Similarities in Difference: The Challenge of Muslim Integration in Germany and the United States

by Mounir Azzaoui

Political Context

In September 2009, only a few days after assuming his post, the new U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Philip D. Murphy, twice invited Muslims to “Iftar,” the evening meal during the Islamic fasting period of Ramadan at which Muslims break from their fast. In so doing, he continued a tradition that was established after 9/11 and the U.S. troop deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and which is part of a larger strategy to broaden contacts with European Muslims. That strategy includes not only a meeting between then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Muslims in Berlin in 2007, but an entire collection of initiatives: International Leadership Programs for Muslims, presentations, and publications about the lives of U.S. Muslims.

The background that motivates these efforts in public diplomacy includes the conviction on the part of the U.S. administration that the integration of Muslims in Europe is severely deficient, not least because some of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks on the United States came from Germany. This criticism was expressed in unusually blunt language in diplomatic circles by Daniel Fried, then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, to his German counterparts. (1) Karsten Voigt, then coordinator for German-American cooperation, heard the criticism: “They [the Americans] are convinced: We do it better [integrate Muslims into society]. We can be an example. But in such a conceptualization, they forget that here [in Europe] and there [in the United States], when talking about Muslims, we are talking about a totally different social and geopolitical group, on the one side and the other.” (2)

German foundations  and associations in Washington, D.C. were initially unprepared to handle topics on religion and politics. But since 2007, German political and cultural foundations in Washington have been working on programs to present information about the socio-economic status and other circumstances of Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic through a variety of events in order to demonstrate that Germany is a multi-cultural society and that it is inappropriate to speak of a failed integration policy in Germany. Muslims in Germany, however, have welcomed the dialogue begun by the U.S. in Germany. The speaker for the Coordination Council of Muslims  in Germany, Ayyub Köhler, speaking at one of the U.S. Iftar receptions in 2007, praised the U.S. initiative and stated that a similar effort from German policymakers was missing; but he also indicated, critically, that there were limits to the U.S. effort and that the U.S. could only regain lasting and effective rapport with the Muslim community if it ended its wars in Islamic countries.

Security issues have played a central role from the beginning of the European-German-American dialogue. While the beginning of the debate was characterized largely by accusations, the discussion has developed more nuanced in the last year. The transatlantic discussion about Muslims in Europe and the United States is characterized by the peculiarity that, although there are some parallels within Europe about integrating Muslims, among European states there are also at times striking, specific distinctions in the experiences of each state depending on the unique political cultures and church-state relations. For that reason, broad comparisons between Europe in general and the United States could seldom be formulated in the discussion. A transatlantic debate about the condition of Muslims in the United States and Germany in particular will certainly be more fruitful.

The following sections of this Issue Brief will first point out central differences between the circumstances of Muslims in Germany and the United States and will highlight the implications of these differences for the German-American dialogue. Second, this essay intends to show that Germany and the United States alike have difficulties integrating Muslims and their religious organizations into society and similar challenges to overcome, which require appropriate political and social responses.

Indigenous and Immigrant Islam

“We didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth Rock landed on us.” This well-known expression by Malcolm X not only describes the experience of the African slaves and their descendants but is also part of the history of Islam in the United States. About 15 to 20 percent of the slaves brought to the United States, numbering about two to three million, were West African Muslims. Islam could withstand the oppressive conditions for centuries, especially as long as  new Muslim slaves were brought to America. (3) Islam in America then probably “died out” in the late nineteenth century, but was revitalized in the early twentieth century by African-American Muslim groups, like Nation of Islam. The late Warith Dean Mohammed steered the majority of the community in the last decades in the direction of Sunni Islam and broke with the racist elements of the Nation of Islam.

African-American Muslims today account for about one-third of American Muslims, and as such, make the United States the only Western country to have such a large number of indigenous  Muslims. This circumstance makes it more difficult for the U.S. to depict Islam as something foreign and un-American, as happens in Europe. The depiction is made even more difficult because only about 10 percent of new immigrants in the U.S. are Muslim. In contrast, the number of German-born converts to Islam and their descendants is about 1 percent of the total Muslim population. Thus, an overwhelming majority of Muslims are immigrants and, furthermore, most of the total number of immigrants are Muslim. In Germany, Islam is connected to Germany’s “guest-worker program.” José Casanova’s statement, “The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic disprivileged other all tend to coincide” (4) clearly applies in Germany.

“Islam is like Spanish”

In Germany, the estimated number of Muslims as a percentage of the total population is around 4.6 to 5.2 percent (3.8 to 4.5 million people) while in the United States it is about 1.6 to 2.0 percent (5 to 7 million people). At such a level, Muslims are the third largest religious community in Germany, after Catholics and Protestants. In view of the relative size of the Muslim community in Germany and the debate about identity and the fact that the Hispanic community is the largest ethnic minority group in the United States (15.4% of the population) with its own identity issues, comparison of these two communities might be a useful focal point in the future. (5) Despite the structural and institutional differences current examinations of Muslim communities in Germany and the U.S. can still yield useful results.

Diversity, Dynamics, and Ties Abroad

Muslims in the United States are a more diverse group than Muslims in Germany. In Germany, Muslims come from fifty different countries, whereas in the United States, Muslims come from sixty-eight different countries and display a higher diversity within those countries. In Germany, the number of Muslims originally from Turkey accounts, at 68 percent, for the vast majority. The next nearest group, Arabs, accounts for only 15 percent and southeastern Europeans (Balkans) 14 percent. In contrast, in the United States, there are three relatively equally large groups: African-Americans (20%), Arabs (24%), and South Asians (18%); a combination of small groups from a variety of other geographical areas accounts for the remainder and constitutes the majority (38%). The Muslim community in the United States could be seen as a “microcosm” of the Muslim  world. This circumstance can be considered particular to the United States; nowhere else in the world will one find such a diverse collection of Muslims.

It is also remarkable that, according to Gallup, the Muslim community within the United States is “the most racially diverse community in the United States” compared to other religious communities. (6) This circumstance means that the integration experience of Muslims in the United States is more dynamic and complex than is the case for Muslims in Germany. The diversity among the Muslim community in the United States also results in greater interaction and cooperation between Muslims from different countries and the significant use of English in religious contexts, notably in Friday sermons, since it is the only common language among various groups.

Even though about a third of Muslims in Germany are not from Turkey, most of the discussions in the Muslim community in Germany are led by Turkish Muslims. Turkish dominance in Germany is magnified by the very strong connections Turks have abroad. The largest Muslim organization in Germany, the  Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute of Religion (DITIB), which includes about 550 mosques, is a branch of the Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Diyanet). Not only is the chairman of the organization a counselor of the Turkish embassy in Berlin, but hundreds of Imams are sent to Germany as civil servants by the Turkish state. Most of these Imams do not speak German and are unfamiliar with the German lifestyle. After they have become accustomed to living in the German environment, many are then reassigned to Turkey and replaced by new Imams with the consequence that the same problems repeat themselves.

Socio-Economic Differences

The immigration of Muslims to the United States for educational purposes, especially after the Second World War, led many Muslims from Arabic and South Asian countries to stay in the United States after completing a degree. As a consequence, most American Muslims are well educated and well-placed economically. American Muslims’ income is identical to the American average; i.e., they “are middle class and mostly mainstream”. (7) By contrast, in Germany Muslims are disproportionately underrepresented in the upper stratum and disproportionately overrepresented in the lower economic stratum of the income range. Overall, German Muslims earn much less than the average German. Similarly, regarding education U.S. Muslims are comparable to the U.S. average whereas the level of education for German Muslims is significantly lower than the average for the total population.

This disparity in Germany can be attributed to the fact that most labor migrants and their families come from under-educated class backgrounds. The discussion of social problems in Germany is often conflated with questions of faith traditions, such that Islam is perceived as a “working-class religion” and the religion is blamed for social problems. Here in particular, the German-American dialogue could contribute to refuting this perception and showing that there is no causal connection between faith and social problems. The United States, with its well-educated and socio-economically successful Muslim community, demonstrates this point clearly. Instead of “Islamizing” problems, political will is needed to change the system to ensure that all have equal opportunity and to turn what Muslims and members of immigrant backgrounds have to offer into an advantage.

Common Good

The high education level and the relatively high income of U.S. Muslims are mirrored in the professionalism and the visionary focus of American Muslim organizations that have grown over past years. Organizations such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council conduct very professional public relations and combine this with a theologically well-grounded vision of an “American Islam.” The Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago (CIOGC), which consists mainly of mosques, has achieved a very good reputation and many U.S. Muslims view this organization as a model for the development of regional and state-wide organizations in other parts of the U.S. This year’s “MuslimAction!Day,” organized by the CIOGC, is not only proof of Muslims’ adherence to democratic rules, but the foci on education reform, opposition to online gambling, and reduction of greenhouse emissions, also show that Muslims have begun to grapple more with issues of communal welfare.

The only topic that had a direct relation to the Muslim community aimed at strengthening Arabic language instruction in public schools. But even this topic was put in an American context: as an issue that is good for the community and good for America, namely, that knowledge of Arabic is important for enhancing security and increasing the global competitiveness of the United States. Another example of social engagement is the Ummah Community Clinic in California, financed mainly by Muslim doctors, where needy patients are treated regardless of their religion. Muslims in Germany can learn from these organizations and actions that serve society as a whole. Until now, Muslims and Muslim organizations in Germany focus their work primarily on religious and political topics that concerns them. If Muslims in Germany were able to get involved in debates and action for the common good, they would meet their religious obligations as well as improve the perception of Islam more than any campaign would.


Public opinion polls have indicated that Muslims in Germany as well as in the United States are more religious than the average in their respective societies. However, the U.S. population as a whole is much more religious than the German population and German society is furthermore deeply shaped by the “hegemonic knowledge regime of secularism”. (8) The decrease of religiosity in Germany is seen not only as a reality but as something necessary and progressive for a modern society and an enlightened Europe. This circumstance explains the remark of a German Member of Parliament that “All religions can be thrown into a bag and beaten, there is no difference.” (9) She wanted to express her liberal view that all religions are devoid of relevance, not only Islam. She was probably not aware of the antireligious component of her statement.

The fact that this Social Democratic politician was the representative for Islam of her parliamentary group (Islambeauftragte) and comes from a “Turkish-Muslim” background reveals much about the representation of religious Muslims in the political process in Germany. Secular German society makes it difficult for Muslims, and especially organized Muslims, to play a part in political and civil society debates. The previously made suggestions to Muslims to engage more forcefully for the common welfare can thus only be successful if German society opens itself more toward religious actors and overcomes, or at least tames, its fear of religions. (10) On the other side, in the U.S. there is a long tradition of integrating immigrants into society through their religions and the political and civic engagement of their religious institutions.

Common Challenges

The debate about Muslims is very much focused on religious and cultural aspects in Germany, for example, the headscarf ban for Muslim teachers or the so-called Muslim Test as part of the naturalization application in Baden-Württemberg, which is administered only to Muslims to prove their loyalty to Germany by asking them moral questions (i.e., attitudes toward homosexuality). While Muslims in both Germany and the U.S. have complained about discrimination through national measures such as racial profiling and searches of mosques, the impact of this topic is more pronounced in the U.S. (11) Although there are significant contextual differences, in both countries large Muslim mainstream organizations are facing difficulties in talking to authorities and there continue to be attempts at delegitimizing these organizations by governments. 

A State-Sanctioned Islamic Church?

Muslim organizations in Germany have not yet achieved the same rights as the Christian churches and Jewish religious communities. This is especially problematic in terms of the introduction of Islamic religious education conducted in German in public schools, one of the most important and recognized forms of cooperation between the state and religious organizations. 

The then Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble initiated the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz) in 2006 to find a solution to these problems. The conference convened regularly multiple times a year until mid-2009 and was comprised of fifteen state and fifteen Muslim representatives. All conference participants, including those from the Muslim side, were selected by the Ministry of the Interior: five representatives of large Muslim organizations and ten intellectuals, authors, and activists with a “Muslim” background, some of whom were—in the opinion of a large number of German migration scholars—anti-Muslim and stoked prejudices against Islam. (12)

The German Islam Conference succeeded in creating a dialogue between the German state and Muslims on a high level for the very first time. The interior minister told the German Bundestag on the occasion of the inaugural conference, “Islam is part of Germany and part of Europe, it is part of our present and part of our future. Muslims are welcome in Germany.” This was a very important statement by a politician from the conservative Christian Democratic Union and definitely strengthened the acceptance of Islam in Germany. However, at the end of the conference only non-binding recommendations were passed, because religious issues are a matter of Länder (regional governments) authority in Germany. A dialogue on the federal level is thus largely symbolic.  The Islam Conference was also compared to invitations from Napoleon Bonaparte to the “Great Sanhedrin” in 1806, an attempt by the Emperor to give the diverse Jewish community in France a common political structure through an obligatory summit. This attempt failed.

The Islam Conference also failed in its attempt to develop “a Muslim representation” because political representation is the duty of parliamentarians and civil society organizations, which also include institutions representing migrants. If a religious contact person is needed, then this dialogue can be undertaken only with religious organizations and their representatives, and not with secular Muslim interlocutors, similar to the conventional practice that the state addresses issues concerning Christian religious education with the Christian churches and not with critics of Christianity. The government’s argument that Muslim organizations represent only around 20 percent of Muslims and that the Islam Conference should thus also encompass anti-Muslim and secularist individuals  to mirror the diversity of Islam is not valid for three reasons.
First, about 20 percent of Muslims in Germany are members of a religious organization or mosque. By arguing that the other 3 million Muslims are not members of a religious organization, the government places de facto limits on the collective rights of these 800,000 Muslims by not introducing, for example, religious education in public schools or religious assistance in hospitals as is granted to the Christian churches or the Jewish community, This is neither logical nor does it correspond to the German Basic Law, which accords these collective rights to religions regardless of their size.

Second, for a long time the standard argument of politicians was that the existing Muslim umbrella organizations should create one organization in order to enjoy the same rights as the Christian churches. In particular this was directed to the four large national Muslim organizations which represent around 80 percent of the mosques in Germany. (13) Under pressure from the German government, these four organizations united in 2006 to form the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland). This was the desired “one contact” organization and represented a large majority of the mosques, but then a new argument was made by the government that this organization represents only around 800,000 Muslims. These inconsistent arguments by politicians, which are viewed by many Muslims as rather tactical, led to a large reduction of trust and de-motivated Muslims in general to conduct further organizational changes to adapt to the German religious constitutional law (Religionsverfassungsrecht).

Third, it is not appropriate for the state to demand only one contact organization, as Muslims have very diverse confessional and ethnic backgrounds. Many different denominations of Christian churches are recognized by the state, so why should it be different for Muslims? Should politicians continue to ask for one umbrella organization, they should direct their demands to the 20 percent of mosques that are not part of the Coordination Council  and discuss with them how to involve them in the process. To ask the Coordination Council  to integrate 3 million Muslims that have not yet been organized and have perhaps no religious aspirations and interests (for example concerning Muslim religious education in schools or the construction of new mosques) is neither possible nor useful.

If the new government intends to continue the Islam conference, it should consider viewing the mosque as the central organizational entity of Muslim life in Germany. A legitimate religious representation of Muslims in Germany can be built only on the mosques.  The mosques also fulfill all criteria to have a federation of mosques legally recognized as a religious community: they are comprised of “natural members” and are responsible for “comprehensive belief implementation” (umfassende Glaubensverwirklichung).  To accomplish this, however, it is necessary that the Turkish Muslim organizations concentrate more strongly on their work in Germany; for example, a first step would be to relax the formal connection of the DITIB with the Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey.  This could be achieved through a new chairman who is not a representative of the Turkish embassy and whose primary home is in Germany, something that was already suggested by a group of politically-engaged Muslims in Düsseldorf. (14) This “cutting the cord” to Turkey needs to be accompanied by German foreign policy measures that should be consistent, decisive, and publicly conducted. 

To the credit of then-interior minister Schäuble, the dialogue with Muslims on the highest level was initiated in an open and respectful manner, but he did not demonstrate concretely how one would place Muslim institutions on an equal footing with the Christian churches and Jewish organizations.  In secular Germany, it is not easy for a politician to communicate to the public that mosques and mosque organizations generally perceived as conservative should be accepted partners of the state.  The hope of producing a moderate Islam through state intervention in which one brings anti-Muslims and conservative Muslims to a conference table does not add up and should be jettisoned. The emergence of a German Islam requires time and space and can emerge only from the religious community itself.

A further problem that hinders the development of several Muslim organizations is the work of the federal and state offices for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz). These offices also observe Muslim organizations that denounce violence, preach no hatred, and recognize the Basic Law.  Through the inclusion in a yearly report on constitutional protections these organizations are stigmatized and then cannot easily participate in civil society and political life. The allegation against these so-called “legalistic Islamist” organizations is that they undermine the democratic order in Germany in the long-run. What exactly is meant by this is unclear; the terms are defined by politicians and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and are more than questionable from a scholarly perspective.  These interpretations are especially problematic if already wearing head scarves or slaughtering according to Islamic rites (halal) are already counted as “Islamist” activities. (15)

Official stigmatization leads to the weakening of the liberal wings within the mosques and Islamic organizations.  The state’s actions serve as an argument for the conservative forces to refuse a further opening of Muslim institutions and mindsets, as Muslims see themselves confronted by an attempt at forced assimilation to a secular way of life that goes far beyond the requests for loyal and tolerant citizens.  With such surveillance and constraint, according to Islam expert Werner Schiffauer, German society is losing more and more its vibrancy and power of persuasion and impedes the often cited internal acceptance of the German state, which is expected from Muslims. (16)

U.S.: Stigmatization of Muslim Organizations

In his speech in Cairo, President Barack Obama alluded to two important aspects of Muslim life in the U.S.  First, Muslims’ right to practice their religion may not be curtailed under the disguise of liberalism. He emphatically pointed out the right to wear a head scarf, without restriction. This view also corresponds to the reality in the U.S., where Muslims normally have no problems with the head scarf. If there is a problem, then it is usually solved quickly by an intervention of the national Muslim civil rights groups or the Department of Justice.
A far larger problem was also identified by President Obama in Cairo: “In the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation.” (17) The so-called Zakat is one of the five main pillars of Islam and compels Muslims to give a portion of their yearly wealth to the poor.  President George W. Bush’s announcement after 9/11 of actions against the welfare organizations that allegedly support terrorism led to far-reaching consequences that go beyond the matter of charitable giving.

According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) countless Muslim welfare organizations were closed without fair evidence in the last few years.  Not only were the organizations forbidden, but the donors were also harassed by security authorities.  The ACLU Report “Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity” demonstrated that the Treasury Department had a free hand and often followed the principle of “guilt by association.” Of the six closed organizations, only one, the Holy Land Foundation, has been convicted so far.  Because the prosecutors did not persuade the jury in the first trial of the guilt of the accused (resulting in a mistrial), the matter was passed to a second trial and sentencing occurred only in 2008.  The charge: the help for the needy also indirectly benefited Hamas.

The Holy Land Foundation case was important because a list of unindicted co-conspirators (UCC) was released—by a United States attorney—which contained large mainstream organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and North American Islamic Trust (NAIT).  According to the ACLU, the listing is based on no concrete cases or evidence and the organizations did not have the opportunity to oppose being named in the list.  ISNA is one of the largest Muslim organizations in the U.S. and supports Muslim communities through the development of educational programs, social and outreach programs, and has been active in interreligious dialogue for many years.  CAIR is the most important civil rights organization that intervenes in cases of discrimination and conducts a very effective media policy to portray Muslim perspectives in the discussion.  NAIT owns the titles to approximately 300 mosques, Islamic centers, and schools to protect the property of Muslims in the long term.  According to the ACLU, with this UCC list the reputations of these mainstream organizations are unfairly and irreparably damaged. (18)

The UCC list with the names of over 300 people and organizations, which should not have been made public according to Department of Justice guidelines, was probably a “legal tactic” as it was formulated by the leading prosecutor to introduce hearsay evidence in the case. This has caused many Muslims in the U.S. to suspect that this was also a politically motivated action to stigmatize the mentioned organizations and other objectionable people. This would resemble extrajudicial punishment, which is not in accordance with the spirit of the American Constitution. (19)

The compilation and publication of the UCC list resulted not only in a curtailment of donations by Muslims to the Muslim welfare organizations, but also to a Muslim concern about engaging with the large Muslim religious, social, and political organizations, not to mention about taking over a leadership function.  This UCC list and other measures such as the assignment of informants in mosques led to a large uncertainty for U.S. Muslims and is counterproductive for the integration of U.S. Muslims and for the fight against terrorism. If it does not reverse the tactics of the FBI and the UCC list in some form, the new administration will be unable to lead a credible dialogue with Muslims


A dialogue about the experiences of Muslim integration in Germany and the U.S. could be made fruitful for all of the challenges ahead —even though they differ in terms of migration history, the meaning of religion in both societies, and socio-economic conditions. Five basic conclusions emerge from the above analysis.

1. German and European politicians and officials should use the experience of the relative well-educated and socio-economically successful US-Muslim community to demonstrate to the public that there is no causal connection between the muslim faith and social problems. In fact in Europe this is a kind of coincidence, should be treated separately and the focus must be to ensure equal opportunity and to turn what Muslims and members of immigrant backgrounds have to offer into an advantage.

2. With an eye on the further dialogue, a focus should rest on the situation of Hispanics in the U.S. and Muslims in Europe, and on the (old) discourse on Catholicism in the U.S. and the discussion over Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. In terms of political measures in the United States and Germany, it is of central importance that one take seriously mainstream Muslim organizations and societies.   An attempt to delegitimize these institutions would weaken important facilitators and infrastructures for political and civic participation.

4. With an eye on the Muslim community, the building of an inner-Muslim transatlantic network and the exchange of ideas promises worldwide effects. Here the central issue is that, in the future, Muslims must more strongly engage in the common good of their  local western societies without losing sight of their responsibility for the global Muslim community (Ummah) and total humanity. A stronger dialogue between Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic can lead to these challenges being more effectively and courageously approached.  Thus, one can arrive at Islamic-based solutions that are appropriate for a globalized world and contribute to justice and freedom.

5. The integration of Muslims has a central meaning for the consolidation of democratic institutions in Europe and the U.S.  Success in this case can help to broadcast a new attractiveness of western democracies around the entire world.  Additionally, the experiences of Muslims in the western democracies can be a beacon for the Muslim world, as debates over democracy, religious freedom, and tolerance are clearly crystallizing.



The statistical data in this text comes from the following four studies:
Muslim Americans – Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEW Research Center, 2007.
Muslim Americans: A National Portrait - An in-depth analysis of America´s most diverse religious community, GALLUP, 2009. 
Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland – im Auftrag der Deutschen Islamkonferenz, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009.
Religionsmonitor 2008 - Muslimiche Religiösität in Deutschland. Überblick zu religiösen Einstellungen und Praktiken, Berteslmann Foundation, 2008.

1“Muslime in Europa sind Gefahr für USA,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 April 2006.
2 “Marshall Plan für Europas Muslime“, Die Welt, 23 February 2007.
3 Sylviane A. Diouf (1998): Servants of Allah – African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas, New York/London, New York University Press.
4 José Casanova (2007): Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: An EU/U.S. Comparison, In: Thomas Banchoff: Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism, Oxford University Press, p. 61.
5 Huntington, Samuel (2004): Who Are We: The Challenge to America´s national identity, New York/NY, Simon and Schuster; Zolberg, Aristide; Woon, Long Litt (2008/1999): Why Islam Is Like Spanish. Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States. In: Arisdide Zolberg: How Many Exceptionalisms? Explorations in Comparative Macroanalysis. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, p. 286–319.
6 GALLUP, Muslim Americans: A National Portrait, p. 20.
7 Muslim Americans – Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEW Research Center, 2007;
8 José Casanova (2007): Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: An EU/U.S. Comparison, In: Thomas Banchoff: Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism, Oxford University Press, p. 62.
9 Member of Parliament Lale Akgün (Socialdemocrats), Neue Aspekte der Integration – Islam und Frauen, NAVEND Zentrum für kurdische Studien e.V. /Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin, December 12, 2007
10 Jose Casanova (2009): Europas Angst vor der Religion, Berlin University Press
11 Open Society Institute (2009): Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Ineffective, and Discriminatory; Louise A. Cainkar (2009): Homeland Insecurity: The Arab-American and Muslim American Experience after 9/11, Russell Sage Foundation
12 Gerechtigkeit für die Muslime. Die deutsche Integrationspolitik stützt sich auf Vorurteile. Petition von 60 Migrationsforschern. 
13 Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion (DITIB), Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren
14 „Notwendige Schritte hin zu einem geregelten Dialog zwischen der Landesregierung und einer Vertretung von Musliminnen und Muslimen in NRW“, Discussion Paper of the Working Group „Green Muslims“ in the Green Party.
15 “Islamismus und Mehrheitsgesellschaft” by Lutz Irrgang, Head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the Federal State Hesse.
16 Werner Schiffauer (2007): Verwaltete Sicherheit – Präventionspolitik und Integration, In: Migrationsreport 2006, Für den Rat der Migration hrsg. Von Michael Bommes/Werner Schiffauer, Frankfurt/New York, p. 113-163
17 White House/The Press Office: Remarks by the president on a new beginning, June 4, 2009.
18 ACLU, June 18, 2008.
19 Statement U.S. Attorney: Extrajudicial punishment: Ira P. Robbins (2004): Guilty without Charge: Assessing the Due Process Rights of Unindicted Co-Conspirators, Federal Courts Law Review, Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 1, p. 21.


This Essay was firts published in: American Institute for contemporary studies – The Johns Hopkins University, AICGS ISSUE BRIEF 33, December 2009.

Bild entfernt.

Mounir Azzaoui is an ERP-Fellow of the German National Merit Foundation (Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes) and Research Associate at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University. (Photo: Yasin Alder)