migration as a result of visa overstays.

Path to regularisation
None of the above approaches is likely to make the problem of irregular migration disappear in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the EU needs to find a pragmatic way to accommodate residual irregular migration in ways that are compatible with human rights, basic law and order and the requirements of integration policy.

First, more stringent standards governing the proper treatment of irregular migrants should be agreed. With open internal borders, some member states might otherwise be tempted to drive irregular migrants away to neighbouring EU countries by treating them poorly. Individual countries that treat irregular migrants decently might in any case end up attracting more than their expected share. Better and common standards for the decent treatment of irregular migrants could help resolve this problem.

Second, a basic framework for regularisation procedures should be defined, recognising the advantages of timely regularisation, as opposed to sporadic mass regularisations accompanied by unrealistic promises of governments in denial that new repressive measures will obviate the need for repeat mass regularisation.

We propose that a system of continuous 'earned regularisation' should be introduced, offering accelerated regularisation for those irregular migrants who rapidly acquire language skills and display other characteristics that are conducive to rapid integration, or for humanitarian reasons. By contrast, irregular migrants who do not conform to this set of criteria would only be regularised after a much longer period during which they would continue to be exposed to the generally small but non-negligible risk of forced repatriation.

The proposed 'earned regularisation' approach could help achieve the declared objective of the French EU presidency of abandoning mass regularisations, and at the same time offer sufficient flexibility to accommodate the disparate positions of countries like Spain, Italy, Germany and France within a single framework.

Asylum
With the end of the cold war, the EU experienced a rapid surge in asylum applications, as can be seen in Figure 5. In response, member states progressively tightened their asylum legislation and also started progressively to introduce EU rules governing asylum within Europe. Hatton (2008) estimates that these tighter and better coordinated rules have contributed to about one third of the recent decline in asylum applications, the other two thirds being attributable to a decline in the demand for asylum especially from citizens of eastern European countries and the CIS.

The legal tightening and the remarkable success in reducing asylum application numbers (and to a lesser extent the number of people granted asylum) raises the question of whether Europe still does justice to its ambition to provide shelter to people who are in need of protection. While Europe continues to receive about three quarters of asylum claims among industrial countries, the contributions of individual countries vary enormously. In particular, Sweden's performance is remarkable, absorbing over ten percent of total asylum claims received in industrialised countries in 2007, a not-so-distant second place behind the US and well ahead of much larger EU countries such as Germany, France, and the UK.

The fact that 41 percent of the 45,200 Iraqi asylum applicants worldwide went to Sweden is something that not only Sweden but also the rest of the EU should be proud of and, consequently, Swedish taxpayers should not foot the bill alone. Perhaps the time has come to acknowledge that an asylum policy which upholds European values is a European public good that should to a larger extent be provided through joint financing and joint organisation.
To start with, this could take the form of a European commitment proactively to offer 25,000 extra people per year refuge from persecution and war (or 0.05 percent of the EU population). Rather than waiting for these refugees to arrive at our borders, such a proactive commitment could include transport logistics where needed. This special category of humanitarian migrants could be offered what we have called a 'new Nansen' passport. The previous incarnation of the Nansen passport was introduced by the Norwegian polar explorer and Nobel peace prize winner Fridjof Nansen to equip refugees from the Russian revolution with travel papers.

Integration
Because the mobility of legal immigrants from third countries remains relatively low, each member state can expect to bear the overwhelming part of the cost caused by failed integration policies for legal migrants. Furthermore, differences between member states in the composition of immigrant populations, institutional differences not least in education and labour markets, and subtle differences in outlook reduce the prospect of far-reaching EU legislation in this area. As a consequence, integration policies should mainly be regarded as a national remit for the time being.

Nevertheless, a continued European dialogue on the challenges of integration would appear to be desirable, providing political momentum to national integration policies and enhancing their quality through joint learning.

Conclusions
The main conclusions and policy recommendations identified in this paper are as follows:

- High-skilled migration: For the EU successfully to participate in the global competition for talent, the Blue Card draft directive needs to be revised. In particular, the Blue Card needs to become more readily transferable so that it genuinely offers access to the entire EU labour market. At the same time, concerns about brain drain should be taken seriously, not least by offering developing countries an opt-out clause.
- Irregular migration: The EU agenda on irregular migration must be balanced to succeed. The currently envisaged efforts to reduce irregular migration through tighter controls will merely slow the inflow of irregular migrants somewhat but will not make the problem of irregular migration disappear. It is proposed that tighter controls should be combined with better and common humanitarian standards and an agreement on continuous 'earned regularisation' as an alternative to denial induced sporadic mass regularisations.
- Asylum: Not least because of past coordination efforts, asylum applications in Europe have dropped considerably in recent years while wars and political persecution continue to make people flee their home countries on a large scale. In order for Europe to help these refugees more effectively, a 'new Nansen' scheme offering 25,000 humanitarian immigration slots per year is proposed, the funding and allocation of which are to be organised at the European level.

References

Congressional Budget Office, 2007, 'Cost Estimate of the Senate Amendment 1150 to S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act 2007', Congressional Budget Office, Washington DC.


**Jakob von Weizsäcker** is Research Fellow at Bruegel, a European think tank devoted to international economics. His research is focused on migration, social insurance, ageing and economic development.
Bernd Hemingway
EU Migration Governance Initiatives: The Involvement of the IOM

As a global, intergovernmental organization on migration, the governance of international migration is central to the work of IOM. The history of IOM can be seen to reflect the changing nature of the migration phenomenon over the last half century, in particular the dramatic increase in human mobility. IOM was established in 1951 as an intergovernmental organization to resettle displaced persons, refugees, and migrants in Europe after the Second World War.

Originally set up as a regional actor in Europe at the initiative of the Governments of the United States and Belgium, the organization started out as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) becoming the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 1980 and finally the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989. This transition over half a century has been shaped by the scale of migration challenges faced by the world and the changing migration trends which have led the organization to extend its scope from a regional primarily operational agency to a global migration agency.

Global Governance of International Migration: Changing Patterns
Growing economic inequalities, changing demographics, extreme poverty, global economic integration, environmental problems, conflicts and wars have contributed to massive and varying patterns of migration which have become more evident in the post Cold War era. The increase in the numbers of migrants is showing a constant trend. The number of people living outside their country of origin which is around 191 million (IOM World Migration Report, 2005; UNO 2006) today is increasing by nearly 3% every year. OECD figures (OECD, Trends in International Migration, 2006) show that international migration to industrialized countries since the 1990s has increased by 25% compared to previous decades.

Apart from the magnitude of the migration flows, patterns of migration have also considerably changed. Historically, migration used to be a relatively single-directional and permanent, whereas recent patterns are more circular and temporary.

The traditional categorization of migration flows is not accurate and adequate anymore as the flows are highly diversified and mixed. The total flows include both highly-skilled migration, low- and middle-skilled migration, migration for the purposes of study, family migration, internal migration, irregular migration. However, between these mobility categories there are no firmly fixed boundaries. And they are not mutually exclusive; they intersect, overlap and merge in many different ways.

While the majority of international migrants originate from developing countries, it is not exclusively a “South-North phenomenon”. There are also strong migration flows between developing countries, in particular between low- and middle-income countries (IOM World Migration Report, 2003).

Policy-makers have had to adjust and intensify their migration policies to be able to respond to these changing patterns of migration; the response has included increasing regional and global consultation initiatives and bringing the migration and development nexus to the global governance agenda. IOM has been fully engaged in these developments.

From Regional to Global Initiatives
IOM has assumed an increasingly important role in this transformation process of migration policies, including through providing support to Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) on migration. An increasingly important element of the Organization’s work has been in contributing to better understanding and dialogue at the regional level, through inter-state and inter-regional consultative processes, including in partnership with International Organizations and other stakeholders. IOM’s involvement in promoting, facilitating and contributing to such regional mechanisms has meant that there are now active processes covering virtually the whole world.

RCPs have been set up around the world, such as the Colombo Process\(^1\) in Asia, Puebla Process\(^2\) in the

\(^1\) The Colombo Process is formally known as the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia, which focuses on
Americas, Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa\(^3\) (MIDSA), and Söderköping Process\(^4\) in Europe. Their emergence attests to the importance that States attach to a regional approach to managing migration.

These initiatives are State-owned processes that bring government representatives together, providing a platform for informal dialogue between them on various migration-related issues of common interest and concern, such as migration and development, labour migration, social integration, smuggling and trafficking in persons and the protection of migrants’ rights. Although an RCP is often initiated by a conference on a particular theme, the occurrence of multiple meetings (rather than a one-time event) is an essential characteristic of RCPs. Substantive focus is flexible and responds to the changing needs of the participant States. The migration and development linkage has, for example, increasingly been included on the agenda of various RCPs as this issue has achieved greater prominence in connection with events like the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).

RCPs have served to build confidence in inter-state dialogue, sharing information and best practices, exploring approaches of cooperation on migration matters at a regional and international level and can provide a framework for capacity building and technical assistance on migration. The informal and non-binding nature of RCPs allows participants to express their policy perspective openly and also gives a voice to smaller, less powerful states together with more powerful, larger states. RCPs facilitate networks of individuals working on migration issues by providing a platform for regular meetings between persons (primarily government officials) who generally otherwise would not interact, or would interact only on an ad hoc basis.

In addition, RCPs generally bring together representatives from different ministries and in that way facilitate the coordination and coherence of migration related policy fields. The structure of RCPs has engendered trust and helped build confidence among States and the networks that are developed through participation in RCPs. create an environment conducive to bilateral and regional operational cooperation on migration; such cooperation often takes place outside of, and is sustained independent of the RCP process.

Some RCPs have produced declarations, recommendations, plans of action or guidelines for government action, although none involve binding obligations; some of these have complemented formal processes and had policy impact (e.g. harmonization of policies in granting visas, registration and identification of asylum seekers). In addition, RCPs often facilitate the compilation and sharing of data and statistics on migration flows and stocks, trafficking groups, etc. (e.g. Puebla Process has developed the SIEMMES database for tracking regional migration flows). These initiatives also enhance efforts towards regional policy coherence.

Fruitful inter-state dialogue on migration at regional and inter-regional levels has demonstrated that issues of common interest can be identified among diverse states, helping to overcome skepticism regarding the possibility of productive discussions on migration at the global level due to perceived insurmountable differences in the perspectives and objectives of developed and developing countries. As a result, RCPs have helped elevate migration on the international agenda, as can be seen in the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). The value and impact of the RCPs on migration management had been carried in to the discussions during the first GFMD. IOM has contributed to the first GFMD and preparations for the second GFMD through providing both substantive and technical input for the preparation, implementation and follow-up phases.

Throughout the GFMD process, IOM has been supportive of the measures that would make migration work for development, such as mainstreaming of migration into development policies and capacity building actions to manage labour migration as a tool for development. During the first GFMD, IOM shared its experience regarding good practices in several areas, including temporary and circular labour migration schemes as tools of development (IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programmes, Return of Qualified Afghans, Temporary Agricultural Workers to Canada), policy coherence (RCPs, PRSP work with Government...
of Ghana), capacity building in countries of origin (again MIDA programmes, health care workers mobility schemes and engaging diasporas (Diaspora Dialogues)).

The conclusions of the first Forum in general underscore the well-being and welfare of migrants with a series of recommendations to this end. One of the main action proposals has been the development of practical, evidence-based migration initiatives holding promise to enhance the beneficial links between migration and development. IOM has long been an advocate of this approach and hence one of the Organization's objectives is to undertake policy-oriented research to support and inform such practical initiatives.

This approach has been carried on to the follow-up activities of the first GFMD. For example, IOM has started developing jointly with the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), a Migration and Development Handbook, the principal objective of which is to assist States, particularly developing ones, in their efforts to develop new policy approaches and solutions for better management of migration for development. In another example, at the requests of the Governments of Morocco and Spain, IOM is working with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to produce a "Compendium of good practice policies on bilateral temporary labour arrangements", which was a recommended follow-up activity to Roundtable 1.2 of the first GFMD on the topic of "Temporary Labour Migration as a Contribution to Development: Sharing Responsibility".

IOM is planning to organize a two-day consultation among the secretariats and chairing governments of major RCPs in 2009, with funding from the Government of Australia. The consultation will further facilitate and deepen exchanges among RCPs and explore ways to harness future opportunities for greater cross-fertilization. It will also highlight the benefits of RCPs and explore ways that RCPs might be further strengthened. In addition, it will provide an opportunity for RCPs to share information about their respective activities and achievements (including in the area of migration and development). It will explore the participants’ views on what the GFMD could learn from RCPs, particularly in terms of those areas of activity that could have a significant impact on the capacity of migration to achieve positive development outcomes, and consider how opportunities for greater cross-fertilization of ideas between the GFMD and RCPs might be harnessed.

IOM proposes to undertake a systematic analysis of the impacts and outputs of RCPs to better understand their role in the governance of international migration vis-à-vis other regional and global mechanisms and to gather effective practices for effective inter-state dialogue and cooperation in migration matters. This assessment would be the first to be done on RCPs and would provide useful information to States and other stakeholders, as international migration continues to rise as a topic on the international agenda and the international community considers existing and potential frameworks for the governance of migration at the national, regional and global levels.

In addition, IOM continues to be involved in RCPs since their inception. As an observer of or partner IOM has participated in most of the major RCPs and made considerable contributions. At the request of the governments, IOM has organized meetings from which new RCPs have developed and advanced (e.g. one of the most important being the Colombo Process). IOM has not only provided substantive contribution but also technical and logistical support to the numerous RCPs through secretariat and coordination services, such as the MIDSA, CIS Conference, Bali Process etc. Additionally, IOM has facilitated consultation among the RCPs through organizing the first-ever consultation workshop bringing together various RCPs in 2005 and creating a centralized source of information on RCPs on the IOM website.

The expertise and experience IOM has gained over the years on RCPs has been conveyed to the first GFMD where IOM contributed to the roundtable on RCPs, and IOM is actively supporting preparations for the roundtable in GFMD 2 in Manila focused on RCPs, including by drafting the working paper both years.

IOM hopes its efforts have provided a further impetus for GFMD II to underscore inter-state and inter-regional cooperation, facilitating the continuing evolution of the migration and development discourse, and the practical development of new ideas and concepts which could be brought back to the regional mechanisms for their consideration and possible integration in their work agendas.

The European Union is one of the most sophisticated examples of regional integration, including in terms of
migration, following the establishment of the Schengen Area. However, it is only in the past decade, following the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (moving from a national EU Member State competence to a Community competence), that international migration has become part of the EU governance framework. Whilst there is still much to be achieved, significant efforts and initiatives have been undertaken by the EU at a global level in partnership with countries worldwide, in order to address both the challenges and the opportunities of international migration.

Migration Management: EU Policy Convergence towards Global and Regional Cooperation

The concept of partnership and cooperation with third countries in the area of migration was acknowledged by the European Council at its meeting in Tampere in 1999, which set out an EU action plan on migration management. As the Tampere's Presidency Conclusions stated:

The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children.

The Tampere programme was followed by the multi-annual Hague Programme (2004-2009), where the EU acknowledged the importance of managing migration flows in a global manner by establishing relations with the countries of origin or transit and jointly carrying out cooperation projects and activities with them.

The Global Approach to Migration, launched by the European Council in December 2005, enhances the Tampere perspective through an integrated and balanced approach to migration. The Global Approach supports the development of a comprehensive approach to migration to be implemented in close cooperation with countries of origin and transit to the EU and which addresses the main aspects of the migratory phenomenon including prevention of irregular migration, facilitation of regular migration, promotion of the links between migration and development, and the promotion of migrant rights.

This "Global Approach" forms the basis of the numerous policy and legislative initiatives related to migration which have been launched by the European Commission in recent years. Geographically it has been applied to sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean as well as Eastern and South Eastern Europe. An integral part of the Global Approach is the "migratory route" concept, and the need to address migration issues faced by countries along the same migration route (countries of origin, transit and destination) in a coordinated manner.

Around the world IOM promotes the implementation of balanced and coherent migration policies, both thematically and geographically, and we therefore welcome the EU's adoption of its "global approach" to migration, and the numerous initiatives at the policy, legislative and programmatic level which the EU has taken to implement such an approach. IOM works closely with the European Union on the various new mechanisms that it has introduced in order to implement the Global Approach, such as migration profiles, mobility partnerships, and the circular migration concept. The Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third Countries in the Area of Migration and Asylum is an important vehicle for advancing the EU's migration management approach, and IOM is a strong partner of the EC in this programme.

Looking Ahead: Some Key Considerations for Inter-State Cooperation on Migration Management

Interstate Consultations/Policy Dialogue

IOM considers the role of inter-state and inter-regional consultation an essential component of effective migration management. In recent years, the EU has enhanced its efforts to establish policy dialogues through such consultation mechanisms. One such example is the Söderköping Process where, together with IOM, UNHCR and governments, the EU has established a structured dialogue with the involved states and EU member states to create a regional network for management of migration and asylum which has helped harmonize positions on migration within states acceding to the EU through a series of workshops and meetings.

The Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat and the EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Tripoli have been important initiatives for bringing the development-migration nexus on the agenda in consultation and cooperation with African states. The declarations and
action plans adopted by the participating governments include strong political commitments which were also reiterated during the first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, a continuing dialogue and clear implementation mechanisms for following through these commitments is needed, in particular in the context of the Global Forum.

**Data Management for Evidence-based Policy Making**

There is an acute need for improving data and statistics in the migration field. A standardized information flow between governments is needed in order to facilitate evidence-based policy making and maintain effective cooperation and coordination.

Migration Profiles, a tool which is being promoted by the EU to assist in the implementation of the Global Approach, can facilitate the development of policy in the field of migration and provide a basis for sound programming and evaluation in the migration area. Migration profiles can provide the framework for bringing the existing data from different sources together in a structured manner, thus helping to identify data gaps, enhance data collection and data analysis and sharing for governments. IOM is carrying out migration profiling studies in selected countries in Africa, as well as in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans.

**Capacity Building in Countries of Origin and Transit**

The concept of capacity building in migration management incorporates the whole spectrum of migration issues which need to be addressed by national governments and regional and international fora if migratory movements are to be managed in an effective orderly and humane manner.

Expert assistance to governments in order to build their capacities and skills in different areas of migration management constitutes an important tool for dealing with migration, and this is where the EU can play an important role in transmitting best practices of EU Member States to third countries. Training of migration officials through technical workshops and increasing bilateral, regional and international dialogue through informal consultations and seminars are good examples of fora for exchange of expertise. IOM has developed The Essentials of Migration Management as a training tool for government policy makers and practitioners.

In light of the EU's efforts to promote a common immigration policy, assisting source countries of labour migration to the EU to build their capacities can help to promote effective labour migration management. Priority needs in this field are more effective data management, labour market assessments in terms of skills and needs, the development of labour matching schemes, and enhanced capacities of national employment agencies for employment referral and training (including for returnees).

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are considered important tools for mainstreaming migration into development policies and improving the policy coherence. To this end, IOM has developed set of adaptable guidelines for integrating migration in PRSPs on a wider scale under the MIDA programme in DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Ghana.

Owing to the lack of mechanisms to support South-south migration, the EU has launched the Intra-ACP Migration Facility under the 9th European Development Fund and which is an extensive programme that aims at capacity building of ACP countries through informing policy makers and general public on migration and development matters. IOM welcomes this initiative.

**Environmental Migration - cooperation with countries of origin and transit**

Environmentally-induced migration is seen as one of the key threats of climate change by the EU and other international actors. To tackle this phenomena there is need to (i) increase knowledge base on the impacts of climate change; (ii) integrate adaptation into EU external actions, by particularly fostering dialogue and partnership on adaptation with third countries in the aim of preventing and dealing with potential climate change consequences such as forced migration and displacement of persons. EU migration policy should also take the impacts of climate change into account, in particular in migration management.

**Bernd Hemingway** is the Regional Representative for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Brussels.
Governance of migration touches on a broad range of economic, security, development, and social protection issues from the perspectives of both sending and host countries. At times, policies intended to address one of these areas may conflict with other policy priorities. Host-country restrictions on money transfers for security reasons end up hurting development in migrant-sending countries. Labor market requirements cause problems related to rapid demographic change. At other times, internal conflicts may develop within a policy area, as in airport and other security measures directed at certain groups, aiding in short-term detection of instruments of harm but potentially creating longer-term problems by creating tensions among the groups that are targeted.

In yet other cases, policies may help one group but hurt another; for example, laws that drive immigrants underground by withholding rights and legal status may help employers who do not need to train their workers, but also hurt employers who must invest in training. Or policies may be sold as helping one group -like laws that make it prohibitively difficult for the foreign-born to work legally in the name of protecting native-born workers, but in reality hurt all workers by making it easier for unscrupulous employers to abuse non-native workers. In this case, there is a gap between perceptions of policy impacts and realities, thus making unnecessary conflicts appear or hiding them.

The challenge in migration policy is to identify the conflicts inherent in any goal that is being pursued, to balance the relevant concerns, and to find ways to mitigate those conflicts so as to maximize benefits and minimize unintended, counterproductive consequences. Key to this process is understanding exactly what the effects of any policy might be.

Security and Goal Conflicts

European countries have experienced a range of immigration-related security challenges in recent years, from high-profile terrorist acts in London and Madrid carried out by recent immigrants and citizens born to immigrant parents; to riots in Paris; and ethnically or religiously motivated attacks on immigrants in many countries. Migrant-sending countries are concerned with the possible radicalization of émigrés in the host country; with the need to ease social tensions through emigration and the related need to keep skilled workers and to co-opt émigrés into projects that allow technology transfer to the sending country.

In the United States, migration-related security concerns tend to focus -with widely varying degrees of accuracy and relevance-on border crossing by unauthorized immigrants seeking work; high-skilled workers in sensitive industries; on questions of secure identification technologies and policies, particularly as regarding air travel; on Muslim, Arab, and South Asian minority populations; and on gang activity by youths principally but not exclusively from Central America and Asia.

Paradoxically, some of the policies intended to discourage unauthorized migrants from coming to the United States have also discouraged them from returning home, and thus have increased the number who live and work in the United States. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the price of crossing the border with the assistance of a coyote, or smuggler, has reportedly escalated dramatically. Because migrants fear not being able to return to the United States after visiting home, they have responded by staying semi- permanently.

Policies aimed at driving out unauthorized immigrants also conflict with the stated goal of promoting integration of immigrants. Because many families are mixed - including both legal and unauthorized migrants as well as citizens-increased enforcement can have a significant negative impact on families and communities. This in turn has troubling implications for the second and third generation, when children grow up in families where relatives’ status is unstable.

Looking at the French example, where rioting in the Parisian suburbs in 2005 was the consequence of economic and social exclusion, it becomes particularly clear that the contributing factors to security problems are much broader than traditional definitions, and that the solution must involve measures that include but by no means are limited to policing, incarceration and other "hard" security measures.
Economic and Labor Goal Conflicts

A large work force deemed to be “temporary” but in most cases is permanently marginalized has stark implications for future generations, raising moral and security issues, as well as economic questions. Temporary workers without the rights of citizens or permanent residents are vulnerable in the work place and thus easily exploitable, with consequences for both native-born workers and for longer-term social-and political stability.

There is significant tension between the needs of businesses with the least amount of value added by labor - for example, agricultural harvesting, meat packing and other repetitive tasks - and businesses for whose purposes some training is required, such as higher-level manufacturing and services. Businesses whose margin comes from skirting health and occupational safety rules, avoiding some of the pay owed to workers, have very different policy interests from businesses which see productivity as stemming from health, education and skills of workers. Policies that prioritize the needs of productivity based businesses are more likely to align with the interests of workers as well.

Social provision policies on health, education, and general welfare trade off short- and long-term fiscal goals: they entail costs in the short run, but social investments in health and education have long-term productivity benefits. Where social protection systems fall short or taxes are high, the costs of providing services to immigrants often perceived as pitting native-born citizens against the foreign-born and non-citizen members of the population, because this view ignores the long-term benefits of social investment. Immigration restrictionists argue that immigration must be limited in order to protect the rights of native-born workers. Yet the very restrictions that they advocate on migrants diminish the rights of all workers, by creating a marginalized subclass of workers whom employers threaten with the prospect of deportation as a way to deny overtime, back wages, and safe working conditions. The goal then must be policies promoting rights of both immigrant and native work forces through protection of rights for all.

Sending and Receiving Nation Interests

There also are goal conflicts inherent in the interests of migrant sending and receiving countries. The question of brain drain, in which the exodus of skilled workers can impede sending countries’ development, is paramount. This is perhaps the most complex of the policy challenges, with implications for education, technology transfer. Prof. Oded Stark argues that the emigration of high-skilled workers can provide incentives that prompt other citizens of migrant-sending countries to acquire additional skills. This possibility is particularly worth taking into account in cases involving health-care workers from developing countries, notably in Africa and the Philippines. Some studies contend that developing countries benefit when technological progress in developed countries - which rely heavily on foreign-born scientists, often from developing countries - lowers costs around the world. Skills are too little likely to be tapped to their full potential when scientists remain in countries without research clusters that have the resources to help develop knowledge. In addition, an oft-cited California Institute for Public Policy study shows skilled émigrés are highly likely to invest in businesses in their countries of origin. In other words, the question is not just whether skilled migrants emigrate, but what policies can be put into place to ensure technology transfer and improved education of those left behind.

Finally, there is a short-term contradiction in linking migration and development policy as a strategy to create the conditions that allow people the opportunity to stay in their countries of origin. Under the “migration hump” phenomenon, improved development in the sending country initially increases migration because more people can afford to leave. Policies must then seek medium to long term improvements for development to be an effective tool in rationalizing migration flows.

Reconciling Goals

The examples above show that to effectively design migration governance policies, they must take into account possible side effects of the policies under consideration, as well as the goals under consideration in related policy areas, to avoid working at cross purposes. Security policy must take into account economic realities and goals; labor market policies must take into account rights; and social provision policies must address the interplay of costs and benefits. Policies can be designed to mitigate the goal conflicts, making policy choices less of a zero-sum game than perceived. In other cases, an analysis of the facts reveals that there is less of a goal conflict than perceived. Sorting out reality and perception thus is a major component of reconciling policy intents and impacts.

Michele Wucker is Executive Director of the New York City-based World Policy Institute, a non-partisan centre for progressive global policy analysis and thought leadership.
The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), launched in Brussels on October 15 2007, is an instrument for benchmarking successful integration policies in Europe. MIPEX is a bi-annual assessment of integration policy, which examines an enlarging number of policy areas critical for a migrant’s opportunities to participate in her country of residence. This second version looked at six areas: labour market access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. The study uses the official EU definition of migrants, third-country nationals, which can be generally understood as persons without EU citizenship. The study covers the Member States of an enlarging European Union (EU 25, prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania) as well as selected countries of immigration outside the European Union. The study opens up direct comparisons between two countries by benchmarking their policies to the highest European standards for legal integration.

The study has grown immensely since the 2004 pilot version to become the largest study of its kind, from eighty to 140 policy indicators, thirty to almost one hundred national experts, and fifteen to 28 countries, including Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. The study is undertaken alongside an extensive network of 21 national partners, from think-tanks to large-scale NGOs and foundations, who contribute to the research design and launch debates in each of their countries. MIPEX is co-financed by the European Commission and co-managed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group. The research is led by MPG, along with two research partners, the University of Sheffield in the United Kingdom and the Free University of Brussels.

This discussion paper draws on many ongoing draft papers and past contributions to various conferences in order to situate the MIPEX project within the methodological framework of benchmarking as well as within the recent political context of European governance on migration policy.

How MIPEX can be used in the benchmarking debate on European governance of migration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU governance of migration policy</th>
<th>MIPEX’s contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Sharing information (mapping)</td>
<td>Comparative policy data &quot;what is&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Standard-setting (planning, analysis)</td>
<td>Normative framework &quot;what should be&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Non-binding principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EC legislation as benchmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Monitoring transposition and Mutual learning (implementation)</td>
<td>Monitoring standards &quot;what has been&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ex-ante evaluation &quot;what could be&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Benchmarking is a methodology for good governance that can be defined as the systematic and continual improvement of policies and practices based on the identification of high standards and the application of lessons learned from best practice. The process is broken down into four stages, which can then be applied to the progress made by the European institutions on issues of integration. Member State governments, European-wide networks of academics, social partners, and umbrella-NGOs have been drawn into a mapping process of defining integration, establishing a comparable vocabulary, and identifying areas of improvement for national policies across Europe.

In the planning phase, migration, integration, and citizenship have become areas of increasing European competence, be it through the Council of Europe or the European Union, particularly for the latter since the benchmark 1999 Tampere Conclusions. Successful mapping and planning exercises lead directly to the analysis phase, where new European measures set common European standards for these areas of improvement. In all cases, policy recommendations entailing high European standards have emerged from the mapping exercises led by European-wide networks of academics, proposal directives from the European
Commission, or proposals from networks of stakeholders and NGOs. For instance, the Migration Policy Group helped bring together the Starting Line Group for the anti-discrimination directives as well as the Amsterdam Proposals for the migration and integration directives, all of which draw on the Tampere legal benchmark.

Where have these recommendations for high European standards led to? Member States have incorporated these standards into the high, but open-ended, principles of many of Europe’s non-binding measures, such as the Lisbon Strategy and the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration Policy, which serve as general guides (rather than fixed standards) for national policies. In addition to non-binding European measures, European cooperation has also provided integration actors with binding legislative actions, such as EC directives on family reunion, long-term residence, and anti-discrimination or Council of Europe conventions on access to nationality and political participation at the local level. Certain directives, notably on anti-discrimination, retain high standards introduced in Commission, academic, or stakeholder proposals, whereas the negotiation process on other directives have watered high standards down to minimum standards which leave Member States great room for manoeuvre.

If one assumes that the analysis phase on integration is completed within the remit of the 2004-2009 Hague Programme, then the European institutions have progressed onto the implementation phase. On the one hand, the institutions have tasked networks of legal experts to undertake monitoring of the transposition of the EC directives (and their alternatively high or minimum standards). For example, due to the monitoring work of European Commission’s network of legal experts in the field of non-discrimination, the Commission has sent formal requests for ‘reasoned opinions,’ the first step towards legal infringement proceedings, to 14 Member States who have not correctly implemented the Racial Equality Directive.

On the other hand, numerous integration actors can undertake mutual learning in order to identify policies and practices across Europe that correspond to the highest common standards possible. This exercise enables countries to go beyond minimum standards and develop their own pathways to policy improvement in an objective and transparent manner. Governments and stakeholders may also track progress along these pathways as policies improve or backtrack over time. Successful monitoring and benchmarking exercises generate policy feedback, whereby new areas of improvement are identified, gaps in vocabulary remedied, and calls for European standard-setting and action initiated.

MIPEX, as one critical part of a benchmarking process, provides integration actors with comparable policy indicators, which measure to what extent a government’s policies meet high European standards on promoting integration. It reveals where the legal and policy framework affords migrants the opportunities to participate in their country of residence. Cross-national scientific analysis and additional research may later link MIPEX scores with additional national implementation and outcome indicators as well as contextual data. Areas of strength or weakness can be identified in policy itself, its implementation, its target group, public perceptions, the effect of the labour market model, etc. Follow-up benchmarking exercises can help to explain why a migrant does, does not, or cannot in practice take up the opportunities provided under the law. Benchmarking enables social scientists and policymakers to observe how successful integration measures lead to successful integration outcomes in many local, regional, and national contexts.

**MIPEX: from principles to policies**

Legal integration, meaning a migrant’s legal status, residence rights, citizenship, and access to rights, goods, services, and resources, receives wide expert acceptance as the first step in promoting integration. Groenendijk, Guild and Dogan put it this way in the introduction to their seminal 1998 Council of Europe report on Security of residence of long-term migrants:

"Our central hypothesis is that security of residence provides the immigrant with a firm base for orientation forward settlement and integration in the new society. For the native population, security of residence is a clear signal that public authorities have accepted the indefinite residence of the newcomers, that they are going to stay, will probably one day acquire full citizenship and that unequal treatment can no longer be justified on the basis of their provisional status in society. Hence, the importance of secure residence rights as a step towards full citizenship and social integration can hardly be overestimated." (Groenendijk et al. 1998 5).
This main expert assumption—that legal integration is the necessary but neither sole nor sufficient prerequisite for integration resurfaces again and again in the academic literature on integration. Most importantly, it forms the basis for the European Union's approach to legal integration of third-country nationals in the development of European Community law: the Tampere Council Conclusions of 1999.

This discussion of legal integration as the necessary but not sole prerequisite for promoting integration reaffirms the importance policy indicators as the starting point in an integration policy evaluation chain. The Migrant Integration Policy Index has produced the first quantitative and comparative dataset based on policy indicators comparing measuring the legal provisions in place across various European countries to promote the integration of third-country national migrant residents. The 2007 second edition established MIPEX as a reliable biannual stocktaking on a widening range of policy areas critical to legal integration. Future editions may consider additional realms relevant to integration.

Given that policy indicators compare policies to an overall vision and set of principles and norms, the first step in drawing up MIPEX was the design of a normative framework. The choices in MIPEX were inspired by Europeanisation and the positions taken by policymakers and civil society stakeholders in setting Europe's standards on promoting integration. The overall framework is the guiding Tampere conclusion that a non-EU migrant's legal status should be approximated to that of nationals of Member States.

This legal integration framework has been articulated in the very specific terms of equality of opportunity and comparable rights and responsibilities located in EC Directives, which EU Member States are obligated to transpose into their national laws, or Council of Europe Conventions, which ratifying countries have committed to implement. Where Directives and Conventions only provide minimum standards or allow numerous derogations, the normative framework draws on higher standards from EC Presidency Conclusions, proposals for EC directives and recommendations from EU-wide policy-oriented research projects. This resulting normative framework allows for evaluations of whether the legal policy framework provides the conditions which are necessary but not alone sufficient for promoting integration.

One challenge endemic to policy comparisons is that such frameworks are by definition based on certain normative assumptions as to the principles and policies that best promote the overall goal, in this case immigrant integration. Although the mainstream inclusion principles expressed in European cooperation and academic discourse are also found in many government definitions of integration, these principles are translated into laws and policies to varying degrees, especially given the piecemeal creation of integration policies in many European countries. Policies deviating from general principles of equality may run the risk of becoming legal obstacles to rather than facilitators of immigrant integration.

In some countries the normative framework may not correspond on every point to the public philosophy and priorities of the current government. The onus is then upon governments to provide and to prove their objective and reasonable justifications as to how these digressions will pursue the legitimate aim of promoting the vision of integration. In this light, MIPEX makes its normative framework fully transparent and open for discussion in its national launch events. Indeed the fact that the project has brought a normative framework to the realm of integration facilitates new debate about what principles lie behind different national integration policies, what justifications are made for changes in law, and what policy coherence has been attained.

The second step in MIPEX is the design of 140 policy indicators to compare national laws and policies according to the normative framework. To be precise, a policy indicator is developed relating to a very specific policy component of one of the six strands. For each the normative framework is translated into three possible answer options. The maximum of three points is awarded to policies that meet these highest European standards. A score of 1 and 2 points corresponds to some of the more restrictionist policy options observed in practices of EU Member States or the derogation clauses of Community directives. Individual indicator scores can then be aggregated together into dimensions and strands that provide a broad-brush overview for policy comparison. It is important to highlight that policy indicators do not replace in-depth research. Rather, MIPEX's quantitative and comparable results make integration policies in Europe more accessible to a wider range of stakeholders and provide a framework for more comprehensive investigations.
The contribution of MIPEX to a joined-up approach is the systematic provision of a quantitative, comparable, and updated database for evaluating integration policy in the following five respects. At the national level, users can assess the success of government policies in meeting the MIPEX’s normative framework for promoting integration. For instance, the labour market access strand in Sweden scores best practice (100%) since resident migrant workers have approximately equal access, security, and rights as Swedish workers as well as possibilities to take up labour market integration measures.

Comparisons can also be made between areas of policy strength and weakness to check for policy coherence. Luxembourg’s policies score consistently halfway to best practice, except in the area of political participation where policies are found to be favourable for promoting integration. Published biannually the MIPEX has an additional longitudinal component to track policy changes over time. At the international level, a country’s successful performance can be compared to those of its neighbours as well as to the ‘average’ for the EU-25, EU-15, or EU-10.

What policy indicators can do best are ex ante evaluations by holding a mirror up to EU Member States for stakeholders to use in the evaluation of new law and policy proposals. The European Commission has since 2006 ensured that future legislation is compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, while Equality Impact Assessments and other mechanisms involving equality bodies and ombudsmen are possible in countries like Norway, Sweden, and the UK. In practice, Ardittis and Laczko’s 2008 international review of assessing the costs and impacts of migration policy found frequent implementation evaluations but little to no ex ante evaluation. Publically available evaluations are even rarer. For Joanne van Selm 2008 the reason is that ex ante evaluations have the greatest policy influence:

An ex ante evaluation assesses the potential impact and seeks to demonstrate weaknesses as well as strengths in the proposed policy instrument and the capacity to meet the stated objectives. It is also the point at which questions can still be raised concerning the objectives, and whether realization is both reasonable and viable given a particular context. (96)

The underdevelopment of ex ante evaluations means that evaluations in integration policy tend to privilege efficiency and effectiveness over vision and principles. This discrepancy favours recommendations to toughen, reinforce, or improve current measures and rules out other options. As noted by Professor Carl Dahlerom in Swedish case on immigrant integration, “the conclusions for policymakers were, therefore, that they were doing the right thing, but just not enough.” The European Commission’s second edition Handbook on Integration observes that exclusively implementation evaluations will not capture problems with the overall strategic direction and use of integration standards. In that sense policy indicators are also useful in ex post evaluations when evaluating new directions and higher normative standards for unsuccessful policy approaches.

One of the conclusions from the Handbook is that policies and their principles should themselves be made the subject of evaluations, since policy indicators, like those in MIPEX, may bring significant improvements to the appropriateness and quality of a country’s integration strategy. For instance the Runnymede Trust (UK) saw the role that the MIPEX framework in evaluating proposals in a February 2008 Green Paper on the path to citizenship;

The type of rules a country will adopt to regulate entry and citizenship will depend to a considerable degree its vision for the society it is seeking to build. While identifying integration as a goal, many of the ways in which this is meant to be achieved may, in our view, be counterproductive. The range of additional burdens and restricted rights to be extended over an increased number of years is more likely to alienate rather than to integrate people who choose to come to the UK to work or to join their families. Runnymede 3.

The evaluation found that should the proposals be adopted the UK would lose its place as 5th most favourable for promoting integration to fall to 10th, just around the EU average. However, the UK’s ‘middle of the road’ conditions for naturalisation would become some of Europe’s most onerous, on par with Austria and Denmark. The contribution of MIPEX to the evaluation chain, particularly for ex ante evaluation, is the systematic provision of a quantitative, comparable, and updated database in the following five respects. Using the MIPEX policy indicator database, stakeholders build
their arguments around assessments of policy’s success in meeting the highest standards for promoting integration, track changes over time, check for policy coherence, and compare national policy performance to that of neighbours and the EU on average.

What policy indicators have difficulty doing is make recommendations for change. Certainly the normative content of the MIPEX indicators draws attention to areas of policy weakness and away from areas of policy strength. On the basis of policy indicator scores alone, it is difficult for governments, with their limited political capital and many tradeoffs and lags, to know which policies to reform when and in what order (Kaufman 2004 8). Kaufman further cautions against ‘teaching to the test’ or ‘reform illusion’ where, in the international development field, rules are changed in isolation on easily ‘actionable’ indicators with the aim of climbing higher on donor’s scorecards. The same could be said for the transposition of EC directives where Member States may adopt a ‘copy out’ strategy by lifting the minimum requirements and wording from the directive in a new national law that goes unenforced. Here the aim would be ticking-the-box on Commission scorecards and thus avoiding infringement proceedings.

Coming back to the hypothesis that legal integration is the necessary but not sufficient first step, it holds that policy indicators must be complemented with the other indicator types in the evaluation chain. This joined-up approach will capture the poorly understood casual links between policies, outcomes, and the other parts in the ’missing middle.’ These assessments can then give weight to policy indicators found to have a significant effect on outcomes and inform policy recommendations for change. A diverse set of other integration actors must step up with complementary indicator types in order to evaluate which actionable MIPEX indicators are also ‘action worthy,’ meaning changes in these policies will translate into real progress on meeting integration principles.

Conclusions

The road to successful integration leads from principles to the comparison of policies and other governmental inputs and from there to the more complicated measurements of outputs, outcomes, and impact. It is a bumpy road with many challenges, yet indicators and analytical tools can illuminate where policies match high principles, are efficient and effective, produce clear results and have an impact on the convergence of outcomes despite the various other factors at play.

Realistically speaking, a joined-up approach would be required to link MIPEX’s policy indicators with the various indicator types needed to produce a complete evaluation chain to measure policy success. What cannot underestimate the significant time and investment from its partners and favourable policymaking conditions, timing, and political will that will be required to move evaluation forward in the migration policy field. Piecemeal progress has been achieved through contributions like the MIPEX in various local, national, and European circumstances. The British Council and Migration Policy Group hope in their own ways to facilitate new partnerships in this joined-up approach, as part of its mandate to enhance European cooperation between and amongst governmental agencies, civil society organisations, and the private sector.

References

Ardditis, S. and Laczko, F., Assessing the costs and impacts of migration policy: an international comparison, (International organisation for migration and Eurasylum; Geneva, 2008)


European Commission, Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners (First and second editions; Brussels, 2004 and 2007).


Kaufman, D. and Kraay, A., Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?, (MPRA Paper No. 8212, posted 10 April 2008 / 16:39)

Niessen, J. and Huddleston, T., On using indicators for raising and meeting integration standards, in Huddleston and Niessen (eds.), Legal frameworks for the integration of third-country nationals, (Brill; Nijmegen, forthcoming).

Niessen, J., Huddleston, T. and Citron, L., The Migrant Integration Policy Index (British Council and Migration Policy Group; Brussels, October 2007)
Niessen, J. and Huddleston, T., Setting up a system of benchmarking to measure the success of integration policies in Europe. (European Parliament; Brussels, 2007)

Runnymede Trust, Written Consultation Response to The Path to Citizenship (Runnymede Trust; London, May 2008).

Thomas Huddleston is a policy analyst at the Migration Policy Group and co-authored the second edition of the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX).
Migration & the Labour Market

In the EU member states, the regulations on labour migration lack transparency, legitimacy and efficiency. Due to demographic changes within the European Union the need for a foreign labour force is evident. However, Europe lacks the tools to manage labour migration based on the qualifications of the immigrants, without displacing its domestic work force. Receiving public acceptance of labour migration policies is crucial in order to successfully integrate immigrants into European labour markets.

Are there mechanisms in the European Union for a coherent policy management on human capital and labour migration in Europe? Do European governance bodies exist to coherently manage and control labour migration? Is a governance of labour migration possible in light of the different situations of the labour markets in the member states? Does the EU Enlargement have an influence on the labour migration policies within the European Union?

- James Wickham explores the conditions to design a European policy for skilled migration that also contributes towards social equity and social cohesion.
- Matin Ruhs, member of the UK’s new Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), introduces the committee’s analysis and recommendations on “Labour shortages and immigration policy”.
- Emanuele Galossi and Maria Mora analyze discriminatory structures toward immigrants in the Italian labour market.
At the Lisbon Council in 2000 the leaders of the European Union gave themselves the dramatic objective of creating the 'world's most competitive knowledge-based economy'. Today one sign of the failure of that ambition is the extent to which young European researchers are now in American universities, research institutes and firms. From this perspective, Europe does not have an immigration problem, it has an emigration problem.

In this brief paper I outline some of the new forms of skilled mobility and new reasons why people migrate. In particular I ask whether it is possible to design a European policy for skilled migration that also contributes towards social equity and social cohesion.

New patterns of mobility and migration

Traditional discussions of migration focus on movements of people move from one country of permanent residence to another. While migration was never that simple, now it has become much more complicated.

Firstly, the boundary line between migration and simply travelling has become blurred, and this is especially the case for many in skilled occupations. Some occupations and some industries require extensive work-related travel, often across national borders. For example, a study of the Irish software industry has shown how extensive air travel is part of the job description of many managers and professionals, enabling small Irish-owned firms to be 'born global' and reach international markets immediately (Wickham and Vecchi, 2008). There are executives who commute between different subsidiaries, often spending time in an apartment rented by the company; some have 'homes' in different countries. In the same industry project work means that Irish engineers will spend at least several weeks working on the client's site in a city such as London or Frankfurt. In jobs as different as financial management and university teaching, a period of several months in another country is important to a successful career.

Secondly, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world a growing number of occupations seem to involve transnational labour markets. Whereas the traditional management career involved moving upwards within the national hierarchy of the same company, now it involves movement both between employers and between countries. Such careers are found not just in many areas of management, but crucially in areas such as NGOs, scientific research and third level education.

Thirdly, young migrants may leave less developed countries for the centres of scientific or managerial innovation, but later return to their home country. They often utilise ethnic networks to mobilise capital and to disseminate technological and organisational knowledge. Thus the origins of the indigenous software industries in countries as different as Ireland and China lie partly in emigrants returning from the USA. Such 'sea turtles' (as they are named in China) have ensured that 'brain circulation' has often replaced simple 'brain drain'. Some such movements also seem to create further movements, with a steady flow of researchers, managers and entrepreneurs moving back and forth between Asia and the USA.

Cosmopolitan service class

These trends contribute towards a growing cosmopolitanism of what sociologists often term the 'service class', crudely people in professional and managerial occupations. In the UK for example those in service class occupations are disproportionately likely to have been born outside the UK, with the proportion especially high in London. This is not simply a question of skilled immigration, since these new arrivals - unlike less skilled immigrants - are also disproportionately like to leave again. Furthermore, just as skilled immigrants are arriving, so 'natives' with high skills are leaving, again often to return again later.

Ireland is a dramatic example of this tendency. Chart 1 shows that in 2002 about 16% of all those with only primary education had lived outside the country, either because they were immigrants or because they had emigrated and since returned. By contrast, of those with at least a graduate qualification, the proportion was over 43%.
This trend is by no means identical across countries. Chart 2 uses an OECD analysis of national census results to show the proportion of those with foreign birthplaces in the different educational groups. Over 15% of graduates in both the UK and (especially) Ireland were born abroad. By contrast, in France and (especially) Germany the service class is significantly more ‘national’ in origin.

New motivations, new policies

Discussion of skilled migration usually assumes that such migrants are driven by economic considerations. There is however a growing literature which suggests that other motivations are often more important.

Today many skilled people from relatively rich countries migrate for reasons as diverse as political and cultural discomfort (e.g. many young Poles in the early 21st century) to the simple desire to have fun. Such lifestyle migration is hardly however the prerogative of the feckless young - nor indeed, of sybaritic older Northern Europeans heading South for retirement. Richard Florida has argued that the ‘creative class’ (roughly the professional and managerial service class) now moves to areas which can offer an attractive life style. Because the creative class values creativity and diversity, its members move to places where these exist. Once there, they then create jobs. The policy consequence is clear:

‘The trick for cities, then, is to figure out how to make this mobile talent want to come - and ideally stay.’ (Florida, 2005: 16).

Clearly skilled migration policy involves a lot more than work permits and tax rates. It is useful to distinguish between ‘hard’ policies which are clearly defined and targeted exclusively at migrants, and ‘soft’ policies which address the society as a whole even though they turn out to be important for migrants.

A necessary but not sufficient condition for attracting skilled immigrants is easy access to the labour market. The proposed EU ‘Blue Card’ would standardise entry procedures and even more importantly ensure that skilled immigrants entered a common European labour market. However, the name is in fact a misnomer. Compared to the US Green Card the proposed Blue Card is restrictive, since it would not give the right to permanent residency.

A country’s ability to attract and retain skilled migrants depends on the openness of its skilled labour markets. If firms and organisations rely on internal promotion for their skilled staff, then they will not consider recruiting immigrants. German firms for example have been shown to be significantly less likely to recruit foreign managers than UK firms (Winkelman, 2002). If in addition a career in such organisations means a long and uncertain wait in temporary contracts before possibly gaining a permanent post, then qualified people will seek more open labour markets.

This rigidity is the main reason for the mass emigration of French, Italian and German young academics today. Some skilled migrants appear to choose their destination in terms of the quality of life that a city offers; for many this determines whether they stay. Here soft policies are decisive. Increasingly, European city governments are aware that their economic success requires skilled immigrants. This is a further reason for policies - such as effective public transport - that make a difference to the quality of urban life for all citizens.

National attitudes to ethnic diversity might seem far removed from the normal concerns of skilled migration policy. The German Green Card scheme for non-EU IT specialists is widely held to have failed because of Germany’s perceived hostility to immigrants. By contrast, the Scottish Executive ‘Fresh Talent’ policy proudly announces to potential immigrants that:
“Scotland is a multicultural society. In 2001, it was reported that 2% of Scotland’s population was from a non-white, minority ethnic group.”

As cultural diversity becomes part of the national brand it is managed and sold to potential migrants. Cultural diversity shifts from a ‘soft’ and contextual issue to a crucial component of ‘hard’ and explicitly targeted policy.

**Conclusion: migrants and policies**

Effective policy depends on specifying what sort of migrants a country wishes to attract. The term ‘skilled migrant’ covers many different groups. Classifying in terms of income would separate the highly paid ‘superstars’ from the merely well heeled ‘experts’. Intended length of stay would separate short term ‘visitors’ from long term ‘settlers’ (although individuals may move between categories over time). For example, in Dubai most high skill immigrants are ‘visitors’, the UK clearly recruits both ‘visitors’ and ‘settlers’. The UK debate over the taxation of ‘non-doms’ (earners not domiciled in the UK) is essentially about ‘super stars’, especially in the City of London. Most of these are at least potentially ‘settlers’, although the debate itself highlights that settlement is not necessarily permanent.

If migration policy focuses on ‘super stars’, it will tend to make the distribution of income more unequal. It will exacerbate trends towards ‘winner take all’ labour markets in which a few very well remunerated stars co-exist with an ever larger number of badly paid and insecure jobs. A focus on ‘visitors’ will also prioritise short term financial rewards; it will assume that migrants do not intend to have a career within the host society and are disinterested in the broader quality of life.

By contrast, a focus on ‘settlers’ would not only make skilled labour markets more open to immigrants, it would ensure that skilled ‘natives’ were less likely to be pushed into emigration. Equally, for many ‘expert’ migrants what matters is the cultural atmosphere and social infrastructure of a country and especially of a city. Furthermore, there is also evidence that some young professionals actually prefer ‘European’ societies because of their social cohesion and social welfare, in explicit contrast to the hyper-individualism of the USA (American healthcare is frequently cited here). A policy that welcomes skilled migrants in this way will however only be politically acceptable if it is coupled with responsible restraints on unskilled immigration.

Finally, even if many migrants may leave again, it is clear that treating them as ‘visitors’ ensures that they are less likely to come in the first place. Here the contrast between US and European attitudes to skilled immigrants is dramatic. American policy treats visitors as potential settlers, in particular by making citizenship relatively accessible. It thus makes the society appear generally more welcoming. If Europe is to attract and retain skilled migrants, it cannot treat them as Gastarbeiter.

**References**


James Wickham is the Director of the ERC and Jean Monnet Professor of European Labour Market Studies in the Department of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin.
Employment Discrimination against Migrant workers in the Italian labour market

This article is a summary of a wider research carried out in 2006/2007 within the Equal LEADER project on employment discrimination against migrant workers in Italy. The importance of this research lies in the belief that the integration of new citizens is closely linked to a correct inclusion in the labour market, which must be achieved by respecting equal opportunities, fighting against illegal and undeclared work, protecting workers as well as containing the brain waste phenomenon by recognising qualifications and giving access to vertical mobility.

It is common knowledge that the Italian labour market continuously absorbs and needs a new migrant labour force, especially in some sectors, however not everybody knows the real working and employment conditions of migrants. Discrimination and racism against migrant workers, who are often silent victims of these phenomena, are even more obscure and only known generically through the news or direct experience.

This research shows that both direct and indirect discrimination are widespread; discrimination takes place when entering the labour market and also while working. Besides simple discrimination, multiple discrimination occurs when different factors are combined: nationality, gender, length of stay in Italy, age, religion and so on. Finally, other relevant forms of discrimination against foreign workers by colleagues and employers are racism and xenophobia.

First of all, the research shows that there are different forms of discrimination in the labour market which can occur during the various macro-phases of the work cycle: access, conditions and type of workplace, terms for resignation of employment. As for the first macro-phase, besides various legal constraints, there is still strong reticence about "allowing" immigrants to access prestigious and highly skilled jobs or jobs for which there is a large pool of Italian nationals. As a matter of fact, the majority of foreigners, even those with a high level of human capital, enter in the low-wage labour market.

In this way, "dequalification" of the immigrant workforce adds up not only to brain wasting but also compromises the correct functioning of the labour market, because it fuels fragmentation processes. “Dequalification” reaches particularly high levels among women, who experience discrimination on the grounds of both nationality and gender. It is clear that such mechanisms work in the same way with other types of discrimination such as age, disability or religion, triggering in this way multiple discrimination processes.

The double discrimination against foreign women probably is the most potent. This survey illustrates that the condition of immigrant women in the Italian labour market is quite complicated. The first remark is about horizontal occupational segregation. As a matter of fact, women seem to be concentrated even more than men in a few occupational sectors. Care and housework are usually the only job opportunities for the majority of female workers who decide to leave their country to work.

Moreover, in these sectors there can be conditions that further discriminate against workers. There are no opportunities for career advancement and undeclared work is frequent. In this sector it is very hard to unionise workers, working hours and conditions are extremely flexible and often depend on the needs of the employer; moreover, wages are often quite low and social security and public assistance contributions are minimal (if met at all).

In Italy, discrimination in the workplace and unequal working conditions seem to answer to a more comprehensive process of segmentation and precarisation of the labour market; this process leads to lower protection for foreign employees who constitute a particularly "vulnerable" group of labour.

The most common forms of discrimination revealed by this research concern:

---

5 Progetto LEADER - Lavoro e occupazione senza discriminazioni Etniche e Religiose, IT-S2-MDL-272.
• The recognition of qualifications: A gap between foreign workers potential and professional achievement has been found; this can be ascribed in part to the difficulties immigrants find in the recognition of university and professional qualifications, especially if these have been obtained in the country of origin.

• Job level: The majority of foreigners work at the lowest levels, even though they actually carry out tasks that, according to the respective collective agreements in force, fall into higher job levels.

• Compliance of terms of contract and working conditions: Among the forms of discrimination identified these should be emphasized: an excessive use of overtime work which is usually paid "cash in hand". The use of foreign workers to carry out the hardest tasks or to cover less desirable shifts (night, holiday, weekend shifts etc.). Failure to pay or irregular payment of the severance indemnity (TFR), which is often not paid out to workers. Moreover, the gap between wages of native and immigrant workers is still wide and growing.

• End of work contracts: The research shows there are differences in the enforcement of employment laws for native and foreign workers in various sectors, especially for dismissal.

• Training and Security: Investment in training and security is the first element to be neglected by firms; this happens in particular in those sectors where there is a higher presence of foreign labour. As we have found out, the condition of immigrant workers is quite adverse in a labour market where labour costs tend to be reduced more and more as a solution to help enterprises gain competitiveness.

Finally, discrimination can also be found in professional trajectories; this mirrors the phenomena just mentioned and it is a process where the reticence of the native population about a genuine equal opportunity system plays an important role.

Immigrants who are less vulnerable to discrimination seem to be those with more skills and knowledge. The work context and the nationality of the worker seem to be more important for interaction with the external environment; these two elements play an important role in the integration into the labour market. The original economic and social backgrounds as well as previous experience gained during the migration process also play an active role. The knowledge of Italian is considered important not only to combat discriminatory attitudes of various kinds, but also to facilitate inclusion and relations in the surrounding environment.

Risks linked to unemployment

During stagnation periods and market contraction, the weakest social groups like immigrants and unskilled workers are destined to suffer the consequences of the downsizing of labour and are more exposed to risks such as unemployment and dismissal. Social exclusion and the high number of immigrants among long term unemployed people show the economic, social and political costs linked to discrimination. Not surprisingly, parallel to the growth of employed people there has been an increase of unemployed people.

Moreover, the incipient tertiarisation of advanced economies and the increase of competitiveness require more qualifications and selection of human resources. This process might penalise immigrants, who usually work in traditional sectors that are more affected by changes linked to globalisation and where more strategies of delocalisation are adopted. Unemployment entails a high risk of marginalisation, especially for immigrants, and a consequent regression in the integration and assimilation process. A higher exposure to unemployment is indicative of the perpetration of discriminatory practices in working conditions.

Objective and subjective elements in discriminatory processes

Some interviewees reveal that there is self-discrimination among immigrants; some believe it is "normal" and inevitable that they are assigned certain kinds of jobs. This seems to explain and be fitting for many cases concerning the professional integration of immigrants who have the following needs: work as a need and work to ensure income to start and/or continue the migratory project, temporarily resigning to skills acquired during previous jobs and/or studies, while awaiting better opportunities.

In fact, we discovered that both the so called "intermediate witnesses" and workers feel there is a gap be-
between foreign workers potential and their achievement, at least regarding access to work. This is also due to the difficulties concerning the recognition of university and professional qualifications which inevitably lead to the "occupational segregation" of foreigners in some labour market sectors.

The fact that immigrants have unskilled jobs usually with low wages has some consequences. Among those, the most serious is no doubt the housing problem: the high rent prices imply that often flats are shared by too many tenants; this leads to a decrease in the value of houses and the widespread practice of real estate agencies that do not rent houses to foreigners. As a result, "discrimination by delegation" takes place, that is to say foreigners face major barriers in finding a house (also irrespective of their economic possibilities) because landlords "delegate" the task not to rent their house to foreigners to agencies.10

Immigration, discrimination and collective bargaining

Finally, our survey demonstrates that, in spite of formal equality sanctioned by law and collective agreements, working conditions of immigrants employed by Italian firms remain poor in every way. Discrimination at work - in the labour market as well in the workplace - is in fact critical and long-lasting; public institutions and other bodies that play an important role in protecting democracy and even have a pedagogical function within firms and among workers such as trade unions should solve these problems.

Among the regulations that establish a protection scheme for foreign workers, collective bargaining and more generally industrial relations deserve a specific mention. In fact, in these areas some primary conditions may exist in order to make anti-discrimination norms established by the Community and national legislator effective. Unfortunately, until now the same trade union admits that "the bargaining experience has not been very influential". This is a constraint that would concern all levels of the Italian system of industrial relations - on the national, company and local levels.

There is no doubt that the scarce spread of contract clauses concerning the specific features of working and living conditions of immigrant workers also reveals a difficulty and a limited ability of trade unions to take concrete action, notwithstanding the considerable effort to try to represent, offer protection to and integrate immigrant workers in trade unions.

Ultimately, the importance of this study lies in the belief and the evidence that the integration of new citizens is closely linked to their correct inclusion in the labour market, which must be achieved by respecting equal opportunities and fighting illegal and undeclared work, protecting workers in every way, containing brain waste processes through the recognition of qualifications and giving access to vertical mobility.

Maria Mora and Emanuele Galossi are researchers at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, the research institute of CGIL, the biggest Italian trade union confederation. Their activities are focused on migrations and antidiscrimination policies.

10 Incidentally, we notice that citizens who migrate alone encounter difficulties in renting a house but even more serious problems must be faced in case of family reunifications.
Migration & Development

The connection between migration and development is overlooked in migration policies. Yet this connection has positive potential through the monetary flows of remittances and the impacts of diaspora communities both for the host countries and the countries of origin. The effects of "brain drain" however can often harm countries due to the emigration of their most qualified workforce. Recently many countries of emigration are experiencing the return of the well-educated and highly qualified, creating the counter phenomenon of "brain gain".

How can the potential of migration become an element of European and international development collaborations? How can remittances be specifically used for poverty reduction and development?

- Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Denis Drechsler and Jason Gagnon from the OECD Development Centre discuss how low- and middle-income countries should manage migration to serve their own economic goals.
- Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah present the results of the new survey about the impact of emigration flows in Kerala, India.
- Oded Stark analyzes the work effort given by illegal immigrants toward their jobs in their host country as an economic factor based on the prospect of expulsion and the risk of losing the host-wage which is higher than the home-country wage.
- Hans Werner Mundt trades off positive against negative effects of migration and argues why a cooperative management of migration is needed.
Immigration reform in several OECD countries; few public policy issues command as much attention or generate as much passion among voters and taxpayers. In the context of immigration countries, such public debates focus, at least in part, on determining how migration can be managed to best serve the nation's interests. Indeed, several studies, such as the OECD horizontal project on Managing Labour Migration to Maximise Economic Growth, seek to provide solid evidence-based recommendations for OECD countries to enact migration policies that promote economic growth. But how should low- and middle-income countries manage migration to serve their own economic goals? This is the subject of this article.

Unlike the issue of return migration, migration management in developing countries has not been subject to rigorous analytical scrutiny, though there are some important papers in the short bibliography on the topic, including Newland (2005) and Hatton (2007). Thus the Development Centre's strategy has not been to review or test existing hypotheses and concepts, but to look at a number of countries' experience with migration management. The objective is to provide empirical accounts that will contribute to this emerging area of policy debate.

To this end, the OECD Development Centre undertook three case studies in collaboration with leading international experts to assess concrete policy options available to developing countries to improve migration management. Two of the most important migration corridors involving both developing and OECD countries - namely, the corridor linking Mexico and the United States, and the migration flows to Europe from the Mediterranean basin (with a focus on Morocco, Egypt, Israel and Turkey) - are represented in the case studies. The third looks at migration flows in Indonesia, which, while not an OECD country, is nevertheless one of the "enhanced engagement" countries with which the Organisation now works more closely, and which furthermore provides evidence to this study from an Asian case.

The case studies explicitly consider emigration, immigration and transit migration as well as the relationship between internal and international migration. Furthermore the importance of circular and return migration is assessed in detail. The migrant-sending countries in these studies will be collectively referred to as "developing countries" though this is not entirely precise: they include OECD countries (Mexico, Turkey), OECD candidate and enhanced engagement countries (Indonesia, Israel), and non-OECD countries (Egypt, Morocco).12

Tools for Migration Management

Not every country of origin in the developing world wields public policy to get more from the migration-development nexus. But in many cases, there has been over the years a change in perception among decision makers regarding the relative importance of migration as a concern for public policy, and sometimes a conscious attempt to incorporate migration-related issues into development policies. Migrants themselves, once characterised as traitors or worse, are now heralded as heroes in public pronouncements in Indonesia.

In Egypt, beginning in the 1970s, authorities began to see migration as a pressure-release valve, and even as a development tool; today there is some political support and new programmes to help migrants with integration in host countries. In Morocco, policies have likewise shifted over time from attempting to stop migration, to promoting circular migration and engaging Moroccan diasporas. Turkey has been proactive, allowing dual citizenship and encouraging circular migration. Israel, meanwhile, has been transformed from an immigration country to one marked by strong emigration, and policies have recently shifted from luring people with needed skills to luring back those who have left (or retaining those who might otherwise leave).

What kind of policy tools are available to developing countries should they seek to increase the benefits and minimise the risks associated with international migra-

---

11 See Dayton-Johnson et al. (2007) for discussion of policy trade-offs in migration policies in European OECD countries, and in developing countries.

12 Unless explicitly noted otherwise, statements regarding Mexico, the Mediterranean Basin countries (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Turkey) and Indonesia are based on the case-study papers listed in the Annex by Alba, Tovias and Tovias, and Hugo, respectively.
tion? In general, policy options can be grouped into the following three categories:

- migration policies narrowly conceived
- international agreements
- non-migration policies with an impact on migration and development.

Migration policies narrowly conceived include measures to leverage, whether implicitly or explicitly, the development potential of the international mobility of nationals. Surely the most remarked upon case of migration management in a country of origin is the Philippines, where public policy in this regard relies upon what we have called migration policies narrowly conceived.\(^{13}\) Migration management in Filipino public administration dates back to laws passed in 1974, and is centred around four pillars: the regulation of recruitment, management of the deployment process, the protection and representation of migrant workers and the establishment of recording mechanisms.

These are inscribed in what can be viewed as the "Magna Carta" of Filipino migration management: The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Together with the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), it seeks not only to ensure the welfare of migrants, but that migration also contributes to the general development of the country. Much of the gains accrued in the Philippine "migration industry" can be attributed to lessons on micro-management learned abroad and applied at home such as the regulation of migrant recruitment agencies, pre-departure preparation of migrants going abroad, the protection of migrant workers through the establishment of financial funds, the development of recording and tracking systems and competition promotion in the remittances industry.

Migration policies may take the form of expenditures to favour migrants abroad or to promote relations with diasporas, such as efforts, like those launched by Israel and Mexico, to attract skilled emigrants back to their home. Or they may take the form of legislation, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, that aids migrants abroad. The cornerstone of the Philippines’ much-remarked upon migration policy has been the production of migrants in host countries; this is true of some of the case-study countries covered by this project. Morocco, Egypt and Turkey tackle issues of border management in close collaboration with the European Union, helping to harmonise immigration and emigration policies.

Policies to facilitate migrants’ settlement and integration into their host countries can be seen as a third set of migration policies with an impact on development and well-being of migrants and their families. Notable examples from the case studies include efforts by the para-statal Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidants à l’Étranger in Morocco to send imams and language teachers to work with Moroccan migrants abroad, or the promotion by Mexico of the matricula consular - an identity card for its migrants abroad. Also in this vein, Indonesia allows a growing involvement of civil society (e.g. NGOs, Migrant Worker Organisations) in questions related to migration management, in part to ease policy-making capacity constraints within government.

Finally, there are policies to facilitate and lower the cost and increase the social benefits of remittance transfers, such as increasing the geographic reach of financial institutions by Turkey and Morocco to increase their accessibility for migrants and their families, or the Directo a México initiative of the US Federal Reserve System and the Mexican central bank. Mexico’s Tres por uno programme, which matches each peso remitted for community-development projects with federal, state and municipal funds, is an example of a public policy to raise the social return to remittances.\(^{14}\)

International agreements can be bilateral, regional or multilateral. Bilateral agreements come in several forms. They include temporary or seasonal worker programmes, like the Bracero Programme between the United States and Mexico discussed below, or the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme between Canada and Mexico, as well as similar agreements between Turkey and several European countries. (Mexico has also recently struck a memorandum of understanding with Spain on temporary workers.) Bilateral agreements also include more complicated readmission programmes, such as those observed between some Mediterranean countries. Mexican efforts aim at establishing an administrative dialogue regarding the handling and management of returning migrants.

\(^{13}\) See Ruiz (2008).

\(^{14}\) OECD (2005) assesses the Tres por uno programme in addition to providing a global overview of the links between remittances and development.
Indonesia has concluded several Memoranda of Understanding with migrant receiving countries to improve the situation of migrant workers abroad (e.g. Malaysia, South Korea, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Australia, Chinese Taipei). Repatriation programmes - whether to attract highly skilled workers back home, or to expel workers who illegally entered a country - are another category of bilateral agreement.

Regional agreements like the Regional Migration Conference or Puebla Process, instituted among Canada, the United States, Mexico, all Central American countries and the Dominican Republic bring more players to the table. And genuinely multilateral agreements include initiatives such as the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the International Migration Convention of 1998 (ratified in 2003), or the GATS Mode IV agreement on the international movement of service providers.

Among non-migration policies with an impact on migration and development are macroeconomic policies that favour development, which might increase emigration in the medium term, only to reduce it in the long term. Active labour market policies, such as the new Programme of First Employment adopted in Mexico in 2006 could in principle dampen emigration by easing employment among young and relatively less-skilled job seekers. (Under this policy, for example, the government covers part of the social-security contributions of new entrants to the labour market.) Regional development programmes, including the encouragement by fiscal and other means of assembly plants (maquiladoras) along Mexico’s northern border, lead to internal migration movements that have affected international mobility as well. Since 2000, border industrialisation efforts have employed more than 1 million Mexicans; whether this absorbs some of the flows that would otherwise leave the country, or attracts more potential candidates for international migration to the border region is an empirical question not easily answered.

Finally, regional trade policies, of which the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is among the most celebrated, are often touted for their disincentivising effects upon emigration (as new jobs are created); in practice, they may lead to a net increase in emigration, as a result of upheavals of economic restructuring, and indeed the greater prosperity that provides more potential migrants with the resources to pay for their mobility. Indeed, since the adoption of NAFTA in 1994, emigration from Mexico to the United States has increased dramatically, even as trade flows have surged between the two countries.

**Challenges for Policy Making**

A 2005 report by the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) provides a useful taxonomy of challenges that beset migration management. The GCIM outlines four such challenges:

- A lack of coherence between host and home country policies;
- Insufficient co-ordination between internal and international policy-making and implementation;
- A lack of general capacity (knowledge and information, institutional adaptability);
- Insufficient co-operation among countries (livelihoods transcend borders - so should policies).

**Fostering Coherence between Host and Home Country**

Increased policy coherence is at the heart of the debate for better migration management. In a number of publications, the OECD has called for greater coherence within OECD countries between development cooperation policies and other policies (e.g., trade, agriculture, investment, security, migration). Coherence among a single country’s policies is only one dimension of policy coherence, however: coherence of policies between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving policies is another. Incoherence and inconsistency in this regard can arise because of different perceptions of the costs and benefits of international migration.

In OECD countries marked by high rates of unemployment among unskilled people, policy makers may well look askance at inflows of low-skilled immigrants. Similarly, developing countries faced with high emigration rates among scarce highly-skilled people (doctors, teachers, engineers) may regret visa policies in OECD countries that make it easier for their compatriots to settle and work abroad. Reality is frequently more complex than this but the basic point is that incoherent policies can stem from opposed interests.

---

15 This so-called "migration hump" - according to which emigration rises as average income rises, only to fall as income rises further - is discussed in OECD (2007) and Katseli et al. (2006).

16 OECD (2007) makes the case for coherence between migration and development policies - in both OECD and developing countries - and provides references to other OECD titles on policy coherence, many of which have been published in the series entitled The Development Dimension.
Nevertheless, experiences from the early migration stages in Mexico and Turkey illustrate that migration can produce mutually beneficial results if both migrant-sending and -receiving countries co-operate closely. These experiences furthermore illustrate that policies have often times not sufficiently taken into consideration the long-term consequences of migration movements.

Migration from Mexico to the United States started in the 1940s when the United States government sent recruiters to rural Mexico to encourage young workers to “go north for opportunity” (PRB, 2008). Throughout the life of the so-called Bracero Programme, Mexican migrants successfully helped fill wartime labour shortages on U.S. farms and returned home with savings and new experiences. Migration was mostly circular and flexible, in line with U.S. requirements. At the same time, the positive experiences of returning migrants encouraged more people to try to get into the United States, increasing an increasingly difficult-to-control flow of undocumented migrants.

A similar pattern can be observed in Turkey, which saw the first waves of migrants towards Germany and other countries in Western Europe in response to a call for “guest workers” in the 1960s. In Germany, for example, poorly educated young men were issued special visas that allowed them entry for one or two years to take unskilled jobs. As in Germany, the economic prosperity of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and other West European countries was partly made possible by immigrant labour, mainly from Turkey and North Africa. Despite efforts of receiving countries to discourage further migration, flows continued even after recruitment programmes had officially ended (as a result of family reunifications, for example).

Improving Co-ordination between Policy-making and Implementation

Many policies seek to increase the net benefits to developing countries associated with international migration - whether by protecting migrants’ rights and well-being, encouraging the retention of skilled workers, reducing illegal migration flows, creating employment opportunities at home. Many such policies have failed or stalled and the reasons are legion. A breakdown of bilateral or multilateral negotiations can be the culprit, as with the United Nations convention on migrants’ rights, or the most recent round of talks between the United States and Mexico. At other times, policies can have unintended consequences, as when NAFTA increased rather than decreased incentives for emigration from Mexico.

Lack of co-ordination, high levels of corruption and numerous administrative burdens are among the factors that prevent better development impacts of migration in many developing countries. Indonesia’s plan to increase high-skill migration to foster remittances incomes has been criticised as being detached from realities on the ground. Although Indonesia now recognises the development potential of migration (and declares that migration should be increased), migration is not integrated into development plans. Despite a High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006, for example, the country still lacks programmes to provide investment opportunities in migrants’ regions of origin.

Addressing Capacity Constraints (knowledge, information, institutions)

Many migrant-sending countries lack the capacity, resources and institutional framework to record and maintain basic data on migration flows, data that could be used to monitor and evaluate the success or failure of different policy measures. Although migration has become a major policy issue, data and statistics on migrants (e.g. concerning their numbers, itineraries, intentions and skills) remain insufficient in many places. Rarely do countries invest in projects such as the “Integrated Migration Information System” in Egypt which helps make more informed policy decisions.

There is thus a need for a much greater commitment of resources by both sending and receiving country governments on the issue. Moreover, migration cuts across ministerial competencies and transcends national borders. Because of this, capacity constraints are closely linked to a lack of coherence among ministries and across countries. Consultative processes on migration must also include technical capacity building, through the training of government officials on strengthening migration management systems, but also a greater circulation of information of use to migrants themselves as well as their households.

The information that circulates in migrants’ networks is another form of capacity that can be mobilised by judicious public policy. The celebrated Mexican Tres por uno programme, for example, can be interpreted as an attempt to harness migrants’ superior knowledge about social-development priorities in their communities of origin. The programme lets migrants and communities...
choose and develop the projects before injecting public funds. Similarly, Mexico's Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (PCME), in place since 1990, or the Moroccan Fondation Hassan II, established in 1996, can be seen as providing physical and social infrastructure to encourage the circulation of information among diaspora communities and countries of origin, which is a form of capacity building.

**Encouraging Co-operation among Countries**

Co-operation among migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries has been discussed already in this document. The growing importance of transit migration and immigration in traditional emigration countries like Mexico, Morocco, and Turkey suggests that the distinction between sending and receiving countries has ceased to be as useful as it once was to discussions of international co-operation. Regardless, there are important externalities of people flows that argue for international co-operation and co-ordination.

In that connection, what is the appropriate framework for co-operation among states in a world of mobile workers? One could entertain the idea of an international organisation designed in the same way as the World Trade Organisation, co-ordinating and regulating the international movement of labour. Another approach to this question is a revival of the "Bhagwati Tax" concept, according to which highly-skilled emigrants would compensate their home countries. However, labour, by its very nature is not "traded" the same way that goods or capital are. It has been argued that the WTO model works for matters of international trade regulation because countries engage in trade when they have a comparative advantage and not an absolute advantage, while the opposite holds for migration (Hatton, 2007).

Perhaps a more pragmatic idea, suggested in the GCIM (2005), is to establish an international body that co-ordinates policies, rather than the actual movement of people. As it stands, several organisations attempt to do just this (e.g. ILO, UNHCR and IOM). None, however, has emerged as the leading organisation to which country-level policy makers can turn. Moreover, the complexity of migration policies suggested in our lengthy typology of the previous section makes it unclear how far such an organisation's mandate would extend in practice. For example, could a World Migration Organisation co-ordinate macroeconomic development policy? Unlikely.

In the absence of truly global initiatives, the ground will be occupied by unilateral and bilateral measures, but also, perhaps, by emerging regional agreements - not all of which will be driven by migration concerns, as is illustrated by the example of NAFTA. Such agreements, whether in Meso-America, the Mediterranean or Indonesia, merit closer evaluation. The lessons from one regional experience will likely have much to teach policy makers elsewhere, but the existence of regional specificities should caution us against crude "one size fits all" recommendations.

Developing countries have much to gain from improved migration management. As illustrated by our country case studies, the significant development impacts are only gradually being recognised and only imperfectly being realised.

Existing institutional set-ups must be overhauled for better migration management; regions must seek mechanisms to promote communication, negotiation and consensus-building among policy communities and their constituencies. Enhanced partnerships between sending and receiving regions may be an effective mechanism for assuring that interlinked and coherent policies are put in place and properly implemented. In addition, migration, employment, trade, investment and development assistance considerations must also be jointly addressed at the regional, national and global levels.

**Policy Recommendations**

On the basis of the case studies and other recent work on migration and development, the following policy recommendations can be proposed:

- At the national level, inter-ministerial and interdepartmental initiatives can promote co-ordination of development and migration policies.
- Migrant-sending countries can draw upon the capacity and credibility of migration organisations (e.g. ILO, IOM, UNHCR) even in the absence of a leading migration agency for international co-ordination.
- Governments can continue to reduce the cost of remittances and increase the range of consumption and investment options available to migrants and their families.
- Governments of migrant-sending countries can draw upon the physical, social and human capital embod-
ied in diaspora networks, in pursuit of both development and migration policy objectives.

**International agreements**
- A better assessment of labour supply and demand in origin and destination countries alike can underpin more successful agreements.
- At the level of supranational entities (e.g. African Union; ASEAN) stronger systematic consultations regarding migration can be put in place across all relevant decision making bodies.
- Regional initiatives among developing countries need to be strengthened; much low-skilled migration from the poorest regions is often to other nearby developing regions.
- Infrastructure investment decisions need to take into account mobility corridors; improved transport and communication capacity can help labour markets in developing countries to adjust to emigration.

**Non-migration policies**
- Macroeconomic policies, including taxation, expenditure and exchange rate policies, must be adapted to the outflow of workers.
- Policies that restrict internal movement in countries of origin, including portability of social security and social protection, limit those countries' ability to adapt to international migration.
- Trade policies affect migration movement, as the NAFTA experience suggests, and should accordingly be set with an eye to those effects.
- Sending regions must adapt their human resource policies, in both the public and private sectors, to emigration in order to facilitate adjustment and replenishment; at a minimum, such policies should not punish migrants who wish to return and re-enter the labour market.
- Financing higher education, including financial assistance to needy students and the planning of curricula, must take into consideration the possibility that some, indeed many, students may migrate.

**References**
Background and case study papers prepared for this research:

ALBA, F., "Mexico's Experience on Migration Management"

BORODAK, D., and A. TICHIT, "Les migrations de retour: le cas de la Moldavie"

GAGNON, J., and J. DAYTON-JOHNSON, "Volver, volver, volver: Return migration and development"

HUGO, G., "International Migration and Development in Indonesia: Issues and Challenges"

MENDOZA, J.E., "Return Migration and Development: the case of Mexico"

PIRACHA, M., and F. VADEAN, "Determinants and Impact of Return Migration in Albania"

TOVIAS, A., and Y. TOVIAS, "Emigration Policies in the Mediterranean Region: Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Turkey"

**Additional References**


OECD (2005), Migration, Remittances and Development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris
OECD (2007), Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries, OECD Development Centre, Paris


Jeff Dayton-Johnson (senior economist), Denis Drechsler (outreach co-coordinator) and Jason Gagnon (research associate) work with the Poverty Reduction and Social Development group at the OECD Development Centre.
S. Irudaya Rajan and K. C. Zachariah  
Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience

Kerala Migration Survey (1998) estimated the number of international emigrants from Kerala at 13.6 lakh and the number of return emigrants at Kerala at 7.4 lakh. That study prognosticated that the number of emigrants from and return emigrants to Kerala would continue to increase, but that the increase would be much larger among the return emigrants. As a result, return emigrants could outnumber emigrants early in the 21st century and that net international migration from Kerala could become negative. Reduced emigration and increased return migration were thought to be the logical outcome of the demographic contraction and the economic expansion in Kerala as well as the changing economic scenario in the Gulf countries.

This conclusion was not however supported by the results of Kerala Migration Survey (KMS), 2003. By 2003 the number of emigrants from Kerala had increased to 18.4 lakh, from 13.6 lakh in 1998 and the number of return emigrants to 8.9 lakh from 7.4 lakh in 1998. One of the significant findings of KMS (2003) was that the prognostication made in KMS 1998 regarding the drying up of the emigration flow in the early twenty-first century was by and large erroneous.

External Migration

Migration Trend

According to Kerala Migration Survey 2007, the number of Kerala migrants living abroad was 18.5 lakh, more or less the same as the estimate for 2003. Emigration from Kerala seems to have lost much of its steam. Has it peaked? Is the situation in 2007 the beginning of a downward trend? After our two consecutive failures in prediction, we do not venture to prognosticate once again. The ongoing Kerala Migration Survey 2008 will show.

Even the nominal increase by 9,400 persons could be attributed to population increase and not due to increase in migration propensity. Relative to the number of households, the change in the number of migrants per household during 2003-07 was negative. Emigrants per 100 households decreased from 26.7 in 2003 to 24.5 in 2007. The increase in the number of emigrants during 2003-07 has not kept pace with the increase in the number of households in the state during the period.

The situation with respect to return emigrants was not very much different either. The number of return emigrants in 2007 was exactly the same as the number in 2003: 8.9 lakh. Return emigrants per 100 households decreased from 13.0 in 2003 to 11.7 in 2007.

The net effect of these changes has been a relatively constant number of non-resident Keralites (NRK), and a decrease in the number of NRKs per household. The total number of NRKs in Kerala in 2007 is 27.3 lakh and the number of NRKs per 100 households, 36.2. These numbers compare with 27.3 lakh in 2003 and 21.0 lakh in 1998. NRKs per 100 households were 33.0 in 1998, 39.7 in 2003 and 36.2 in 2007.

Geographic Dimension of Migration

Emigrants' Destination Countries

In the past, Gulf countries used to be the principal destination of Kerala emigrants. In this matter there has been no change in 2007 also. In 1998, 95 percent of Kerala emigrants went to one of the Gulf countries. By 2003 the corresponding percentage declined to 91 percent. In 2007 the proportion of Kerala emigrants who went to the Gulf region has come down further to 89 percent.

However significant changes are observed in the distribution of emigrants within the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia had been the principal destination country in 1998. By 2003, it yielded its first rank to the United Arab Emirates, which at that time received 37 percent of the total emigrants from Kerala compared to 27 percent in Saudi Arabia. The UAE continued its dominance and by 2007, it has received 42 percent of the Kerala emigrants. In the mean time, Saudi Arabia's share declined further to just 24 percent. Apart from the UAE, Kuwait also continues to attract an increasing share of Kerala emigrants.

Outside the Gulf region, the United States of America is a major destination country. It received 5.7 percent of the total number of emigrants from the state. Its share had been only 2.2 percent in 1998.

Origin of Emigrants within Kerala

Rural-Urban Origin: According to the 2001 census, 74.0 percent of the population of Kerala lived in rural areas.
and 74.5 percent of the households were located in rural areas. However, only 68.2 percent of the emigrants originated from rural areas; 31.8 percent came from urban areas. Similarly 69.2 percent of the return emigrants were living in rural areas and the balance 30.8 percent in urban areas. Thus, propensity to emigrate is slightly higher in urban areas. But the differentials are not very large. The most significant differentials are in the number of emigrants per 100 households. It is as much as 33.1 percent in urban areas but only 23.7 percent in rural areas.

District of Origin of Emigrants

Malappuram district had the distinction of sending out the largest number of emigrants from Kerala in 1998 and in 2003. It has retained the distinction in 2007 also. In fact in 2007, Malappuram district was the place of origin of 336,000 emigrants or about 18.2 percent of the total number of emigrants from Kerala. However, there has been a decline in the proportion of emigrants from Malappuram compared with the situation in 1998. Its share had been as high as 22 percent in 1998.

The district next in importance with respect to emigration from the state has been Kannur in north Kerala, with 254,000 emigrants. Unlike Malappuram, which lost its importance over the years, the share of Kannur had doubled over the 9-year period. In 1998 only 6.5 percent of Kerala emigrants had originated from Kannur, but by 2007 its share increased to 13.8 percent. Overall, there has been a steady shift northwards with regard to the centre of emigration in the state.

The other districts with relatively large number of emigrants have been Thiruvananthapuram with 189,000 emigrants (10.2 percent), Thrissur with 170,000 emigrants (9.2 percent) Kollam with 147,000 emigrants (7.9 percent), Ernakulam with 143,000 emigrants (7.7 percent) and Alappuzha with 114,000 emigrants (6.2 percent). As had been the case in previous years, the districts with the smallest number of emigrants have been Idukki (0.1 percent) and Wayanad (0.8 percent).

On the whole, the northern districts of the state have gained importance as a source of emigrants from the state. The share of the Kasaragod district increased from 2.8 percent to 5.3 percent, Kannur from 6.5 percent to 13.8 percent and Wayanad from 0.3 to 0.8 percent. Some of the southern districts have lost ground in this matter, the principal among them being Pathanamthitta, and Idukki districts.

The total numbers of emigrants from a district depend on its total population also. Control for this difference is ensured, by calculating the number of emigrants per household. In 2007, the average number of emigrants per 100 households has been 24.5 at the state level. But the corresponding average has been as high as 49.8 in Malappuram, 48.8 in Kannur and 38.5 in Kasaragod districts. In the Idukki district, there have been only 0.7 emigrants per 100 households.

Over the years, emigrants per household increased in most of the northern region extending from Malappuram district to Kasaragod district. However, it decreased considerably in Pathanamthitta district.

Religious Affiliation of the Emigrants

The total number emigrants have been 18.48 lakh in 2007. Among them 8.83 lakh (48.2 percent) were Muslims, 6.17 lakh Hindus (33.3 percent) and the balance 3.47 lakh (18.5 percent) Christians. Thus Muslims who constitute less than a quarter of the total population has almost double that proportion among the emigrants.

The most important religious differential is with respect to the growth of numbers of migrants. During 2003-07 the number of emigrants has shown only a negligible increase of a mere 0.5 percent, but the increase has been as much as 9.8 percent among Muslims and 7.6 percent among Hindus. The number of emigrants among Christians seems to have decreased by about 25 percent. Over the longer period 1998-2007 the increase has been the largest among Hindus: 51 percent of emigrants, 43 percent of return emigrants and 48 percent of NRKs. Christians experienced the smallest rate of increase.

In the state as a whole, 100 households have 24.5 emigrants and 11.7 return emigrants on average. But the corresponding numbers among the Muslims are 52.2 and 22.1 respectively. Thus 1 in 2 Muslim household has an emigrant each and 1 in 5 households had a return emigrant each. Three out of four households had a NRK each. Thus the Muslim community in Kerala is very much in the migration business, i.e. Gulf migration.

For all religious groups taken together, 89 percent of the emigrants have gone to the Gulf countries, but among Muslims almost all (98 percent) emigrants went to the Gulf countries. The proportion of Christian emigrants who went to the USA is 14.6 percent and, that of the Hindu, 8.7 percent; but among Muslim emigrants, only 0.2 percent selected the USA as their destination.
Destination of Return Emigrants in Kerala

Although Malappuram district is number one in emigration, it is not number one in terms of return emigration. Of the total of 886,000 return emigrants, 161,000 (18.8 percent) were enumerated in Thiruvananthapuram district, and only 143,000 (16.2 percent) were enumerated in Malappuram district. Thrissur is the destination of 104,000 return emigrants (11.8 percent). Kollam district is the place of residence of 85,000 return emigrants (9.6 percent). Very few return emigrants have come back to Wayanad and Idukki districts. But Wayanad and Idukki with their small numbers of return emigrants showed impressive rates of increase of 137 percent and 124 percent respectively during the 2003-07 period.

Over the years, Thiruvananthapuram Kollam and Alappuzha districts have attracted increasing numbers of return emigrants. Pathanamthitta district is the biggest loser in this matter. Kozhikode and Palakkad districts also have lost considerable ground.

At the state level, there have been 11.7 return emigrants per 100 households in 2007. The rate has not shown any substantial movement since 1998, having been 11.6 in 1998, and 13.0 in 2003. The different districts have experienced widely different rates of return migration. Malappuram and Thiruvananthapuram had high rates of about 20 percent each and Idukki and Wayanad had the lowest rates. On the whole Malappuram, Thiruvananthapuram, Alappuzha, Thrissur, Kollam and Kasaragod districts had relatively high levels of return emigrants.

Over the years, return emigration rates have on the whole remained stable in most districts. One major exception is Pathanamthitta in which return emigration per 100 households decreased from 27.7 in 2003 to 7.9 in 2007. There has been a similar decrease in Kozhikode district also.

Non-Resident Keralites (NRK)

The size of the Non-resident Keralites, defined as the sum of emigrants and return emigrants, is a better measure to assess the impact of migration on the Kerala society. In 2007, NRKs number was 27.3 lakh showing no increase during 2003-2007. The corresponding figure had been 21.0 lakh in 1998.

Malappuram with 480,000 persons as NRKs (or 17.5 percent of the state total) leads all other districts with respect to the number of non-resident Keralites. Other districts with large number of NRKs are Thiruvananthapuram (351,000) Thrissur (275,000), and Kannur (308,000).

Malappuram district had about 71 NRKs per every 100 households. This is the highest among all the districts. Kannur district comes next with 59 NRKs per 100 households, closely followed by Kasaragod with 53 NRKs per 100 households, Thrissur with 38 NRKs per 100 households, Alappuzha with 32 NRKs per 100 households, and Kollam with 35 NRKs per 100 households. The corresponding number for the state as a whole is 36.2.

Over years, the number of NRKs has increased in most districts, significant exceptions being Pathanamthitta and Palakkad districts. However, the number of NRKs per 100 households decreased from 39.7 to 36.2 percent in the state as a whole.

Gulf Wives

The number of “Gulf Wives” that is married women living in Kerala whose husbands are emigrants living in other countries, is estimated to be about 1.2 million. They form about 10 percent of the currently married women in the state. However, among the Muslims, as much as, 22.9 percent of the married women are “Gulf Wives”. The corresponding proportions are 5.3 percent among Christians and 5.6 percent among Hindus.

Households with Migrants

A rate of 36 NRK per 100 households does not mean that 36 percent of the households have an NRK each. Some households have more than one migrant and some others don’t have any.

Only 17.7 percent of the household had one or more emigrants each in 2007. Only 10.6 percent of the households had one or more return emigrants each and only 25.7 percent of the households had either an emigrant or a return migrant each. As pointed in 1998 and 2003, a large majority of the households in Kerala (74.3 percent in 2007) are not directly exposed to emigration. They do not have any emigrants or return emigrants in them. The proportion has not changed since 2003.

Demographic Profile of Migrants

Sex Composition of Emigrants

Emigrants are a selective group with respect to their demographic characteristics. Females are relatively few among them and so are the very young and the very old.
persons. The proportion of females among emigrants has been 14.4 percent in 2007. It is not as high as was expected on the basis of the 1998-2003 trends. In fact the proportion has decreased from 16.8 percent in 2003 to 14.4 percent in 2007.

There were considerable differentials in the proportion of females among emigrants belonging to different religious groups. Christians have the highest proportion of females among emigrants and Muslims, the lowest.

Age Composition of Emigrants
In 2007, the average age of male emigrants has been 26.8 years and that of females 22.7 years. A slight increase in the average age of the emigrants is observed during 2003-07.

The full age distribution of the emigrants is given in Figure 7. In 2007 the largest number of emigrants has been in the age group of 25-29 years. There have been very few emigrants older than 50 years.

Socio-economic Profile
Educational Level of Emigrants
It was generally believed that the educational levels of the Kerala emigrants have improved considerably in recent years. But the present study does not support such a significant shift. The data show that there has not taken place any major shift in the educational attainments of the emigrants from Kerala. The largest number of emigrants has always been from among those with the primary level of education but without a secondary school leaving certificate: 45.27 percent in 2007, 46.7 percent in 2003 and 54.3 percent in 1998. Thus improvement in 2007 in educational attainment of emigrants has been relatively marginal compared to the situation in 2003.

The emigration rate among males has been 9.3 percent and 1.4 percent among females. For males and females taken together it is 5.3 percent. At higher educational levels, (degree, secondary level and upper secondary level), emigration rates were higher than the general average. In the case of females a higher emigration rate is observed only among graduates and persons with secondary school leaving certificate.

The propensity to emigrate for employment increases with the levels of education. Emigration rate is 11.2 percent among degree holders, 9.3 percent among secondary school leaving certificate holders and 5.5 percent among persons who have not completed secondary level of schooling. For all emigrants together, the rate is 5.3 percent.

Sector of Employment of Emigrants
About 59 percent of the emigrants had been gainfully employed before emigration. The unemployed constituted 24.3 percent of the emigrants. The balance 16.7 percent had remained outside the labour force. Among the gainfully employed, 46.2 percent had been non-agricultural labourers, 27.1 had been working in the private sector and 21.2 percent had been self-employed persons. Thus about 95 percent of the emigrants who had been working prior to emigration had been either non-agricultural labourers, or persons working in the private sector or self employed persons. Only about 3 percent were employed in Government or Semi-Government organizations, or in schools and colleges.

The emigration rate for the total population is about 12.6 percent among males (15+years) and 1.8 percent among females. But among the unemployed, the emigration rate is as high as 43.5 percent. Similarly, the emigration rate among private sector employees has been 24.0, or double the average for the total population. These are the two employment sectors highly over-represented among emigrants.

The unemployment rate among the prospective emigrants (situation before emigration) has been as high as 29.1 percent; 28.4 percent among males and 40.4 percent among females.

Employment Before Emigration and After Return
According to the 2007 survey, prior to emigration, 83.3 percent of the emigrants had been in the labour force, of whom 59.0 had been employed and 24.3 unemployed. Among return emigrants, 72.3 were in the labour force of whom 67.3 percent were employed and only 5.0 percent were unemployed. The unemployment rate was 29.1 percent among emigrants and only 6.9 percent among the return emigrants. There was thus a decline of 22.1 percentage points in the unemployment rate.

Emigration has had direct as well as indirect impact on the employment situation in the state. The unemployment rate among the general population of the state was 12.2 percent. But among those who emigrated, unemployment rate before emigration had been as high as 29.2 percent. If these persons had not emigrated, the unemployment rate in the state would have been
higher, say 14.4 percent. Thus emigration has reduced unemployment in the state by 2.2 percentage points. This is the direct effect of emigration on unemployment.

**Remittances**

**Total Remittances to Kerala**

An approximate estimate of the total remittances to the state is estimated using data published by (i) the Reserve Bank of India on total workers’ remittances to India, (ii) the Kerala Migration Survey 2007 data that give the total number of emigrants from, and return emigrants to, the state, and remittances sent to families by emigrants living abroad.

Total remittances to Kerala have showed a steady increase. Between 1998 and 2003 the increase was about Rs. 4.9 thousand crore. The corresponding increase during 2003-07 was Rs. 6.0 thousand crore. There was thus a modest acceleration in remittances to Kerala even in the absence of such an acceleration in the volume of emigration.

**Total Remittances by Districts**

Remittances received in the different districts varied widely. The largest amount of remittances in 2007 was received by Malappuram district, which received Rs. 4.6 thousand cores or 19 percent of the total for the state. Three other districts also received more than 10 percent each of the total: Kozhikode (12.9 percent), Thrissur (12.1 percent) and Thiruvananthapuram (10.2 percent).

On average, a Kerala households’ share of the total remittances was Rs 32,000, but Rs 69,000 in Malappuram, 48,000 in Kozhikode and Rs 40,000 in Thrissur.

**Remittances by Religion**

Nearly Rs12,000 crores, or 50 percent of the remittances to the state were received by the Muslim community which forms less than 25 percent of the total population of the state. Hindus who constitute the majority received only a third of what the Muslim community received. Such differentials were observed in earlier years also. The differentials in remittances with respect to religion and districts are not only large but also persistent. The long-term implications of such persistent differentials on regional development are worth calls for detailed investigation.

**Macro-economic Impact of Remittances**

The total remittances in 2007 were amounted to 20.2 percent of the Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) of the state. The corresponding ratios were 22.0 percent in 2003 and 25.5 in 1998. Thus, the increase in remittances has not kept pace with the increase in NSDP. Remittances in 2007 formed more than 28 percent of the states revenue receipts. It was 3.85 times the amount the state received from the central government.

**Number of Households receiving Remittances**

We have seen earlier that 17.7 percent of the households had an emigrant each. But only 16 percent of the households received remittances in cash. About 17 percent of all households received remittances in one form or the other. Thus, most of the households with emigrants in them have received remittances in one form or another. At the same time, it is important to underline the point that 83 percent of the Kerala households were not direct beneficiaries of workers’ remittances from abroad.

Over the period 2003-07, no change is observed in the proportion of households that received remittances in one form or other. The proportion remained constant at 17 percent.

**End use of Remittances by Households**

Household remittances were meant mainly for the subsistence of the emigrant’s relatives back home. About 94 percent of the households that had an emigrant had indeed used remittances for subsistence. Next in order of importance was education and more than 60 percent of households with emigrants had used remittances for education. Nearly half the number of households used remittances for repayment of debts incurred for meeting the cost of emigration. Only 11 percent of the households used remittances for buying or building houses. Less than 2 percent of the households used remittances for starting a business.

**Conclusions**

This paper provides the results of the most recent (2007) round of the Kerala Migration Survey being conducted by the Research Unit on International Migration of the Centre for Development Studies (CDSMRU), financed by the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala.

International migration has remained absolutely stationary during 2003-07. Mobility has become, so to say, immobile. The number of emigrants had been 18.4 lakh in 2003; it was 18.5 lakh in 2007. The number of return emigrants had been 8.9 lakh in 2003; it was 8.9 lakh in 2007 also. The number of non-resident Keralites had
been 27.3 lakh in 2003; it was 27.4 lakh in 2007 also. Migration rates, however, experienced some significant decline. The emigration rate declined from 26.7 per 100 households in 2003 to 24.5 per 100 households in 2007. The corresponding decline in return emigration rate has been from 13.0 per 100 households to 11.7 per 100 households. The rate of non-resident Keralites (NRKs) per 100 households declined from 39.7 to 36.2.

The proportion of Kerala households with an NRK each in them has remained more or less at the same level as in 2007; it had been in 2003, 25.8 percent. Three-fourths of the Kerala households are yet to send out migrants outside India. And this situation has not undergone any change in recent years. Gulf migration from Kerala is not as widespread among Kerala households as it is often depicted to be in the media.

The northern districts of Kerala are gaining importance as areas of emigration. As years pass, more and more Kerala emigrants emanate from districts such as Malappuram, Kannur and Kasaragod. In Malappuram - 71 percent of the households have in them either an emigrant or a return emigrant each.

The United Arab Emirates is becoming the preferred destination of Kerala emigrants. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been losing ground to UAE as the preferred destination of Kerala emigrants. Countries beyond the Middle East such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom have also been receiving increasing numbers of emigrants.

Nearly half the number of emigrants was Muslim. Among the Muslims, 3 out of every 4 households (74 percent) have an NRK each, but among the Hindus less than 1 in 5 households (22 percent) only have an NRK each in them.

The unemployment rate among emigrants was as high as 29.1 per cent, prior to emigration, but it is only 6.9 percent among emigrants who have returned to Kerala. Emigration has thus had a significant salutary impact on the unemployment situation.

Demographic contraction (reduction in the proportion of persons in the younger age groups as a result of decrease in the birth rate) could have been an underlying factor in the stability of the volume of migration from the state. Demographic trends seem to have started exerting their inexorable pressure more effectively on migration from the state in recent years than in earlier years.

The district that has advanced most in demographic transition, Pathanamthitta, is also the district that has evinced the largest decline in emigration. The effect of demographic contraction is probably accentuated by Kerala’s retrogression in terms of the employability of its graduates in general arts and sciences.

An equally important factor accounting for the stagnation in migration from Kerala could be the increase in employment opportunities within the state. It seems that in recent years, remittances to the state are being invested more productively, generating increased demand for youngsters and thus reducing the urge for their migration. Indirect empirical support to this surmise is provided in the study by the very large volume of job creation in both the private and the self-employment sectors.

International migrants have sent about Rs 24.525 thousand crores as remittances to Kerala in 2006-07. This amount represents a modest but consistent acceleration compared to the corresponding figures in 1998 and 2003. Remittances in 2006-07 were about 20 percent of the state’s NSDP. Thus, remittances have not kept pace with the growth of NSDP; in 2003 remittances had formed 22 percent of NSDP. Earlier in 1998, they had accounted for 26 percent.

The Muslim community that forms nearly 25 percent of the state’s population received 50 percent of the total remittances during 2006-07. The share of the seven northern districts of the state in the total remittances (61 percent) was almost double the share of the seven southern districts (39 percent).

In the matter of regional development, developments based on the cultivation of rice and coconut gave way to rubber-based development since a long time ago. Soon, rubber-based developments could be giving away to developments based on external remittances. This will have considerable long-term impact on the type of regional development within Kerala.

Dr. S. Irudaya Rajan is Associate Fellow and Dr. K C Zachariah an Honorary Fellow at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram Kerala, India.
Similarly, a change in the composition of the group of illegal migrants by country of origin, or a change in the wage rate in a given country of origin, will induce a corresponding shift in enforcement policy in the receiving country. Thus, variation in the extent to which receiving countries undertake measures aimed at apprehending and expelling illegal migrants can be attributed not to characteristics of the illegal migrants themselves, but to a feature of the illegal migrants’ countries of origin.

**The General Argument**

Countries differ in the extent to which they are lenient or harsh toward the illegal migrants in their midst, and particular countries appear to treat such migrants differently at different times. Most of the countries of southern Europe, whose illegal migrants come largely from North Africa where wages are very low, have been much more lenient than the countries of northern Europe whose illegal migrants have often come largely from southern Europe where wages are not so low. Illegal migrants in Israel have lately been treated very harshly — a special government authority was set up to arrest and expel illegal migrants - a policy shift that closely follows a compositional change in the population of illegal migrants from workers coming largely from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to workers who increasingly originate from eastern Europe. While there could be cultural, sociological, or political reasons for this diversity, there may be an economic explanation for the apparent variation in the degree of moderation in expulsion policy, henceforth referred to as the “tolerance” accorded to illegal migrants.

Illegal migrants supply a valuable productive input: effort. But their status as illegals means that they face a strictly positive probability of expulsion. A return to their country of origin entails reduced earnings for them when the wage at origin is lower than the wage at destination. This prospect induces illegal migrants to exert more effort than comparable workers who face no such prospect. The lower the probable alternative home-country earnings, the harsher the penalty for illegal migrants on their return - for a given probability of expulsion - and the harder they will work at destination. While the home-country wage that awaits the illegal migrants upon their return is exogenous to the host country, the probability of their return is not. Given the home-country wage, a higher probability of expulsion will induce illegal migrants to apply more effort. Hence, different combinations of probabilities of expulsion and home-country wages yield the same level of effort. In particular, a high home-country wage combined with a high probability of return will elicit the same level of effort as will a low home-country wage combined with a low probability of return.

**Detailed Reasoning**

An advantage associated with the “admission” of illegal migrants is that they supply more effort for a given destination wage than legal migrants (Proposition 1 below). The reason for the differential supply response is that while by definition legal migrants have permission to stay, illegal migrants face a strictly positive probability of expulsion, and consequently a strictly positive probability of losing the high wages that they enjoy at present. Even if the probability that legal migrants will be asked or be compelled to leave is not zero, this probability is likely to be lower than the corresponding probability for illegal migrants. (When the downswing of a business cycle hits hard, legal migrants are often induced, requested, or even pressured to return to their home country. Similarly, social pressures by an alienated indigenous population can compel return migration.) Given a strictly positive probability of expulsion, a lower wage at origin will elicit greater effort at destination (Proposition 2 below). The reason for this relationship is that since a lower home-country wage inflicts a harsher penalty for illegal migrants on their return — for a given probability of expulsion — and the harder they will work at destination. While the home-country wage that awaits the illegal migrants upon their return is exogenous to the host country, the probability of their return is not. Given the home-country wage, a higher probability of expulsion will induce illegal migrants to supply more effort. Hence, different combinations of probabilities of expulsion and home-country wages yield the same level of effort. In particular, a high home-country wage combined with a high probability of return will elicit the same level of effort as will a low home-country wage combined with a low probability of return.

Let \( W_F \) be the wage rate at the destination country, and let \( W_H \) be the wage rate at the home country, such that \( W_F > W_H \). Let \( e \) be the level of work effort, henceforth effort, exerted by illegal migrants at destination, and let \( -U(e) \) be the twice differentiable disutility of effort, measured in money terms, such that the marginal utility from exerting effort is positive and rising: \( (\partial U / \partial e) > 0 ; (\partial^2 U / \partial e^2) > 0 \). Let \( t \) be a measure of the tolerance of the government of the country of destination toward the illegal migrants in the country, and let \( P(e, t) \) be the twice differentiable probability of
not being expelled, such that the first order effects of \( e \) and \( t \) on \( P \) are positive, and the second order effects are negative, namely the impact of effort exertion on the probability of not being expelled is positive, \((\partial P/\partial e) > 0 \), and declining, \((\partial^2 P/\partial e^2) < 0 \); the impact of the level of tolerance on the probability of not being expelled is positive, \((\partial P/\partial t) > 0 \), and declining, \((-\partial^2 P/\partial t^2) < 0 \); and, since the impact of both the degree of effort exertion and the level of tolerance on the probability of not being expelled is positive, the effect of an increase in the level of tolerance on the impact that effort bears on the probability of not being expelled is assumed to attenuate this impact, \((-\partial^2 P/\partial e\partial t) < 0 \). For simplicity’s sake, let the level of effort exerted by the illegal migrant at the home country be normalized at zero.

The illegal migrant seeks to maximize his net earnings, that is, his expected wage minus the cost (disutility) of effort. The net earnings per illegal migrant function associated with effort level \( e \) is thus

\[
V(e) = P(e,t)W_F + [1 - P(e,t)]W_H - U(e).
\]

Equation (1) can be rewritten as

\[
V(e) - W_H = P(e,t)(W_F - W_H) - U(e), \tag{1'}
\]

where the left-hand side of (1’) is the net gain to the illegal migrant from working in the destination country. Without loss of generality, we assume that \( V(e) - W_H \geq 0 \).

The decision problem of the illegal migrant is how much effort to exert. In this setting, since

\[
\frac{\partial V(e)}{\partial e} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial e}(W_F - W_H) - \frac{\partial U}{\partial e},
\]

the illegal migrant’s chosen level of effort, \( e^*(t, W_H, W_F) \), is implicitly given by

\[
\frac{\partial P}{\partial e}(W_F - W_H) - \frac{\partial U}{\partial e} = 0. \tag{2}
\]

Proposition 1. Illegal migrants supply more effort for a given destination wage rate than legal migrants.\(^3\)

Proof: Legal migrants can be characterized by a large \( t \), while illegal migrants can be characterized by a small \( t \). Since from (2),

\[
\left(\frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial e^2} de^* + \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial ec t} dt\right)(W_F - W_H) = \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial e^2} de^*,
\]

we have that

\[
\frac{de^*}{dt} = -\frac{\partial^2 P(W_F - W_H)}{\partial ec^2} - \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial e^2} < 0.
\]

Hence the proposition follows. \(\square\)

Proposition 2. Given a strictly positive probability of expulsion, a lower wage rate at origin elicits a larger effort at destination.

Proof: Since from (2),

\[
\frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial e^2} (W_F - W_H) de^* - \frac{\partial P}{\partial e} dW_H = \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial e^2} de^*,
\]

we have that

\[
\frac{de^*}{dW_H} = -\frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial e^2} (W_F - W_H) - \frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial e^2} < 0.
\]

Hence the proposition follows. \(\square\)

Corollary: The same level of effort by illegal migrants will be elicited by a combination of a low wage at origin and a low probability of expulsion as by a high wage at origin and a high probability of expulsion.

Apprehending and expelling illegal migrants is costly. While (ordinarily) the government of the host country cannot affect the wage rate that prevails in the illegal migrants’ home country, it can, at least to some extent, choose the level of resources it allocates to interdiction. From the perspective of the host-country government,

\(^3\) Clearly, if all the migrants are to be treated equally and if the migrants’ continued stay in the country of destination is independent of their effort, then all the migrants will exert the same effort and their home-country wage will play no role in determining their effort.
the sanction of expulsion is an effective but not costless policy tool to procure a desirable degree of effort. Since expulsion lowers earnings, illegal migrants seek to dampen the probability of their expulsion by exerting more effort. Yet maintaining any positive level of the probability of expulsion requires outlays on apprehension and deportation. Suppose that the balance of benefits and costs associated with the “production” of expulsion probability \(1 - P(e, t)\) yields an optimal level of effort (from the perspective of the government of the host country), \(\tilde{e} = \tilde{e}(\tilde{t}, \tilde{W}_H, \tilde{W}_F)\). From the Corollary it follows that a destination country that is anxious to encourage the efforts of its illegal migrants can “buy off” the desirable effort \(\tilde{e}\) more cheaply when the illegal migrants’ home-country wage is lower than \(\tilde{W}_H\).

To see how the optimal outlay on apprehension and deportation of illegal migrants rises in tandem with the illegal migrants’ home-country wage or, put differently, how a lower home-country wage enables the host country to economize on the optimal cost of interdiction as a device for eliciting desirable effort, consider the following framework.

The host country and the illegal migrant play a Stackelberg game in which the host country is the leader while the illegal migrant is the follower. In the first step of the game, the host country sets and announces the tolerance level \(t\). In the second step, the illegal migrant chooses the effort level \(e\). The host country finds the optimal tolerance level by backward induction. If the host country sets a “target” level \(\tilde{t}\), then the corresponding tolerance level \(\tilde{t} = \tilde{e}(\tilde{t}, \tilde{W}_H, \tilde{W}_F)\). Specifically, let \(C(t)\) be the cost of migration law enforcement per illegal migrant in the host country at the tolerance level \(t\), \(\frac{\partial C}{\partial t} < 0\). The host country’s economy benefits from the illegal migrant’s exertion of effort, \(e\). Let the benefit be \(B(e)\) with \(\frac{\partial B}{\partial e} > 0\). Thus, the host country will have a net benefit (economic rent) of \(B(e) - C(t)\) per illegal migrant in terms of its GDP. For simplicity, let us assume that the host country maximizes the surplus \(B(e) - C(t)\). The first-order condition is

\[
\frac{\partial B(e)}{\partial e} \left(1 + \frac{\partial C}{\partial t}\right) = \frac{\partial C}{\partial t}.
\]

Solving (3) yields the host country’s optimal tolerance level \(\tilde{t}\); and then at \(\tilde{t}\), the illegal migrant’s optimal level of effort \(\tilde{e} = \tilde{e}(\tilde{t}, \tilde{W}_H, \tilde{W}_F)\) for a given home-country wage \(\tilde{W}_H\). With a higher \(\tilde{W}_H\), \(\tilde{t}\) has to fail to elicit the same level of effort \(\tilde{e} = \tilde{e}(\tilde{t}, \tilde{W}_H, \tilde{W}_F)\), that is, \(\frac{\partial t}{\partial \tilde{W}_H} < 0\). Hence we have that \(\frac{\partial B(e)}{\partial \tilde{W}_H} > 0\).

This consideration suggests that a country that hosts illegal migrants from poorer countries will be more tolerant of illegal migration than a country whose illegal migrants originate from countries that are less poor. An apparent warm compassion could be the outcome of cool consideration. Likewise, a country that seeks to elicit a particular level of effort from its labor force of illegal migrants and that faces a rise in the share of migrants from poorer countries, can relax its apprehension and deportation policy. While this approach gives the appearance of benevolent tolerance, the underlying reason for the policy shift is a recognition that it is possible to procure toil more cheaply.

This result relates to the interesting issue of the role and prevalence of altruism as a motive in human and economic affairs. Let us refer to illegal migrants who originate from a country in which the wage rate is relatively low as poor, and to illegal migrants who originate from a country with a relatively high wage rate as less poor. A straightforward implication of altruistic inclinations is to accord the poor a more generous treatment than the less poor. The inference from conduct to motive suggests that altruism is at work when a country with poor illegal migrants is more lenient toward the illegal migrants than a country with less poor illegal migrants. The reason provided in this paper for the differential treatment of the poor and the less poor implies that inferring from consequence to reason requires caution; seemingly altruistic acts can emanate from pure self(country)-interest.

**Concluding Remarks**

By and large, wage rates have featured in migration research in one of two ways: explaining migration, and explaining labor market outcomes. The explanatory variable of migration that has been studied most closely is the wage differential. There has also been considerable interest in the wages that migrants earn. Presumably this interest has arisen because these wages are seen as a measure of migrants’ relative and absolute success and as determinants of their consumption (savings), their remittances, and their capacity to self-finance human capital investments. Correspondingly the productive characteristics of migrants as determi-
nants of their wage earnings were studied closely. A related interest has been the effect of the arrival of migrants on the wage earnings of native-born workers. Recently attention has been drawn to the wages that migrants do not earn as determinants of migrants’ performance. This line of work is prompted by the idea that although the economic performance of migrants in the host country undoubtedly depends on qualifications, it is also affected by inclinations. Given the probability of return migration, a behavioral link has been established between the incentive of migrants to save in their country of destination and the prevailing wage rate in their home country such that migrants coming from a low-wage country have been shown to optimally save more than migrants from a high-wage country (Stark, 2002). It has further been shown that the relationship between the home-country’s wage and the optimal level of savings at destination can shed fresh light on the intertemporal variation in the economic performance of successive cohorts of migrants from a given country of origin. Much of the interesting literature, eloquently reviewed by Lalonde and Topel (1997), on the convergence of the earnings of migrants and those of the native-born views the observed pattern as an artifact; the pattern arises not from an upgrading of the skills of a given cohort of migrants but from a change in the unobserved skills of successive cohorts of migrants. Suppose that cohort $k + 1$ is drawn from a section of the home-country distribution of unobserved skills that is to the left of the section from which cohort $k$ is drawn. If skills, productivity, and earnings correlate positively, the cohort $k$ migrants will outperform the cohort $k + 1$ migrants, giving rise to the false impression that the performance of migrants improves over time spent at destination. The finding that a lower wage at origin prompts higher savings at destination suggests a new explanation of the observed pattern. Presumably, in time, the home-country’s wage rises. The finding implies that the incentive facing the cohort $k + 1$ migrants differs from the incentive that the cohort $k$ migrants had faced, such that the optimal savings and thereby the mean income of the cohort $k + 1$ migrants are lower than those of the cohort $k$ migrants. The variation in the economic performance of migrants may thus be explained by neither skills nor assimilation but rather by incentives.

The present paper continues this line of research. It shows how the wage at origin after migration, that is, the wage that migrants have given up but would earn if compelled to return, affects behavior at destination, and how variation in this wage interacts with a variation in the degree of tolerance accorded to illegal migrants by the host country. The complete story of how pre-migration wages impinge on post-migration preferences, choices, and outcomes is yet to be written.

References


Oded Stark is Professor at the Universities of Bonn, Klagenfurt, and Vienna, at Warsaw University and at Warsaw School of Economics.
Hans Werner Mundt  
Migration and Development

There is renewed interest in the nexus between migration and development, the issue being intensively discussed at international conferences and workshops. The discussion has been pushed strongly by the World Bank, particularly in its "Global Development Finance Report" of 2003. This relatively new debate emphasises the positive impact of migration on the countries of emigration, in particular focusing on the role of remittances.

More recently the discussion has broadened to include other activities of Diasporas, such as investment, trade and charitable actions. The World Bank report demonstrated the fact that remittances form the most important source of external finance for most developing countries. Exceptions include some of the emerging markets which receive more foreign direct investment. Since 2003, remittances have continued to increase, though this is probably also due in part to the availability of better statistical data. According to a survey carried out by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, remittances add up to about USD 3 billion.

Even the emigration of highly skilled persons, usually described as brain drain, has been at least partially reinterpreted as a brain gain. The theory suggests that highly skilled emigrants are likely to return with their newly acquired skills to their home countries and contribute to development there. This effect has been observed in detail in the case of the nearly 500,000 Indian IT-professionals migrating to the USA.

Now, in addition to this, scholars have shown how the prospect of migration has also led to a noticeable rise of university graduates. This has not only increased the number of highly qualified migrants, but has also improved the human resources in the respective countries. Finally, the contribution made by transnational networks of emigrants from the countries of origin has been emphasised by a number of scholars.

In the excitement to advance the development agenda we should remember some very basic facts:

- Migration is a highly complex social phenomenon. Its development impacts cannot be understood when we focus on a single aspect of this phenomenon such as remittances. What we must do is to trade off the positive against the negative effects of migration. Remittances alleviate the poverty of families and might even foster economic development by its multiplier effect. But at the same time they might reduce the efforts of the recipient families to earn their own livelihoods at home. Remittances strengthen the balance of payments of the receiving countries, yet they might at the same time reduce the competitiveness of these countries by increasing the external value of their currencies, thereby weakening the competitiveness of the local export industry. Furthermore the development impact of remittances cannot be properly assessed without taking into account other effects of migration. High levels of remittances might imply a large number of disrupted families, single mothers or fathers, and children growing up without their parents or in single-parent families. As a consequence, the development effects of migration can only be judged by balancing economic, social, cultural and political implications.

- Such an assessment will bring about a mixed picture with regard to the development impact of migration. Whether there is a positive or a negative impact will depend on the structure of the émigré population (e.g. highly skilled or unskilled), the number of highly skilled as a proportion of the overall numbers of highly skilled available in the original county, the inclination to return and to invest (which in turn also depends on the overall investment climate), the uses remittances are put to (productive or pure consumption; consumption of local or imported goods), and so on. Each case will be different and has to be examined carefully in order to formulate a development-oriented political response.

- Designing a migration policy is not an easy task; to get it accepted can be even more difficult. We have to concede that there are conflicts of interest between the sending and receiving countries. For instance, sending countries might be interested in the emigration of low-skilled persons, while receiving countries want to attract highly-skilled persons. Combating illegal migration and the readmission of irregular migrants is more likely to be in the interest
of the receiving countries. In most fields of policy, conflicts of interest are usually resolved through negotiation, normally moderated by specialised, international organisations - as, for example, with trade or cross-border capital flows regulated by the IMF and WTO. Migration policies, by contrast, are still decided unilaterally by the receiving countries. Migration is still governed in the way that trade was during the times of Colbert’s mercantilism. In fact, there is no political or institutional framework through which a reconciliation of conflicting interests could take place.

There is much talk of win-win, or even triple-win scenarios. Yet it is hard to imagine how these scenarios could come true if migration remains one of the last areas of truly protectionist policy.

What are the prospects for change?

Some effort was made by the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anan, who organised the first High Level Dialogue on International Migration in 2006, followed by a Forum on International Migration and Development in Brussels in 2007, and in Manila in 2008. But there is no indication that this process will lead to any more cooperative management of migration. Neither have the efforts of the EU Commission - starting with the conferences of Rabat and Tripoli - shown any results yet. As long as the negotiations focus on irregular migration and re-admission and do not open a window for legal migration they will fail.

Why should governments - particularly ministers of home affairs - agree to negotiate migration instead of deciding it unilaterally? With an estimated five million irregular immigrants in the EU and a chaotic situation on the EU’s southern and eastern boarders; with the consequent loss of confidence among the EU population in the ability of their governments to control migration properly; and with the incompatibility of migration policies and other policies such as trade or development: with all these pressures, the governments should finally realise that the unilateral management of migration is simply not feasible.

Negotiation does not mean that borders will be opened. Rather, negotiation and the cooperative management of migration mean that migration policies can be formed based on the needs and interests of the EU while taking into account the legitimate interests of the sending countries. Not until this is done can we talk seriously about migration and development.

Dr. Hans Werner Mundt is Senior Advisor at the Department Migration and Development of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
Forced Migration, Resettlement & Asylum

The fragmented and unsystematic migration policy of the member states and the lack of opportunities for legal immigration contribute to the abuse of asylum rights and the increase in irregular migration. The continuously declining absorbed refugee quotas in the European Union demonstrate that most EU member states are increasingly unwilling to fulfil their humanitarian obligations and shared responsibility to protect asylum seekers, create new opportunities for the absorption of quota refugees and resettlement programs. The access to the asylum process for individual immigrants, arriving independently of the quota system, must be improved. These three approaches, refugee absorption quotas, resettlement programs and asylum processes, can help create a policy that will set an international standard.

How can a European asylum, resettlement and humanitarian policy be developed within the framework of a common European migration and asylum policy? Which governance structures already exist in order to coordinate manage migration between Africa and Europe? Which conflicting and common interests can be identified (i.e. remittances vs. brain-drain)? What effect do campaigns for legalization have on immigrants and the European migration policy? How can the issue of security of the vulnerable as well of the sovereign states be addressed accordingly? How can human rights and humanitarian organizations be involved in the European migration and development policy?

• Jean-Pierre Cassarino evaluates the increasing involvement of Maghreb countries in negotiations with the EU about migration policy highlighting that readmission policies remain problematic and demonstrate the unequal relationship between the EU member states and the Maghreb countries.
• Don DeVoretz asks what are the appropriate and inappropriate uses of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, and religion in order to enhance border security and proposes a group profiling based on a pedigree system.
• Doris Peschke highlights the shared responsibility and the strategic use of the resettlement of refugees in the EU.
Over the last few years, the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) have been increasingly involved in migration talks and negotiations, at bilateral and multilateral levels, related to migration management issues, including the readmission of third-country nationals and the reinforced control of the external borders of the European Union (EU).

There is no question that the participation of the Maghreb countries in these talks is reflective of their willingness to open a dialogue on such issues as the management of migration flows (whether legal or illegal), reinforced border controls and police cooperation. However, despite the openness of the Maghreb countries to dialogue on migration management, the conclusion of readmission agreements remains a tricky issue. This situation stems from the resilience of various obstacles that have acquired mounting importance in multilateral and bilateral migration talks. Actually, the capacity of the Maghreb countries to deal effectively with the reintegration of their forcibly removed nationals remains extremely limited, from an institutional, structural, financial and economic point of view. Moreover, readmission agreements have been predominantly viewed by most Maghreb countries as being responsive to the sole interests of the EU and its member states. The former have been reluctant to engage in formal readmission agreements with the latter.

These obstacles are reflective of resilient contrasting visions pertaining to the management and impact of readmission. Also, they are reflective of an unequal relationship between EU member states and African countries when it comes to dealing with readmission or enforced return.

Unbalanced reciprocity in the cooperation

The vast majority of readmission agreements are concluded at a bilateral level and include reciprocal obligations as well as procedures pertaining to the identification process of undocumented migrants. The contracting states also commit to carrying out removal procedures without unnecessary formalities and within reasonable time limits, with due respect of their duties under their national legislation and the international agreements on human rights and the protection of the status of refugees, in accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol.

Although they are framed in a reciprocal context, the obligations contained in the readmission agreement are typically unequal. In fact, the willingness of a country of origin to conclude a readmission agreement does not mean that it has the legal institutional and structural capacity to deal with the removal of its nationals, let alone the forced return of foreign nationals and the protection of their rights. Nor does it mean that the agreement will be effectively or fully implemented in the long run, for it involves two contracting parties that do not necessarily share the same interest in the bilateral cooperation on readmission, nor do they face the same implications, at the domestic and regional level.

Alternative patterns of bilateral cooperation on readmission

It is a well-known fact that negotiations on the conclusion of standard readmission agreements with Mediterranean third countries have been difficult. This does not mean that bilateral cooperation on readmission has been shelved. On the contrary, various rounds of negotiations, at bilateral and multilateral levels, are taking place. These have allowed both some EU Member States to adaptively develop alternative patterns of cooperation on readmission. Exerting pressure on migrants’ countries of origin or last transit to induce them to cooperate on readmission might be tactically mistaken, above all when these countries have been gradually empowered following their proactive involvement in joint police operations aimed at reinforcing the control of the external borders of the EU.

Indeed, various North African countries (particularly Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) have been jointly involved in numerous police operations aimed at controlling the external borders of the EU, at bilateral and multilateral levels. These operations have been conducive to the emergence of unprecedented patterns of interconnectedness between the
North and the South of the Mediterranean. Not only because they promote, among other things, exchanges between national law-enforcement agencies, but also because these operations have allowed various South Mediterranean and African countries to play the efficiency card in migration talks and to enhance their international credibility in the management of migration and border controls. These countries, and their regimes, have become strategic partners in migration talks and they intend to capitalise on their empowered position.

Policy-makers in the EU Member States, particularly France, Italy and Spain, are becoming aware that a new compromise on readmission needs to be found in order to guarantee a modicum of cooperation with these strategic (and empowered) countries. Their adaptive inclination is now more a necessity than an option. Clearly, not all the EU Member States are equally affected by the issue of readmission in their interaction with the Maghreb and African countries. At the level of the EU-27, France, Italy and Spain are the most prominently involved in readmission cooperation and in ongoing negotiations with the Maghreb and African countries.

Indeed, as of June 2008, regardless of the number of agreements that are currently negotiated, more than 65 per cent of the 36 bilateral agreements linked to readmission that have been concluded between the EU-27 Member States and African countries (including the Maghreb countries) remained concentrated on these three Member States, reflecting the fact that France, Italy and Spain have been the most proactive over the last few years in mulling ways of inducing Maghreb and African countries to become more cooperative on readmission or enforced return.

More interestingly, more than half of the concluded agreements are based on alternative patterns of cooperation on readmission including exchanges of letters, memoranda of understanding, administrative deals and police cooperation agreements with a clause on readmission.

**Securing the operability of the cooperation on readmission**

The main rationale for the adoption of non standard deals is to secure bilateral cooperation on readmission and to avoid defection as far as possible by responding flexibly to new situations. Various EU Member States have been prone to flexibly readjust their cooperative patterns with some Mediterranean third countries with a view to addressing the pressing problem of re-documentation, i.e., the delivery of travel documents or laissez-passers by the consular authorities of the third country needed to remove undocumented migrants. Such flexible arrangements result from repeated consultations allowing cooperative patterns to be readjusted with a view to complying with the terms of the bilateral arrangements.

Undoubtedly, the incentives offered to African countries have certainly played a crucial role in inducing the latter to engage in such informal deals on readmission. However, the low level of public visibility and the high adaptability and flexibility of these deals to changing circumstances also explain the reason for which these arrangements have been gaining importance over the last few years.

These characteristics are sufficient to explain the gradual importance of the informal patterns of cooperation on readmission. They are also key to understanding why and how the Maghreb and African countries have been responsive to the call for enhanced cooperation on readmission with some EU Member States and why the latter have been prone to readapt their patterns of cooperation with the former.

**Policy implications**

A whole spectrum of agreements linked to readmission has been emerging over the last decade in the bilateral cooperation patterns existing between African and European countries. Standard readmission agreements constitute just one pattern of cooperation. Furthermore, incentives do play a crucial role in inducing third countries to cooperate on readmission. However, they do not adequately account for the sustainability of the bilateral cooperation in the long term. Actually, the perceived costs and benefits facing each country also shape the durability as well as the pattern of cooperation.

The issue of readmission permeates an array of policy areas in Euro-African and Euro-Maghreb relations. It is strategically embedded in a whole range of cooperative patterns which shape the terms of the cooperation sometimes favouring and sometimes hampering the conclusion of standard readmission agreements.

African and European migration stakeholders know that the conclusion of agreements linked to readmission...
(whether standard or not) is no guarantee for their effective implementation, owing to the strong asymmetry in costs and benefits that typically characterises their bilateral cooperation.

The gradual proliferation of deals (e.g., memoranda of understanding, pacts, administrative arrangements and police cooperation agreements including a clause on readmission) shows that the issue at stake lies in finding flexible solutions aimed at cooperating on readmission more than in the mere conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements per se. The agenda remains unchanged, but there has been a shift in priority actions with regard to the Maghreb and African countries. Actually, the operability of the cooperation on readmission has been prioritised over its formalisation.

This shift in priority has various implications in terms of policy-making:

- The patterns of cooperation have been primarily conducive to judicial and police reforms in the Maghreb and African countries as well as to enhanced technical assistance to police forces and law-enforcement agencies aimed at strengthening their border management capabilities. One is entitled to question whether the prioritisation of such security concerns and the technical assistance provided to law-enforcement agencies and border police authorities in origin and transit countries may be compatible with the promotion of good governance, democracy and public accountability in the Maghreb and in Africa, let alone the development of a genuine legal system aimed to the respect of the rights of migrants and the protection of asylum-seekers.

- Another implication stemming the prioritization of security concerns in the field of the cooperation on readmission lies in the fact that the bilateral cooperation is aimed at securing the effective removal of unwanted migrants but does not foresee any mechanisms aimed at supporting the social and professional reintegration of the persons subjected to a removal order. Such reintegration mechanisms will necessarily have to be considered, for they will determine the efficacy of the bilateral cooperation on readmission as well as its durability.

A new compromise is emerging in the field of readmission in the Euro-African relations, resulting predominantly from the convergence of short-term security concerns. This compromise reflects the emergence of power relations which substantially differ from the ones that prevailed few years ago leading to flexible patterns of cooperation on readmission.

However, the patterns of cooperation stemming from this new compromise may not be self-sustaining in the long term if they continue to prioritise security concerns over the pressing development problems facing the Maghreb and African countries; these remain the actual root causes of migration flows and refugee movements, together with poverty and the search for major civil and political rights.

Dr. Jean-Pierre Cassarino coordinates the Multi-sector Programme on Labour Migration at the International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation Turin. Before he directed the MIREM project on return migration at the European University Institute, Florence. On the topic he published: Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood
Don J. DeVoretz
Profiling at the Canadian Border: An Economist’s Viewpoint

"Trying to develop a comprehensive exit and entry control system to fight illegal immigration and discourage terrorism has […] been mission impossible."

Since 2001 Canada as well as other countries have increased their scrutiny at the border and have greatly increased their budgets devoted to this mission. In fact, Canada created a whole new service ministry in 2003, Canadian Border Services Agency with a budget of $1.3 billion (CDN) in 2006-07. Given this vast increase in resources and the inherent allocation questions imbedded in scrutiny at the border it is surprising that economists have limited their analyses largely to the economic impact of tightened border and not the broader issues surrounding an optimal scrutiny strategy.

This paper will attempt to address this gap in the literature by addressing the fundamental question of whether racial or any type of profiling at the border will be the least mechanism to enhance Canadian border security. An economist rarely analyzes research or policy questions that are not amenable to a methodology based on employing optimization models whose goal is either to maximize an individual’s utility or a firm’s profits (DeVoretz, 2006).

The economics literature on optimal law enforcement is no exception. This branch of the literature has largely addressed mundane questions concerning cross border tax avoidance or illegal cross border activities under various enforcement regimes (Globerman and Storer, 2006). The protagonists in these economic enforcement models are faceless agents with no ethnic, racial or religious characteristics and, from an economist’s viewpoint their cross border illegal actions are motivated solely by profit maximization. Hence, optimum enforcement of legal sanctions across borders does not involve racial, ethnic or religious profiling to either minimize enforcement costs or maximize conviction rates.

This economics literature whilst not directly concerned with profiling at the border however still provides us with a conceptual framework which I will apply in this essay. First, there exist two types of economic costs arising from enforcement. First, the direct costs in terms of resources devoted to enforcement in terms of manpower, equipment and time. Next, there exist indirect costs as enforcement in one area creates shifts in illegal activities to other geographical domains imposing new costs on new players. Thus, before entering into this arena of enforcement with or without ‘racial or group’ profiling an economist must carefully construct a social welfare function to relate the enforcement costs to the preferred benefits in their stated social welfare function. For example, if a secure border was deemed more important than international trade than the least cost solution which insured a minimum of ‘false negatives’ which would minimize the admissions of terrorists would be preferred.

Once an economist moves into the world of immigration research to investigate the economic impact of immigrants on the receiving country, and the economic outcomes of immigrants after arrival, discrimination and racial profiling rise to the forefront (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998) to explain labour market anomalies. Concepts such as labour market segmentation (Blinder, 1973) have been introduced to explain why two different immigrant groups with identical human capital characteristics but different racial, ethnic or religious compositions receive differential treatment in the labour market.

Jews, to name one religious or cultural immigrant group, which have been profiled by economists, have been cited as “overachievers” in the Canadian labour market owing to a combination of their intensive human capital acquisition and their “unobservable” positive labour market traits (Dean and DeVoretz, 2000). Economists have not carefully defined these “unobservable” variables whose definitions may contain elements of racial profiling. However some authors offer us some insights into what they see as “unobservable”. For example, Binder (1974) and Oaxaca (1973) have suggested that these "unobservables" include the positive or negative discrimination inflicted on the profiled group by the majority group. Borjas (1994) has argued that these "unobservables" may include the profiled group’s degree of energy, networking skills and other forms of group social capital.
Theoretical work by Stark (1993) has extended the profiling of immigrants in an economic context by suggesting that employers practice group profiling due to the asymmetric information available to them in the short run. In other words, as the first immigrant group enters the labour market the employer lacks information on the immigrant's work history and credentials and thus will pay the first arrival cohort less than other well known and older vintages of immigrants. Once employers have a history of the work experience and can properly value their credentials, employers will no longer discriminate against this profiled group. In short, group profiling is the labour market's initial response to ignorance about individual characteristics (work history, certificates, etc.). However, as the employer better understands the value of the work history, education or certificates held by this new cohort the employer will now pay this individual a wage based on his/her potential productivity rather.

This brief summary of economists' views of 'optimal' group profiling in the economy suggests that either the economist assumes away racial profiling by having faceless agents interact or if profiling exists, competitive forces will drive racial profiling away as more information is obtained. My tactic now is to translate this standard economic screening paradigm into contemporary Canada circa 2006 and assess the efficacy of various screening devices at Canada's border. I first devise several regimes which avoid "group profiling" and rank them in terms of both their security and economic outcomes. I then offer my version of a screening technique based on an individual history which will avoid "group profiling". Finally, armed with my explicit social welfare function I will choose an 'optimal screening' mechanism at the border.

Screening without "Group Profiling"

Can an economic case be made for optimal "group profiling" at Canada's border to insure that Canada realizes its stated goals of security and unimpeded commerce at its border? In this context, I replace "racial profiling" with the broader term of "group profiling" to cover the more common types of profiling that are based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender or citizenship. My earlier work suggests that any perceived optimal action taken to restrict a profiled group at the border (e.g., foreign students) has both intended and unintended consequences since every action at the border causes a later deflection of potential entrants at the border (DeVoretz, 2005). Thus, the answer to the question will not be unambiguous.

Autarky at the Border

If Canada's foremost goal is to insure security at its border by excluding terrorists while not practicing "group profiling", it could practice autarky. In other words, Canada could exclude all non-Canadian citizens from crossing Canada's border. This would occur at a heavy economic cost to Canada since trade requires the movement of people (Globerman and Storer, 2006). However, the large economic cost derived from the presence of an autarky would not prove insurmountable. Even though forty percent of Canada's gross national product involves trade, Canada would not necessarily reduce its standard of living by that amount under autarky. Much of Canada's trade is in commodities which could still be transshipped at Canada's border. Moreover, Canada could obviously substitute for the loss of imports under autarky by the home production of previously imported goods and services. Finally, exports obviously could continue to leave Canada provided there is no retaliatory action by Canada's trade partners.

In short, an efficacious screening system without "group profiling" could be developed by practicing autarky. The cost of avoiding "group profiling" and insuring security would be the substantial decline in Canada's gross domestic product but no terrorists would enter Canada.

Random Screening

Autarky is one of two security regimes at the border which would insure the absence of "group profiling". The other position is now to allow non-Canadian citizens to approach the border and be randomly selected for more complete secondary scrutiny. This secondary scrutiny could result in rejection or admission at the border. This procedure has both security and economic costs which I outline below.

---

19 In this case of graduate students, the tighter post-9/11 sanctions on potential Arab based graduate students intending to the United States led to more applications at Canadian universities.

20 I omit scrutiny of Canadian citizens at the border since presumably ascension to citizenship allows sufficient time for adequate internal scrutiny unlike scrutiny at the border which requires instant decisions with incomplete information.

21 Under transshipment, goods would be offloaded within a security perimeter which would prevent foreign shippers actually entering Canada. Later this cargo could be reprocessed in the secure area by Canadians and shipped out of Canada.
The fact that travelers or shippers are randomly selected makes Canada's border less than secure in three ways. First, a terrorist could bypass secondary screening and enter Canada and harm Canadians because she was not randomly selected to be screened. Secondly, a non-terrorist who is randomly selected for screening could be incarcerated. Finally, even if a non-terrorist was randomly selected for secondary inspection a false negative could allow a terrorist to pass into Canada. Clearly, under a random selection system, all of these three errors are bad. In additional substantial economic costs which I outline below will arise under random screening. Nonetheless, under truly random screening there would be no "group profiling".

The economic costs of random screening are substantial. Secondary screening could prove expensive and lead to deflection at the border. Goods and people could stop entering Canada or do so only at great cost to Canadian consumers. An example should suffice to show my point although examples abound (De Voretz, 2005). A potential shipper knows that there are three added cost components to moving cargo to Canada.

First, time at the border is increased even if the shipper is not randomly selected due to congestions costs that arise as others in front of the queue are selected for further screening. Next, if a shipper is randomly selected more time is added to cross the border before her goods or services arrive in Canada. Finally, due to frequent false positive decisions under the random screening regime at the border the shipper could have her shipment rejected at the border. All of the time costs would then be passed on to the Canadian importer, or the shipper who would pass on these costs to the Canadian consumer. Finally, the exporter could simply export to another country if these added costs result in lost sales and revenues in the Canadian market.

In sum, both Canadian taxpayers and consumers of importables would pay for this "non-profiling" or random selection model of screening. The problem of course is that we cannot compare the costs and benefits of this regime. Unlike autarky which did not allow any terrorists to enter Canada, the random selection technique will admit terrorists or terrorists' shipments with at least a small likelihood of catastrophic consequences. In addition, non-terrorists will be rejected.

Since both autarky and random "no-group" screenings appear non-optimal, I now offer a screening technique that both reduce the costs outlined above and the likelihood of a catastrophic terrorist act.

**Optimal Screening: A Pedigree System**

The two extreme solutions to avoid "group profiling" at the Canadian border have led to non-optimal outcomes. The question at this point is does there exist a screening device which insures both greater security at a lower economic cost whilst avoiding "group profiling"? There are at least two alternative screening methods which will lead to an affirmative answer to this question and I explore them both below.

We noted earlier that screening costs arise at the border due to two types of mistakes. The "false positive" type mistake leads to time-related costs being passed on to others. The example of a safe trucker being delayed at the border ultimately implies that the Canadian consumer will pay for the time lost at the border. The second error is a "false negative" which allows a terrorist to enter Canada and inflict damage.

An optimal screening device at the border should simultaneously reduce the probabilities of both "false positive" and "false negative" decisions. I propose the introduction of a "pedigree system" that relies on the concept of repetitive successful border crossings. In short, the number of times a non-Canadian citizen successfully crosses the Canadian border in both directions without incurring an infraction either while in Canada or during the act of crossing the border will constitute a piece of information to construct a "pedigree system". For the system to work, the initial entry into Canada would require both sponsorship and vetting by a certified source outside of Canada. Sponsors would verify the information required for the initial applicant to cross the border. Of course, sponsors would have been previously vetted by the Canadian government and have a perfect track record. Canada would pay sponsors for their services and the proceeds from the initial visa entry cost borne by the applicant would defray Can-

---

22 The autarky regime while effective is too expensive in terms of lost output and the random profiling while less expensive admits terrorists.

23 Canada currently uses this system for foreign agricultural workers. The initial entry of a foreign temporary worker into Canada is sponsored and vetted, and returning to Canada in the next season is earned by good behaviour while in Canada including leaving in the previous year before her visa expires.

24 Canada currently follows this procedure for issuing passports with a domestic Canadian sponsor. The application form must be signed by a recognized authority who verifies that the applicant is the person identified in the document.
ada's sponsorship costs. In other words, the programme would operate like Canada's current immigration programme which involves a landing fee.

The initial entry of a foreigner would be monitored in two ways. First, the applicant would have to leave on or before the end date of the initial entry visa. Next, the applicant must report in person to the foreign sponsor upon return home at a mutually agreed upon time and place. Success in meeting these two requirements would lead to one point earned by the visitor. Each successful double crossing, that is, correctly and timely reported entry and exit, would lead to an additional point on the foreign visitor's pedigree scorecard.

The pedigree scorecard in turn will yield information on how Canada should conduct screening searches in a non-random way to minimize both false positives and false negative decisions. For example, a failure to meet the entry-exit requirements initially could either lead to being treated like an initial entry seeker or result in a lifetime entry ban. The decision would depend on the discretion of the border official given the nature and degree of abuse of the entry-exit reporting requirements. Examples of extreme dereliction in reporting would be, overstaying in Canada, leaving and returning without reporting during the approved stay, entry to a designated "terrorist producing" area during an illegal stay-leave period, etc.

In short, there would be no "group profiling" under the pedigree regime, and any adverse decision about further re-entry would be a by-product of the individual foreign visitor's actions and not due to group attributes.

How would several successful return trips affect the traveler's pedigree? At some point the number of successful entry-exit occurrences by a foreigner would yield a pure enough pedigree to allow less scrutiny at Canada's border and longer stays within Canada. The key to this decision making process is two-fold. First, the foreign visitor in particular and all potential foreign visitors must be unaware of what constitutes a good pedigree. Next, the time allowed in for the foreign visitor's stay must be inversely related to the number of successful prior entry and exits.

Triage at the Border under a pedigree screening system

Canada could practice triage by grouping visitors into shorter queues at the border. This ranking at the border would be based on the pedigree holder's number of successful exit-entry occurrences, their type of entry visa (student, agricultural worker, visitor, religious worker, etc.) and similar pedigree information acquired from other countries which construct pedigrees on individual visitors.25

My pedigree system under triage would work as follows. Foreign visitors with no past history would have no pedigree and be detained at the border to verify their identity. Then they would be subjected to secondary screening including verification of their sponsor's testimonial via a life teleconference ending with an iris imprint. All other foreign entrants with a Canadian pedigree would enter a separate queue and would be given an initial screening to verify their identity and to determine what class of pedigree they hold and whether they appear on a daily updated "watch list" at time of arrival.

Any further action at the border now depends on their class of pedigree. A class 1 pedigree would imply no further screening while a class 2 pedigree would imply both a restricted stay in Canada in terms of time and place and the issuance of a surety bond by a "well known" third party. Class 3 pedigree holders would be refused entry to Canada. This result would arise because the visitor previously did not leave Canada at the agreed upon time and/or did not notify his home country sponsor upon return. All class 4 pedigree holders would be detained at the border since this person would have multiple violations of entry-exit conditions in Canada or other countries with similar regimes.

The pedigree system could be made even more sophisticated and would reduce the probability of type I or II errors and simultaneously avoid "group" profiling. Some of these extensions of the system based on personal history and voluntary actions are outlined below.

Modifying Pedigrees

Given a history of successful entry and exists from Canada other extenuating events can alter the foreign visitor's placement (i.e. Class 1 to 4) in the screening triage based on her original pedigree. For example, the pedigree rating of an individual who voluntarily joins a group that espouses or supports violence would be altered. This decision would be based on this group's history or the average pedigree rating of its members.

25 Triage in this context refers to grouping people into queues based on their past history of entrances and exits. Those with the greatest number of successful entry and exits would be in the first queue and all others would follow in separate queues.
In other words, an individual with a class 1 pedigree rating—no screening at the border—who voluntarily joins a group whose members have a class 3 rating and implies detention at the border would receive a class 2 rating. In this case a class 2 rating would imply a complete vetting at the border with a limited stay in Canada and a surety bond held by a well known third party.  

In addition, if intelligence indicates an imminent security threat then the individual's pedigree ranking can be altered during the period of the perceived threat. In this case, a high alert would reduce everyone’s pedigree level one step for an announced period of time. The individual could either accept this diminution in her pedigree or can wait for the threat to subside so that her pedigree status can be restored.

The individual’s pedigree can also be altered by the foreign sponsor reporting a criminal offense in the visitor's home country. For example, the criminal free record required under the initial successful vetting by the foreign sponsor would be updated if a crime was committed in the interim and the current pedigree level could be reduced depending on the severity of the crime as judged by Canadian officials. For example, a felony conviction of murder in Mexico would reduce a previously class 1 Mexican pedigree holder to class 4. On the other hand a felony conviction for marijuana possession by a Texan who held a class 1 Canadian pedigree may not alter the pedigree rating in the eyes of Canadian border officials.

In sum, in the economist’s world several paradigms are available to insure the absence of “group profiling” at Canada’s borders. Both autarky and random screening at the border would avoid “group profiling” but are deemed non-optimal. A pedigree system in which all the costs are internalized by the potential visitor based on individual records eliminates profiling, reduces both type I and I errors and minimizes the economic cost arising from queuing at Canada’s border.

**A Case for "Group Profiling" at the Border**

Group profiling of potential foreign entrants while difficult to justify politically may still be acceptable under other criteria. My definition of group profiling is wide and much more encompassing than the standard racial profiling definition. The following table provides four alternative definitions of ‘group profiling’ by different political organizations. Seven markers are cited including race, colour, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, place of origin or link to an identified group.

**Factors included in some definitions of “racial profiling”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Ontario Human Rights Commission</th>
<th>Quebec Commission des droits de la personne et des libertés individuelles</th>
<th>Amnesty International, Civil Liberties Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>race</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colour</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ancestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link to a group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a static world with no learning by potential entrants “group profiling” could be justified on economic and security grounds. First I would isolate selected people at the border if they fulfilled a combination of criteria in the table which I knew in advance would simultaneously reduce Type I and Type II screening errors and reduce trade distortions at the border owing to shorter queues.

A simple regime of "group profiling" could be instituted under a pedigree system by simply adding any one (or more) of the criteria in the table to the pedigree assessment of the potential foreign-born entrant. For example, a class 1 entrant based on past entry-exist history could be moved to class 3 or 4 depending on the average exit-entry performance of a group which the potential entrant belonged to as identified in the table. In the short run, "group profiling" would decrease errors, reduce queuing time and would be preferred to any of the above regimes without "group profiling".

The efficacy of group profiling becomes less obvious once I introduce time and the possibility that potential terrorists at the border learn what groups are being profiled. Once terrorists learn of government "group profiling" these actions will become counter-productive as terrorists choose to contract their work out to non-members of any of the seven groups identified in the table.

In a dynamic setting, a mixed strategy of my pedigree screening device with and without "group profiling" may prove the most efficacious at the border as long as the
“group profiling” strategy was turned on and off randomly. This would prohibit learning by terrorists whilst still enjoying the benefits of “group profiling”.

Beyond the Canadian Border

Optimal border screening alone cannot guarantee security. Some bone fide terrorists will still gain entry to Canada and some innocent foreign entrants can be corrupted whilst in Canada and become terrorists.

The question now becomes: how do we scrutinize those that we have allowed to enter? Canada’s first internal check is the declared date of departure. If a policy of no internal visa extensions is in place, then those who have not left by their set date will lose their pedigree and be rejected if they try to re-enter Canada. In addition, all relevant “third party” countries will be notified of this “overstay” status in Canada with a request for detention at the “third party” country’s border if the individual attempts entry in the “third party” country.28

An overstaying pedigreed foreigner can either plot from within or takes action (e.g. laundering money) while in Canada on behalf of other terrorists or conduct an actual act of terrorism within Canada.

No pedigree system can effectively prevent the conversion of the pedigreed foreign visitor to a potential terrorist whilst in Canada. The pedigree system nonetheless, does allow the beginnings of solid police work to seek out the potential terrorist prior to any action or apprehend the foreigner after a terrorist act. In short, the search for potential terrorists would be in reverse order of their pedigree as well as their individual characteristics on file (language abilities, occupation, gender, etc.) to match the information on the potential or actual terrorists. These actions based on the pedigree system would aid the apprehension of overstaying pedigreed foreigners or actual terrorists.

Conclusions

This essay has attempted to shed light on the question: What are the appropriate and inappropriate uses of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, and religion in a security context? Answer: Group profiling based on a pedigree system. In sum, it should be noted that the implementation of my preferred pedigree system may prove cumbersome, expensive to the foreign visitor and probably prone to administrative error. Thus, if this pedigree system failed for these reasons then as an economist who is extremely concerned about terrorism my social welfare function would lead me to choose autarky.

References


Don J. DeVoretez is a Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University and Senior Fellow at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

28 A “third party country” in this case is any country which is not Canada or the foreigner’s sending country. This “third party country” may have a reciprocal agreement with Canada to enforce Canada’s pedigree class and vice-versa.
According to UNHCR statistics around 11 million refugees are currently in need of international protection. Crisis situations such as repression against political organisation, e.g. in Burma/Myanmar, Zimbabwe, or conflict situations as in Iraq, Sudan, and other countries still force people to flee. In addition, a larger number of persons is fleeing violence and conflict regions, and again an other considerable number of persons is displaced in the country of origin. A more recent example is the military conflict between Georgia and Russia which led to thousands of persons loosing their homes.

The vast majority of the global refugees are hosted by the poorer countries in the world. There is financial and technical assistance granted by the more wealthy countries, but too often refugees are housed in camps with little perspectives for their lives.

Resettlement - a durable solution for refugee protection

Resettlement is one of the three durable solutions for refugee protection, the others are asylum and integration in the country of asylum, and repatriation to the country of origin when the situation allows.

Often resettlement is confused with repatriation, however resettlement is clearly defined: The country of resettlement ought to offer a permanent and durable solution, refugee status and a long-term residence with a possibility of naturalisation. This means that persons identified to be in need of international protection will be referred for resettlement, generally by UNHCR, and be granted a refugee status in the country of resettlement. Most countries with regular resettlement programmes grant a permanent status, in Canada for example, the refugees would qualify for citizenship after three years of residence.

Protracted refugee situations

According to research into various refugee situations undertaken in 2007, between 60-70 % of refugees live in protracted refugee situations. More refugees spent longer times - increasingly more than a decade - in camp situations with little prospect of finding a decent life for themselves or possibilities to take up jobs or make a living of their own. While children are offered education - often inside the camp - usual role models in society are scarce. Thus developing the skills of taking initiative on their own, creating opportunities and shaping their future, taking responsibility in society are not possible. The effects of "hospitalisation", well known in social science in the fields of work with homeless people for example, or apathy, well known in the work with unemployed persons, are considerable risks.

There is often also a lack of protection in the country of first asylum. If various refugee groups are hosted in the same camp, some of the tensions between ethnic or culturally or ideologically diverse groups are living on. To give an example: Political activists against the Shah-regime of Iran had to flee the country when the Islamic government took over; they found refuge in Iraq and settle there for two decades. In the aftermath of the war, a Shiite majority takes over in their region, and they are no longer safe and again have to flee. Another example are mixed families who are often at risk in conflict situations, Bosnia may serve as an example. Resettlement is in such situations the only option for refugees to truly rebuild their lives.
applications in 2002, in 2007 there were only 28,570 (s. Eurostat).

While there has been a notable increase of asylum applications in the border countries of the EU, Greece had four times as many asylum applications from 2003 to 2007, or in Cyprus, where the asylum applications in 2007 were about 17 times the number received in 2003, or Malta, where the figure has doubled between 2003 and 2007. However, this multiplication is on the basis of rather small figures, Malta had 470 asylum applications in 2003 and 955 in 2007, Cyprus had 405 in 2003, and 7,170 in 2007, and Greece had 4,810 in 2003 and 20,990 in 2007. For these countries, the increase in asylum applications poses a real challenge, and other EU Member States ought to find ways to assist these countries which currently face problems. And yet, these increases are relative, as the absolute figure for all EU Member States has dropped dramatically. It is clear that the EU is far behind its possibilities of providing protection for refugees.

Malta and the Netherlands have introduced the notion of intra-EU resettlement, to relocate persons who arrived and were recognised as refugees from Malta to the Netherlands. While the process and definition is similar, the term relocation may be more appropriate. The need for such relocation may arise also for other countries guarding the EU's borders, however, considerations and aspirations of refugees ought to be taken into account also in these procedures.

Governments of EU Member States have largely agreed in the consultations on the future European Common Asylum System that resettlement should be developed as an additional EU scheme for providing protection.

**Resettlement by EU Member States**

Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway (part of Schengen) have maintained refugee resettlement programmes also at times when other European countries stopped their programmes at the end of the 70s. The Netherlands, UK and Ireland have started their programmes some years ago, and also Iceland (Schengen) has an annual quota. European countries have taken in 5-600 refugees per year.

In 2007, Portugal, Romania and Hungary as well as the Czech Republic have expressed their interest in resettlement. Portugal has established a small quota and started to resettle in 2007; in Romania a transit evacuation facility has been agreed with UNHCR, and Hungary has decided on a legal framework for resettlement in the parliament. After some debate, France has announced early in 2008 to resettle approximately 1000 refugees to France, 500 to be referred by UNHCR. In September 2008, the first refugees are expected to arrive in France.

Germany had some political and public debate on refugee resettlement in spring 2008, and there were hopes that Germany could resettle 20-30,000 of Iraqi refugees from Syria and Jordan. However, a European agreement was tied into this deliberation. There has also been some confusion between resettlement and evacuation, essentially different concepts.

Certainly, the Iraqi refugee crisis with around two million refugees in the neighbouring countries Syria and Jordan and an additional two million displaced persons inside Iraq deserves urgent attention and action. While a common EU approach would of course be desirable, the EU does not have a mandate to oblige Member States to resettle refugees. It will depend on the political will of each Member State to resettle, and thus such decisions ought to be taken as swiftly as possible. An EU resolution can complement these actions, it cannot replace it.

In the past years, Germany had taken in small numbers of refugees on an ad-hoc basis in emergency situations, such as for example the Uzbek refugees in 2005. It will be important for any resettlement programme, to reserve some places for such emergency cases. The importance of regular programmes is that they are regular and continuous, that a budget provides for the necessary expenses for selection and determination, preparation, travel, reception and integration programmes.

**Europe’s role in refugee resettlement**

Globally, the US, Canada and Australia and New Zealand have well established refugee programmes. The US for example resettles between 70-75,000 refugees per year. Resettlement, however, is not only about figures. The feasibility study commissioned by the European Commission in 2002/2003 highlighted also the strategic use of resettlement. To become strategic, political will and decisions and speedy and thorough action are required. With a common approach agreed between EU Member States as well as the US and
Canada in the context of the Annual Tripartite Consultations of UNHCR some refugee crises could be considerably eased, if not even be resolved. The Bhutanese refugees in Nepal may serve as an example: some thousand refugees live for decades now in Nepal, a very poor country, with no prospects of returning and no prospects of integration in Nepal. If a sizeable number of refugees could be offered resettlement, a smaller number may find an integration option in Nepal. It appears that joint efforts in 2008, negotiated with UNHCR, may prove to be effective.

The size and success of the US and Canadian resettlement programmes is to a large degree possible, because the governments and authorities cooperate closely with civil society actors, faith communities and welfare organisations at all stages of resettlement. Civil society organisations have possibilities to point to desperate refugee situations and propose resettlement for group referrals, or in the case of Canada, also for individual cases. The decisions are of course taken by the authorities. Civil society actors are informed thoroughly throughout the process, in the case of the US programme; voluntary agencies also assist in preparations for cases for the authorities.

Pre-departure orientation programmes, and post-arrival orientation and integration programmes undertaken by civil society organisations have proven successful. This cooperation requires transparency regarding the criteria for the selection of refugee groups, and openness on the side of the authorities to discuss such criteria. In the European programmes, the cooperation with non-governmental organisations is still more an exception than a rule. It may be a fair assessment to say that the size and the acceptance of refugee resettlement as a humanitarian obligation of society as a whole are enhanced by the cooperation of all actors. As a consequence, European programmes would possibly grow more substantially if the cooperation was enhanced as well.

Refugee Resettlement and integration of refugees

A major discussion - and indeed a major challenge - is focussing on the integration potential of refugees. There are diverse views and positions, whether an assessment of the integration potential of refugees ought to be among the selection criteria. As a matter of principle, the humanitarian need and the vulnerability criteria as outlined in the UNHCR Handbook on Resettlement ought to be the guiding principles for decisions.

As the Finnish Red Cross has outlined in a research study, integration is not a linear process, it is influenced by many subjective and objective factors. The expectations of refugees play an important role: Particularly upon arrival, in many instances, refugees would like to start their new lives, initiate meetings, look for jobs, and learn the language. However, frustrations like not being able to communicate, lack of interest of receiving communities, difficulties to find a qualified job, non-recognition of qualifications, have also an effect on the motivations. For refugees as well as for society at large it is important to understand that integration has several phases, that there are hurdles and set-backs and that expectations and frustrations need to be managed.

The debate on integration has however also an other consequence: Older refugees, who may no longer be able to (re-)train and take up a job, who may have difficulties to acquire yet another language, may find it difficult to be selected, although they are clearly in need of protection and many may deserve some quiet and peaceful years at the end of their often difficult lives. Such humanitarian concerns ought to be considered, too, when we talk about a European resettlement scheme sharing the international responsibility to provide protection.

Europe can do much more and much better than we currently do, in terms of figures and quality of programmes.

Towards a European Refugee Resettlement Programme

The European Commission will elaborate elements of an EU Resettlement scheme and make proposals in the coming year. An EU Refugee Resettlement Programme would hopefully be part of the future programme on asylum and migration, which will be adopted in autumn 2009 under the Swedish EU Presidency.

An EU programme would facilitate a more strategic use of resettlement, but also provide for practical cooperation between resettlement countries. Common selection missions, sharing information on refugee situations, but also providing specific services could be better planned. For example, refugees with disabilities could be offered specific rehabilitation at specialised centres available in
European countries; or specific medical treatment, operations could be offered to those in need.

As long as European resettlement programmes are relatively small, they appear to be rather expensive because of the necessary infrastructure. But planning together, indicating specific options and joint operations particularly for selection allow both, reducing the relative expenses and increasing the value of the programmes. An EU programme needs to build in cooperation with non-governmental organisations at all stages, for the benefit of the programmes, and for the benefit of refugees. The EU is excellent in competition rules. Rather than competing on who is best at reducing the number of asylum seekers, could we envisage more competition in providing the best and highest quality of protection for refugees in the EU?

**Further reading**

UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2004

A. Passarelli, D. Peschke (eds), Resettlement: Protecting Refugees, Sharing Responsibility, CCME 2006

CCME, Resettlement Fact Sheets, available in English, German, French, Czech, Finnish, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Brussels, 2007

ICMC, Welcome to Europe! 'A Comparative Review of Resettlement in Europe', Brussels, 2007

Doris Peschke is General Secretary of the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, an ecumenical agency of churches in Europe on migration, asylum and anti-racism.
DOSSIERS

MIGRATION

DOSSIER Border Politics - Migration in the Mediterranean *
DOSSIER Migration & Entwicklung
DOSSIER European Governance of Migration
DOSSIER Leben in der Illegalität *
DOSSIER Europa 2007: Chancengleichheit für alle!

INTEGRATION

DOSSIER Migration & Gesundheit *
DOSSIER Migrationsliteratur - Eine neue deutsche Literatur?*
DOSSIER Starke Jugend - Lebenswelten junger MigrantInnen
DOSSIER Religiöse Vielfalt & Integration *
DOSSIER Schule mit Migrationshintergrund
DOSSIER Der Nationale Integrationsplan auf dem Prüfstand
DOSSIER Muslimische Vielfalt in Deutschland
DOSSIER Wirtschaftliche Potenziale von Migration & Integration
DOSSIER HipHop zwischen Mainstream und Jugendprotest
DOSSIER Multikulturalismus: Vision oder Illusion?
DOSSIER Fußball & Integration *

DIVERSITY

DOSSIER Politics of Diversity *
DOSSIER Medien und Diversity
DOSSIER Managing Diversity - Alle Chancen genutzt?
DOSSIER Das Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz
DOSSIER Schwarze Community in Deutschland

Die MID-Dossiers erscheinen als Online-Dossiers, zu finden unter
http://www.migration-boell.de/web/sonstige/747.htm
Die mit * gekennzeichneten Dossiers können auch als pdf heruntergeladen werden. Stand September 2009
Commenting with Adobe Acrobat and Reader

The commenting tool of the Adobe Acrobat/Reader can be very helpful tool when you have to read larger publications on screen or want to exchange information through the internet.

Akin to a printed document, you can use the commenting tool to highlight, edit, or comment directly in the PDF-file. In larger documents this creates a personalised navigation in the comments window.

Most common is the Sticky Note Tool. When opened it is made up of a window in which you can write text or paste something from the clipboard. Such notice windows are also part of nearly all other commenting tools.

Using the attach function in the comments menu you can send PDF-comments separately from the document by email and they can be imported by receivers into their own version. Use in the comment-window >options >import comments.

If you want to reply to a comment, use the reply function: click with the right mouse button on the comment and choose reply.

On the right you find a part of the tools window in which you can customise the comment types in >tools >customise toolbars... The tick marks indicate tools which are chosen.

The highlighter tool can be used to mark shorter parts of text just like on paper.